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This dissertation has its origin in discussions that I had with Sam Baker while 
taking a course on Romantic poetry several years ago.  Steering away from canonical 
Romantic authors, I ran across the poetry of Charlotte Smith.  Smith piqued my curiosity 
and gave birth to a desire to read through a body of remarkable texts from the Romantic 
period that I was encountering for the first time.  While the studies in Feeling Forgotten 
represent a point of culmination of many years of intellectual labor, I believe that they 
also give me a strong basis for future work.   
Needless to say, I am deeply indebted to the members of my committee, mentors 
past and present, and many colleagues.  At UT-Austin, Sam Baker has been a constant 
source of inspiration and advice; a great deal of this dissertation simply would not have 
been written without his timely suggestions and contributions.  Without the support, lucid 
advice, and seemingly endless supply of patience invested in me by my committee co-
chairs, Alexandra Wettlaufer and Lisa Moore, over the course of many, many years, I 
don’t know how I would have found the stamina to complete this dissertation.  Working 
for the American Comparative Literature Association under the supervision of Elizabeth 
Richmond-Garza has also taught me to see our field from new perspectives.  The many 
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lively discussions that I have had over the years with my colleagues Olin Bjork and John 
Pedro Schwartz have been a constant source of intellectual inspiration.    
At UW-Milwaukee, I first discovered that I actually had something called 
“intellectual curiosity” while taking courses with Roy Arthur Swanson and Marcus 
Bullock in the Program in Comparative Literature.  Without their graceful willingness to 
respond to my ideas, I would never have thought of pursuing graduate work in literature.  
At UW-Madison, I discovered a love of classic literature while reading Dante and 
Petrarch with Christopher Kleinhenz.  My later understanding of what it means to be a 
committed literary critic was deeply informed by working with Mary Layoun, Prospéro 
Saíz, Jane Tylus and my graduate student colleagues in the Department of Comparative 
Literature at UW-Madison.   
Finally, I happily acknowledge the deep well of support offered time and again by 
my family, by Andrea, my love, and by Harley, a proverbial “cat of feeling” and constant 
companion through countless hours of reading and writing. 
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Feeling Forgotten charts a shift in late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century 
English literature that is structured on a crisis of memory.  This shift consists in a 
movement towards a literary construction of aesthetic and moral self-forgetfulness that 
draws its intense power from an anxiety about human mortality and historical forgetting.  
Through analyses of texts that depict the need to overcome individual and cultural loss 
through a desire for oblivion, Feeling Forgotten contends that the Romantic period gave 
birth to anti-mnemonic aesthetic in which the displacement of a perceived loss of the 
feeling of lived memories into various literary fictions preserves the past in such a way as 
to answer an unavoidable loss of feeling by asserting that the past, one’s own and others, 
can be felt (again) in the complex affective experience found in reading about the past.   
In a more ambitious sense, Feeling Forgotten attempts to point the way towards 
an understanding of Romantic and post-Romantic nostalgia as a strong rejection of its 
melancholic forbearers and as a response to late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century 
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self-forgetting.  Indeed, the rejection of this more complex Romantic form of nostalgia, 
one in which the always frustrated attempt to inscribe forgetfulness itself into the text of 
memory is productive of the ongoing act of writing, would become the founding principle 
for later forms of nostalgia that seek to render forgetting as an act that resides outside the 
written text.  Based on a reorientation of Charlotte Smith’s poetic archive of feelings, 
which defines feeling as the failure of poetry to contain and defuse feelings themselves, 
and the passionate rationalism of William Godwin’s early nineteenth century texts, in 
which self-analysis serves as both the generator and corruptor of the sympathetic feelings 
found in sentimental literature, Walter Scott’s passive, amnesiac romances stage the 
fantasy of an evasion from the political and material significance of history. 
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I feel and I forget.  A nostalgia – the same one that everyone feels for everything – invades me as if it were 
an opium in the cold air. … So many times, so many, like now, it has oppressed me to feel myself feel – to 
feel anguish just because it’s a feeling, restlessness because I’m here, nostalgia for something I’ve never 
known, the sunset of all emotions. 
-Fernando Pessoa, The Book of Disquietude 
 
In beginning this project, it would seem appropriate to address the embedded 
references included within its title.  Feeling forgotten: what is significance of this phrase?  
As I hope will become clear, I wish to go down the two different routes that can be taken 
here: on the one hand, forgotten feelings and, on the other, feeling forgotten.  Embedded 
within the single phrase, and in the broadest possible terms, I hope to explore the ways in 
which forgotten feelings, an inspiration for and consequence of re-examining past 
experiences, are tied tightly to the feeling of being forgotten, or, to experiences that 
alienate or isolate individuals from their present moment or social milieu.  Indeed, the 
intimacy of the self’s evaluative and critical relation to itself based on feeling is seen to 
threaten the way in which the individual thinks of or even recognizes itself in a variety of 
historical and political circumstances.   
In the first chapter, I use a poem by John Keats to begin to consider the contorted, 
temporal complexity of this notion.  Keats’s poem is meant to act as a tuning fork for 
many of the readings throughout this project, one which sounds with a concern over 
forgotten feelings which can never be re-experienced in their imagined totality.  This 
anxiety over the past comes to haunt the present to the degree that feelings are no longer 
tied directly to self-forgetful, unconscious immediate experience, but become dissociated 
from the subject who feels them.  When I (wish to) remember the experiences of the past, 
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what and who is it that I am encountering?  From this perspective, is it not also equally 
important to recognize that I am forgetting the past in the very moment that I remember 
it, that forgetting is not simply an unavoidable and natural blanking or erasing of the 
screen of memory, but a process or discourse that has its own history and feelings 
associated with it?  As Harald Weinrich intimates in his book, Lethe: The Art and 
Critique of Forgetting, we are quite used to thinking of memory and history as almost 
interchangeable terms, and of forgetting as an activity which we do not control and that 
threatens both memory and history.1  In spite of these ingrained habits, Weinrich states 
that we must recognize that forgetting is another mode of interacting with the world and 
ourselves, and that its processes exert a tremendous power.  Indeed, in highlighting the 
interplay, processes and discourses of forgetting and feeling, I feel that this project offers 
an alternate lens for viewing many of the authors and their texts in the period.   
One of the decisions that I made in this project needs to be explained further, and 
it involves the choice of texts and the resonance that these texts have regarding any 
subterranean argument about gender.  From a certain perspective, it would be 
understandable to assume that this project situates Charlotte Smith as a poet who explores 
the limits of the lyric through an investigation into private feelings that are forgotten, 
whereas Godwin and Scott explore how the forgotten ought or ought not to be feelingly 
written into the public register of history.  In the beginning of my chapter on Smith, I 
employ the apparently modest image of sea-shells to orient a reading of her poems as 
based on a rejection or critique of the Wordsworthian natural sublime; in this sense, 
                                                 
1 Harald Weinrich, Lethe: The Art and Critique of Forgetting, translated by Steven Rendell (Cornell: 
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Smith sees herself and her poetry as located within the temporal, natural world rather 
than attempting to stand powerfully outside of it.  Indeed, if Smith can be seen as positing 
a space outside of this world, it is not one that assumes the privileged role of human 
agency or its works in establishing a frame or form of control over the natural.  Rather, it 
is one that sees natural time from two conflicting perspectives, and then speaks feelingly 
about this conflict that poses threats to individual human identity; in other words, Smith’s 
poetry places the recognizable form of a cyclical natural world, understood through the 
seasons and their return, against a more progressive or apocalyptic view of history that 
has a single beginning and ending.  Rather than finding comfort in either view of history, 
Smith chooses to amplify the loss of the material, individual memories in both and uses 
this amplification to chart out a different way of considering the transmission of 
memories from one individual or period of history to another.    
To this degree, my argument is explicitly invested in very close readings of 
Smith’s complex poetry in an attempt to argue for her importance as a poet invested in an 
uncompromising exploration of the variations of a Romantic strain of forgetting that runs 
against the critical evaluations of the period.2  However, I would like to acknowledge 
                                                                                                                                                 
Cornell University Press, 2004).   
2 In one sense, thinking of the rhetoric of health that subtends the discussions of memory in traditional 
reading of the Romantic period, forgetting may have been forgotten, displaced or quarantined as a virulent 
strain within that field.  By strain, I would also wish to highlight for Smith the musical definition of the 
term as a refrain or recognizable section of melody.  In her sonnet “On the Sonnets of Mrs. Charlotte 
Smith" (1791), Jane West points towards this reading of Smith as one including the recognition of a 
musical strain as a private performance that must remain unbroken: “Thy strains soul-harrowing melting 
pity hears, / Yet fears to break thy privacy of pain, / She blots thy page with sympathetic tears, / And while 
she mourns thy wrongs enjoys thy strain.”  In contemporary critical evaluations of Smith, unlike West’s 
evocative reply, this strain is quite evident in the way that Smith’s melancholy is heard as monotonous.  I 
would point beyond the confines of this project and suggest that Smith’s attempts to consider a proper 
register for “responses” to her own lyric poetry (critical or poetic) could be explored more fully as a means 
for investigating how Smith envisions an alternate form of history based not on the ideal and inherently 
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here that Charlotte Smith was also very explicitly invested in the public, and in many 
respects she was viewed as a public figure not only by the French revolutionaries who 
lauded her, but also by her fellow British citizens.  On the one hand, Smith’s popular 
novels explore the resonances of public memory and forgetting quite often.  For example, 
although Scott was thought to bring the term oubliette (“forgotten place”) back into 
circulation in poems such as “Marmion” (1808), in which a woman is buried alive, or 
novels such as Ivanhoe (1819), in which Scott references the oubliette as a “cell of 
forgetfulness, in which those were imprisoned who were doomed never to revisit the 
light,”3 or Anne of Geierstein; or The Maiden of the Mist (1825), Smith discusses in quite 
painful terms the oubliette in her novel The Banished Man (1794) as a forgotten place or 
black site for the torture and execution of revolutionary sympathizers.  Whereas Smith 
locates this Gothic device within the contemporary present, Scott safely positions it back 
within the Gothic past, putting it within the hands of villainous nuns in a convent in the 
twelfth century.  Considered in relation to Smith’s poetry and its resonances with Mary 
Wollstonecraft, the oubliette may be considered a symbol that gives voice to the private 
experience of suffering against the attempts by those who write histories which legitimate 
the suffering that is inflicted in their names.  In ways that are familiar to readers of female 
novelists of the period, it also makes explicit comparisons between the experience of 
those put directly within “forgotten places,” such as slaves or political and national 
enemies, to those who experience this kind of suffering as “legitimate” citizens within the 
                                                                                                                                                 
evaluative form of Hegelian history (based on objective categories that stand the test of time) but upon the 
strange materiality of memories passed and refigured from one voice to another as variations on an elusive 
theme.     
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borders of the nation and within their own minds.  Smith, like Wollstonecraft and 
Godwin, takes numerous Gothic conventions like the oubliette and literalizes them within 
a familiar world (British women and children, for example, are like slaves, captives or 
enemies) in order to critique the impersonal infliction of suffering that Godwin will also 
explore in Fleetwood.   
In addition, one of the more forgotten texts by Smith, and one which I would have 
liked to explore in more detail, is a public elegy.  Writing for the financial benefit of the 
survivors of a shipwreck near Weymouth, Smith penned the narrative of “The Wrecking 
of the Catharine, Venus, Piedmont, Thomas, Golden Grove and Aelous” in 1795.4      
Beyond the novelistic explorations in which the private and the public are seen as 
occupying different spaces and times (a difference that the forces of public history 
violently police), this piece demonstrates the extent to which Smith considered private 
sorrow as public sorrow; similar to the way in which Smith literalized Gothic 
conventions within a familiar world, so too does she see herself as literalizing public 
sorrow through private suffering.  In reading Smith’s poetry, we must always remember 
that public sorrow is not excluded or forgotten, but that which Smith gives form through 
the example of her individual voice.   
Smith begins the piece on the shipwreck in the following way, and I excerpt at 
length both to demonstrate the way in which the private and public are wedded together 
                                                                                                                                                 
3 Found in Ian Duncan’s note to Walter Scott, Ivanhoe: A Romance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1989), 579. 
4 Charlotte Smith, “The Wrecking of the Catharine, Venus, Piedmont, Thomas, Golden Grove and Aelous” 
(London: Sampson Low; and C. Law, 1795).  Below the title, the description of this piece would be apt as 
title for a sonnet, given its description of the place-name: “Narrative of the Loss of the Catharine, Venus, 
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for Smith and to invoke it as a kind of ghostly presence when I turn to explicit analyses of 
Smith’s poetry:  
Under the depression of sorrow that can end only with my life, and vainly 
contending against the weight of oppression, heavy is prolonged, I should not 
have entered upon so mournful a talk as this, had not some of the gentlemen, who 
have already so benevolently exerted themselves on behalf of the unfortunate 
person who escaped (with her life only) from the scene of destruction, believed, 
that a name, to which the public has showed some partiality,' might be useful in 
promoting farther their humane intention and, that being accustomed to fictitious 
narrative, I might be enabled to arrange, for publication, the information with 
which they have for that purpose furnished me; and to connect, in one detail, 
several detached anecdotes of calamity, alas ! but too real!   Some also, among the 
respectable friends of those who perished 'on the fatal Eighteenth of November, 
have expressed their wishes that such an account of this catastrophe might be 
made public.  Affection for the memory of those they deplore naturally induces 
them to desire, that their country, to the service of which the days of these brave 
men were dedicated, should join in the tribute of just regret; and that to their 
private sorrows should be added, those of a Nation on so sad a conclusion to 
useful and honorable lives.  These motives, added to my wish to contribute all I 
have to give, my time, to assist the unfortunate person in question, have together 
induced me to suspend, for a few days, the labour. I am condemned to for the 
                                                                                                                                                 
Piedmont, Thomas, Golden Grove and Aelous Merchant Ships, near Weymouth, on Wednesday the 18th of 
November Last, Drawn up from Information taken on the Spot.”, 
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support of my own plundered family; and I shall receive great satisfaction, if the 
Public accepts my attempt with so much favour as to make it answer the purpose 
for which it is intended. (3, my emphases) 
Without going into too much well-deserved detail on this remarkable passage, in which 
we can hear quite distinctly the effort and hedging by Smith to position herself as a public 
female elegist, we can see here that Smith considers her role as a writer as one in which 
the private is “added” or included within those of a “Nation,” as the “public has showed 
some partiality,” and which therefore gives to the private suffering chronicled in the 
Elegiac Sonnets a demonstrable purpose.  For the Sonnets, a desire to forget suffering is 
given a form of memory that preserves or perhaps respects and taken seriously that very 
desire. For Smith, the purpose of lyric poetry, as found in her Sonnets, is not to console 
suffering but to give it a voice, even if the very desire of that voice (to be forgotten) 
strains against the form in which it is sounded.  In detailed explorations of a grotesque 
Gothic torture device, such as the oubliette, depictions of real private sorrow in the public 
elegy, or sonnets that provide a melancholy archive for very private, personal suffering, 
Smith is always working to create in a public sphere that is not based on the wreckage of 
the private, one might say, but on a sympathetic or “partial” attunement to the soundings 
and voices of those which are forgotten.    
As found explicitly in Smith’s public elegy, forgetting maintains a metaphorical 
refuge in the act of survival or living on.  Indeed, Smith was commissioned to write the 
elegy by the survivors of the dead, and as we shall see, Godwin’s own formulation of 
survival addresses the role of forgetting in survival.  In considering the sensation of 
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experience of surviving, then, the feeling of forgetting that I chart in this project may in 
some respects resemble the experience of the sublime, which focuses on the survival of 
consciousness in its encounter with forces that threaten it with extinction.  For the 
purposes of this project, sublime disinterestedness, purposelessness, or the category of the 
poetic-philosophical impersonal, whether derived from Kant and other German idealist or 
transcendental philosophers, Wordsworth or his Victorian apologists, such as Arnold and 
others, are not derived from but are substitutions or re-inscriptions for what I am 
highlighting as forgotten feeling.5  Although they have distinctly different ends, Smith, 
Godwin and Scott resist the category of the sublime in order to make their own criticisms 
against the powerful return of consciousness that has survived its encounter with finitude 
or death by focusing on the role of the imagination in anticipating survival.  What does 
this entail in this project?  The imagination plays a strong role in memory and forgetting 
here because it appears as the only category capable of giving shape to a future in which 
the present survives in some form or a past from which the present has survived.    
Quite clearly, it is in this respect that the events of the French Revolution (1789) 
and the Reign of Terror (1793-4) that followed are key touchstones for the concerns that 
                                                 
5 In The Politics of Aesthetics: Nationalism, Gender, Romanticism, a book that has inspired many of the 
directions taken in this project, Marc Redfield provides a trenchant critique of Arnoldian disinterestedness, 
for example, and its relation to aesthetics as a hidden political agenda: “to be sure, the priests of high 
culture and the postmodern cultural critics differ in their attitude toward the possibility of ‘disinterested’ 
aesthetic judgments.  But under inspection, this difference turns into a knot of interfiliations and 
ambiguities.  Disinterestedness can never be absolute or pure in traditional aesthetic discourse.  One must 
always be able to return – invigorated, educated – to the workaday world of intentions, meaning, and 
action.  Translated into the language of politics: disinterested criticism, according to Matthew Arnold, 
keeps its distance from ‘the political, social, humanitarian sphere’ in the hope that it may ‘perhaps one day 
make its benefit felt even in this sphere, but in a natural and thence irresistible manner’” (2).  In making 
these claims, Redfield seeks to complicate the notion of the aesthetic and makes the claims of the political 
upon aesthetic representations or experience less immediate and more complex.  In my own modest way in 
this project, I also seek to trouble the investment that political, philosophical or national discourses have in 
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Smith or Godwin, and Scott have with memory and forgetting as related to private and 
personal histories and their imaginative representations in works of art.  Or ought we to 
say, a key touchstone?  Are the Revolution and the Terror the same historical event, or is 
one a direct refutation of the principles of the other?  In the great majority of Romantic 
studies, the answer to this question determines how the period and the intentions of its 
authors are read.  For the purposes of this project, it may do well to refer to the 
revolutionary, military leader and key architect of what would later be actually referenced 
as the Reign of Terror, Louis Antoine Léon de Saint-Just.  One of Saint-Just’s maxims 
narrates the relation of the ‘citizen’ to the nation:  “The citizen first has relations only 
with his conscience and morality; should he forget them, he has a relation with the law; 
should he scorn the law, he is no longer a citizen: here begins his relation with power.”6  
Another maxim by Saint-Just states, “A republican government has as its principle virtue, 
if not terror” (227, my emphasis).  The form of memory advocated by Saint-Just is, in 
most respects, a form of legal, virtuous terror that exists within the “conscience” and 
“morality” of the citizen.  At the same time, the ‘citizen’ that Saint-Just describes cannot 
possibly have a real existence, as it is meant to be a figure that the people of France were 
meant to keep constantly in mind as a form of terror, as well as a figure through which 
Saint-Just was able to exert brutal, impersonal power.  To forget that one is subject to this 
kind of “law” is not a private act, as if one were harmlessly forgetting a fact or an event; 
rather, it is the condition for the exertion of material power masquerading as the law.   
                                                                                                                                                 
aesthetic representations.  Truth be told, I feel that the authors studied in this project make claims for the 
difficult divestment of the political, philosophical, and national from the aesthetic.   
6 Quoted from Maurice Blanchot, The Infinite Conversation, translated by Susan Hanson (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1992), 226.    
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The imagination is no longer operating within the individual, but is given shape 
and force: whereas Frederic Jameson famously pronounced, “history is what hurts,” we 
might consider Smith, Godwin, and even Scott, as adding imagination to that formula.  
Contextualizing the formal close readings that I give in the chapter on Godwin is his 
explicit critique and rejection of the tyranny of imagined forgetting that lies at the heart 
of memory as a deeply-felt terror, or, a sublime self-forgetting that never allows for the 
return of private, individual consciousness.  While several of the texts studied in this 
project acts as a warning in this regard, they also highlight the divergent ways in which 
their authors attempt to keep alive an ideal hope for the future during a period in which it 
was increasingly threatened.  
11 
Chapter One 
The Life of Forgetting, Forgetting (as) Life:  
Feeling Romantic Memory in Theory and Practice 
 
 
The power of life, as a power of continued life, is equated with forgetting.  It is only in being forgotten and 
thereby transformed that anything survives at all. … Hope is not memory held fast but the return of what 
has been forgotten. 
- Theodor Adorno, Minima Moralia 
 
 
In 1988, Umberto Eco published an article in the PMLA entitled, “An Ars 
Oblivionaris?  Forget it,” in which he attempted to explain why an art or science of 
forgetting would not be possible.  One day, Eco recounts, he found himself speaking with 
a group of academic colleagues.  On a lark, they decide to invent “advertisements for 
university positions in nonexistent disciplines.”1  One of the more interesting calls for 
positions is in “the ars oblivionalis, as opposed to the mnemonic arts.  We had to decide 
whether this art should be classified in the Department of Adynata or in the Department 
of Oxymoronica. The uncertainty, as we shall see, is of no little import.” (254).  Indeed, 
the difference between adynata, a rhetorical figure for the impossible or, more 
cryptically, the expression of the impossibility of expression, and oxymoron, the 
rhetorical figure for the combination of opposites, will be important for Eco’s 
classification of this imaginary science that investigates “the techniques of forgetting” 
(254).   
                                                 
1 Umberto Eco, “An Ars Oblivionaris? Forget it,” PMLA 103 (1988), 254. 
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Approaching forgetting as a science, Eco explores a number of different strategies 
that could produce an anti-mnemonic technique.  All of the approaches that he considers 
fail to pass the test.  According to Eco, “if an art of memory is a semiotics, then we can 
understand why it is not possible to construct an ars oblivionalis on the model of an art of 
memory. If one did, the ars oblivionalis would also be a semiotics, and it is proper to a 
semiotics to make present something absent” (258).  Eco determines that it is impossible 
to forget through rational inquiry because every time that one would try to forget 
deliberately, one would need to call something to mind in order to forget it.  More 
importantly, Eco directs the reader’s attention to the possibility that calling something to 
mind is not an extra-linguistic activity, but the very reason for the existence of language 
as such: indeed, for the purposes of Eco’s article, without language as a means of 
representation, nothing can be recollected.  Based upon an attempt to get outside of 
language through language itself, all that an ars or semiotica oblivionalis can do is to 
confound rational processes rather than make absent something present.  In the end, Eco 
soberly concludes that this science, considered as a technique (ars) or semiotics 
(semiotica), would fit beneath the departmental headings of both adynata and oxymoron: 
“So it has been established why an ars oblivionalis is not possible. It belongs to the 
Department of Adynata because it cannot be realized. But if we understand it to be a 
semiotica oblivionalis, it belongs to the Department of Oxymoronica, because a semiotics 
is by definition a device that stalls natural processes of oblivion” (261).   
To read Eco’s text as an article, however, and as representative of a serious mode 
of inquiry, is to miss a crucial point.  It is important to recognize that this so-called article 
13 
begins with the words, “once, as a joke.”  The irony of the article is to be found in taking 
seriously that which the sobriety of analysis seems to discard; to take Eco’s findings at 
face value and conclude that all this talk of an ars oblivionalis is simply impossible, then, 
is to get the joke.  To this end, the techniques for an ars oblivionalis are discovered in the 
failure to discover any suitable technique, and so a semiotica oblivionalis fails to make 
absent that which is present.  As a sly dig at academia and its pretensions of 
comprehensiveness in increasingly specialized departments, such as the “history of the 
wheel in the pre-Columbian empires, history of painting on Easter Island, Aztec horse 
racing” (254), all of which one could imagine as existing in a university somewhere 
(within a metaphysical “Department of Adynata”) and as contradictory to each other (the 
university as an ever-expanding “Department of Oxymoronica”), Eco’s “article” simply 
“proves” that the limit to this kind of epistemological construction of the world through a 
rigorous logic is discovered in fanciful, imaginary departments that have no techniques to 
teach, no histories to construct and no proper object of study.   
At the same time, Eco’s text seems to pose a yet more troubling question: what is 
it that keeps the alleged absurdity of the “history of painting on Easter Island” as a field 
of study from resembling semiotics or even history itself?  In a more trenchant critique of 
the techniques or cultural semiotics dispensed through existing university departments, 
Eco seems to posit that the study of the world based on an attempt to reign in its vast and 
at times contradictory diversity avoids thinking about the possible impossibility, 
obsolescence or even fictiveness of that which is already known.  In spite of the safety 
and satisfaction expressed through the narrator’s objectivity, Eco intimates that these 
14 
bodies of knowledge can be forgotten, discarded and replaced as easily as the imaginary 
sciences or fields of study that are dismissed by the pseudo-logic of the article’s inquiry.  
Some day, semiotics may be classified and filed away as a curious specimen: semiotica 
oblivionalis. 
Whether it is a serious article in a well-respected academic journal, a short story, a 
joke, or all three at once, Eco draws attention to something that is relevant to my own 
argument.  For Eco, while the passage of time is presented as a transformational 
forgetting that threatens the viability of academic fields of study, it nevertheless provides 
each one of them with glimpses of a categorically unknowable future for which alternate 
means of comprehension are required.  Beneath the veil of a joke, Eco argues that the 
rigorous pursuit of comprehensiveness as a way of knowing the world is no longer 
supported by a faith in a divine or transcendent teleology that determines what ought to 
be remembered, but, rather, by the fiction of what may be forgotten within memory itself.  
And so, if the belief that strategies of memory and recollection, on a personal, societal 
and institutional level will lead to comprehensiveness or the completion of history is 
comedic from the position of Eco’s ironic authorial distance, then the uses and abuses of 
memory to forestall an inevitable forgetting signal something more tragic and, in the 
logic of Eco’s text, something decidedly human.  Within Eco’s text it is clear that neither 
the disinterest of comedic objectivity and resolution nor the tragedy of a frustrated, more 
limited, awareness can resist referencing each other.  To this degree, to submit an ars 
oblivionalis to an ars oblivionalis of its own results in a purely formal repetition that is 
both maddening and outrageous, one that transforms progressive understanding into 
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asymptotic analysis: a functional comprehension of comprehending 
incomprehensiveness, or, a purely formal memory of how one misremembers rather than 
any information about the people, places, and events that appears to be available to 
memory via the written text.    
While Eco seems to embrace a postmodern, semiotic playfulness in addressing an 
obstinate forgetting that calls forth both the need and impossibility of memory, I would 
like to call attention to the ways in which forgetting takes an important role in the 
construction and representation of affect and feeling in literature from the Romantic 
period.  For Eco, the operation of memory in referencing itself, or, in coming up with 
various ways to unveil the processes of remembrance as that which must be remembered, 
cannot subsist without reflecting on how it feels to remember or forget.  I wish to closely 
analyze representations and connections of feeling and forgetting, as well as their roles as 
the engines of the development of a consolatory or commiserating subjectivity in British 
Romanticism.  Feeling Forgotten: The Survival of Romantic Memory in Charlotte Smith, 
William Godwin, and Walter Scott, 1784-1815 examines three cases from the Romantic 
period in which the relationships between memory and forgetting were given shape not 
through an ironic rational inquiry, as in Eco, but through elegiac, affective reactions to 
representations of epistemological and cultural limits in works of art, all of which invoke 
the desire for and fear of a forgetting or self-forgetfulness of a more permanent nature.  In 
its most tragic and sharply critical sense, there exists in the work of these authors a 
growing awareness that their own historical period, seen in various guises and compared 
against different epochs, has been plagued by an absence of sympathetic feeling.   
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The feeling of a catastrophic loss of feeling, associated with personal or public 
histories and generated by the sudden disappearance of emotion and the perceived feeling 
of not feeling, engenders in its turn yet more powerful, emotional responses.  As we shall 
see, it is the act of giving an aesthetic, representational form or figure to this turn that 
generates feeling in the first place.  What is the status of an emotion that is employed in 
mourning the loss of emotion itself?  Can anything permanent, final, or irrecoverable 
happen to the notion of “feeling” in an encounter with its own limitations?  How does this 
strange alienation of emotion from itself impact an awareness of history or community 
(that is presented) after affect?  Feelings about feelings that have been, that will or will 
not have been, or are posited as forgotten, give shape to a number of profound, 
fundamental concerns for these authors, all of which have to do with the very possibility 
or impossibility of change and difference, from individual self-development to historical 
progress and national identity, as well as and at times especially in the relation of these 
terms to each other.  
In addressing the possibility of change from the position of feeling change, ending 
or history take place, these authors seem to discover or point towards a representation of 
feeling that resonates beyond the limits of a communicable idea with which it may be 
associated, postulating within feeling a space for something incommunicable and 
interruptive of memory.  For these authors, to conceive of this radical mode of difference, 
of feeling after forgotten feelings, required using the imagination in a negative sense, and 
to consider a sensation that second-generation Romantic poet John Keats would later 
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designate “the feel of not to feel it” in his poem from 1816, “In drear-Nighted 
December:”  
 
In a drear-nighted December,  
   Too happy, happy tree,  
Thy branches ne'er remember  
   Their green felicity:  
The north cannot undo them,  
With a sleety whistle through them;  
Nor frozen thawings glue them  
   From budding at the prime.  
 
In a drear-nighted December,  
   Too happy, happy brook,  
Thy bubblings ne'er remember  
   Apollo's summer look;  
But with a sweet forgetting,  
They stay their crystal fretting,  
Never, never petting  
   About the frozen time.  
 
Ah! would 'twere so with many  
   A gentle girl and boy!  
But were there ever any 
     Writh’d not of passed joy? 
The feel of not to feel it, 
     When there is none to heal it, 
Nor numbed sense to steel it, 
     Was never said in rhyme. 2 
 
In this poem, Keats provides a glimpse into the contorting temporal structure of feeling 
that is more convoluted than Raymond Williams’ formulation, yet that is nevertheless 
tied to the kinds of emotional residues that Williams finds at work in larger social units.3   
                                                 
2 John Keats, Selected Poems, ed. Susan Wolfson (New York: Pearson Longman, 2007), 79-80. 
3 In The Long Revolution, Williams defines the “structure of feeling” as the concentrated remainder of the 
lived experience of a group outside of their institutional organization yet nevertheless tied to the 
representation of that group as a whole in a highly complex way.  What I find fascinating about Williams’ 
discussion of structures of feeling is that, while always gesturing towards a fully comprehensible whole 
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Indeed, feeling becomes associated precisely with that which remains as a trace of what 
cannot be recollected.  Keats suggests that a “passed” joy, a feeling no longer present but 
recollected, is an occasion for emotion, or, “the feel of not to feel” a “passed” joy.  Once, 
Keats seems to say, I was happy, but now, as I am no longer happy, I feel that lost 
emotion more keenly; for Keats, it is perhaps the vocation of the poet to represent 
feelings only in their irretrievable absence.  
At the same time, however, is it more appropriate to say we rather than Keats or 
the poet?  After opening with a reference to the “sweet forgetting” of the natural world, 
the poem pivots on a rhetorical question in the final stanza with two possible responses.  
It is directed to an audience who assuredly must know what it is like to have “writh’d … 
of passed joy,” is bound together by this absence of emotion, and hardly needs to 
respond.  The inhuman alternative, as seen in nature, is to not to have “writh’d of passed 
joy,” an insinuation which seems to haunts the negations which echo throughout the rest 
of the passage.  The buried resonance that passes unseen here is given voice in this 
apocalyptic insight, the possibility that we cannot recall the point at which feeling was 
forgotten, and the continuation or extension of this state of being is the only form of 
memory possible, a stuttering recollection of forgetting unable to overcome or name 
itself.  The line, “when there is none to heal it,” conflates time (“when”) with a 
changeless eternity (“there is”) with nobody present (“none”) and no consolation (“to 
heal it’), an emptiness made the more palpable, paradoxically, in the consequent desire 
for the absence of empirical feelings (“numbed sense”) and language (“never said”) to 
                                                                                                                                                 
picture of a society, they make room for expected social relationships and patterns as well as   
“discontinuities of an unexpected kind” (63).   
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give this non-time a representational expressiveness that has any aesthetic value at all 
(“in rhyme”).  Indeed, it may not be an exaggeration to say that through this poem, for us, 
“joy” is the word that best describes unutterable inner experience because it is to be 
found in the social, shared feeling of “passed joy” that is at once a marker of the absolute 
past, of both the individual and its recollected experience, and that which is passed 
among nameless others as the source of a shared emotion that is different than that which 
is said to be experienced by the individual.  Both passed and past in an interweaving of 
forgetting and recollecting, the structural integrity of this unutterable, impossible “joy” is 
to be found in its loss and in a world that is constructed amongst others upon a social 
feeling beyond language and feeling.4  Keats’ “joy (discovered in a kind of affective 
capability, one might say)5 is to be found in inspiration as both a moment of divine, 
original creation without precedent and in the destruction of this moment’s 
representational possibility in inexpressible suffering and loss that can only be shared 
among individuals.6 
                                                 
 
4 In “The Defense of Poetry,” Shelley describes a version of Keats’s “joy” as the essential, creative act of 
the poet: “creation, with genius, is an expansion, a flowing-forth, of the soul – when it takes heed of 
nothing but its own promptings, and bounds along without thinking how it goes … (The mind) is melting 
all her ideas into one golden stream, which she pours forth with a joy that takes note of nothing but itself” 
(651).  In The Mirror and the Lamp, M.H. Abrams likens this sense of “joy” with Plotinus’s emanation 
philosophy and Wordsworth’s “naturalistic doctrine of the spontaneous overflow of powerful feeling” 
(132).   
5 Keats famously notes the “negative capability” of the work of art, which dwells in its ability to cause the 
viewer to doubt his or her own existence.  By “affective capability,” I am extending Keats’ formulation to 
suggest that the work of art also has the ability to appropriate not only the locus of timeless being, but also, 
the locus of authentic feeling. 
6 Byron alludes to a similar sense of the joy as a necessary forgetfulness of mortality: 
 
 And if I laugh at any mortal thing, 
   ‘Tis that I may not weep; and if I weep, 
 ‘Tis that our nature cannot always bring 
    Itself to apathy, for we must steep 
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Absent feelings and self-forgetting function as markers for Keats in a strange kind 
of non-emotional, silent, and obviated communication, one that has meaning because it 
either survives or predates the demise of communicative language itself.  We might find 
apt expression for the residual power of this strange definition of absent feeling as the 
creative and destructive Romantic “joy” or indeed sublime hope of lived experience for 
Keats that exists in communicating the desire to pass beyond language.7  In Keats’s 
poem, the natural world provides a model for an ahistorical or incommunicable 
experience of joy in “a sweet forgetting” of the past that will “ne’er remember” what has 
come before, even as and precisely because this process of never remembering is passive 
rather than active.  The “feel of not to feel it” marks (the passage of) feeling itself as 
something that is remembered only when it is “ne’er remember(ed),” a phrase in which 
negation is marred and contracted (“ne’er”).      
Whereas Keats explores a communal relationship between feeling and forgetting 
that is felt or sensed in the demise of the language and natural imagery that conveys it, 
                                                                                                                                                 
 Our hearts first in the depths of Lethe’s spring, 
    Ere what we least wish to behold will sleep: 
 Thetis baptized her mortal son in Styx; 
 A mortal mother would on Lethe fix. (Don Juan, 5:204; 4.4.24-32) 
 
The first stanza of Keats’ “Ode on Melancholy” (1819) states, “no, no, go not to Lethe … For shade to 
shade will come too drowsily, / And drown the wakeful anguish of the soul.”  Here, Keats appears to reject 
Lethean forgetfulness and benumbed consciousness in order to preserve lived experience (“the wakeful 
anguish of the soul”), but it should also be noted that Keats attempts to preserve a feeling of anguish that 
structurally mimics the “joy” to which I have been alluding, in that both are markers of an untranslatable 
inner experience that appears elusive to representation.   
7 In The Story of Joy, Adam Potkay describes Wordsworthian joy is driven by the confluence of individual 
and communal experience: “the lyric ‘I’ in Wordsworth is often and unexpectedly interchangeable with a 
communal we, and this is particularly true when Wordsworth addresses the power of joy.  This resonates, 
in a general way, with what I have been calling the paradox of joy, an affect poised always between the 
not-I and the expanding I” (123).  He continues to explain the “recompense” of feelings lost (lost joy, for 
example) with philosophical or ethical insights into the significance of that loss, or thought. 
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Friederich Nietzsche, in the second of his untimely meditations, “On the Uses and 
Abuses of History,” posits a relationship between feeling and forgetting that can be 
discovered through a comparison with nature and history.  In the meditation, Nietzsche 
employs the following example:  a cow, in this instance, exists without ennui or suffering 
because it does not remember.  Because it has no past upon which to ruminate, the cow 
appears content.  At the same time, the contentedness of the animal is not exactly happy 
or joyous because it has nothing with which to compare its present state. It simply exists, 
and is unconcerned with the past as either the source or negation of happiness.  Nietzsche 
uses this example to point to the power of what he calls "active forgetting," a sheer 
abandonment of the past that is beyond the capacities of the cow but nevertheless similar 
to it: 
In the case of the smallest or of the greatest happiness ... it is always the same 
thing that makes happiness happiness: the ability to forget or, expressed in more 
scholarly fashion, the capacity to feel unhistorically during its duration.8 
Nietzsche calls for a rejection of the past as a determining factor for the present because, 
as he says, it "returns as a ghost and disturbs the peace of a later moment" (61).  As an 
antidote to the “sickness” (100) of its historical predicament, he suggests a critical 
discourse on the past that would be attentive to the needs of the present and able to 
distinguish between what in the past is useful and what is harmful for life.  Thus "active" 
forgetting is a kind of selective remembering, one in which not all past forms of 
knowledge and not all experiences are understood as beneficial for present and future life.  
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Active forgetting, then, is part of a broader attempt by Nietzsche to bring to 
consciousness haunting feelings from the past in order to engage them with another kind 
of feeling, an unhistorical feeling that neither escapes from nor overwhelms these 
moments from the past.  Indeed, for Nietzsche, forgetting is important because it has the 
potential to save people from the history to which they appear destined and with which 
they are always burdened, a history that is considered disastrous and repetitious.  Near the 
beginning of the meditation, however, Nietzsche advises caution with respect to both the 
degree of forgetting and the imperative to know or remember the past:  
Imagine the extremest possible example of a man who did not possess the power 
of forgetting at all and who was thus condemned to see everywhere a state of 
becoming: such a man would no longer believe in his own being, would no longer 
believe in himself, would see everything flowing asunder in moving points and 
would lose himself in this stream of becoming: like a true pupil of Heraclitus, he 
would in the end hardly dare to raise a finger. Forgetting is essential to action of 
any kind, just as not only light but darkness too is essential for the life of 
everything organic. A man who wanted to feel historically through and through 
would be like one forcibly deprived of sleep, or an animal that had to live only by 
rumination and ever repeated rumination. Thus it is possible to live almost 
without memory, and to live happily moreover, as the animal demonstrates; but it 
is altogether impossible to live at all without forgetting. Or, to express my theme 
even more simply: There is a degree of sleeplessness, of rumination, of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
8 Friederich Nietzsche,"On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life," in Untimely Meditations. 
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historical sense, which is harmful and ultimately fatal to the living thing, whether 
this living thing be a man or a people or a culture. … The unhistorical and the 
historical are necessary in equal measure for the health of an individual, of a 
people and of a culture. (63) 
An individual or a people, when actively forgetting, seeks to strike a balance between 
knowing and not knowing, between remembering and forgetting the past, for life 
demands not simply an oblivion of the past, but a balance between the historical and the 
active, between reflection and experience.9 
Time for Nietzsche has a similar twofold role: it is a figure for the specifically 
human situation as well as a dimension of existence outside of human control. The man 
wondering at the cow begins next to wonder at himself and realizes "that he cannot learn 
to forget but clings relentlessly to the past: however far and fast he may run, this chain 
runs with him;” Nietzsche describes time as "a moment, now here and then gone, nothing 
before it came, again nothing after it has gone" (61).  The moment "nonetheless returns as 
a ghost and disturbs the peace of a later moment. A leaf flutters from the scroll of time, 
floats away--and suddenly floats back again and falls into the man's lap" (61). Where the 
                                                                                                                                                 
trans. R.J. Hollingdale, (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1983), 56. 
9 In “Wordsworthian Wakefulness,” Sara Guyer explores the status of insomnia in several of Wordsworth’s 
sonnets to sleep.  For Guyer, employing the notion of insomnia as developed by both Heidegger and 
Emmanuel Levinas, insomnia represents the eternal wakefulness of being to its own inability to step 
outside of itself.  “For Wordsworth apostrophe (in the sonnets to sleep) fails to overcome wakefulness, but 
rather repeats and reproduces the state it aims to suspend. In this respect, Wordsworth's sonnets "To Sleep" 
suggest that wakefulness is suffering, and show that the response to wakefulness only ever reintroduces 
wakefulness. The response—as in Wordsworth's apostrophe—cannot prevent or rescue one from 
wakefulness. To the contrary, it leaves one submerged” (103).  Guyer annotates this section of her essay 
with a remark that “in post-Holocaust works, apostrophe—if it too renders wakefulness—becomes a mode 
of bearing witness to the endless night of destruction. Wakefulness takes on the additional significance of 
interminable vigilance and uninterruptable existence. It names ethics and ontology” (110).  In my chapter 
on Godwin, in a discussion of his “Essay Upon Sepulchres,” I will attempt to address this consideration of 
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nation--another concept fundamental to our understanding of the call for active 
forgetting--is concerned, Nietzsche favors "assimilation" and a transformative 
"incorporation" of foreign elements into German culture, as he says when he addresses 
the possibility of Germans as an authentic people (123). 
Nietzsche invokes the ruminating cow not simply to point to the need for selective 
memory but, more importantly, in order to assert that active forgetting counters history 
because forgetting, as in Keats, submits this discourse to the bare, affective experience of 
the living moment that has value precisely because it will not last.  Moreover, with active 
forgetting, Nietzsche is not attempting to avoid the past but to open up a possibility for 
the future together with a different understanding of what history may be.  As with Keats, 
Nietzsche is oriented towards a future that stands in direct, positive refutation of his own 
present moment (and hence, “untimely”).  For Nietzsche, the possibility that the future 
holds something new is not driven by whether or not remembering can recreate the 
forgotten or whether forgetting can fully erase the possibility of recollection. The 
question is rather of the possibility of some form of balance between remembering and 
forgetting, between the historical and archival, on the one hand, and the active or 
interruptive as Nietzsche envisions them. For Nietzsche every historical moment ought to 
be always and categorically new, always open to both recording and reexamination, and 
to feelings that passed unnoticed.  
The direct implications of this newness is not that history as an object of study is 
no longer possible or desirable, but that it should be replaced by a stance towards the past 
                                                                                                                                                 
witnessing as a confluence of Romantic and post-Holocaust writing via Godwin’s discussion of survival 
and friendship.   
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that is not bound by establishing the timeless significance of recollected events.  For 
Nietzsche, to think time otherwise than the historical requires an interruption of thinking 
that takes on the characteristics of an affective positioning outside of history, such that 
the experience of history, in this sense, becomes even richer than actual living 
experience.  To feel “ahistorically,” then, is not to think in a passive, reflective sense on 
events in the world or to record them; rather, it is to approach them with a critical 
perspective that is driven by affect.     
What do both Keats and Nietzsche have in common?  For both writers, the 
alignment of feeling or affective experience with forgetfulness is productive of a 
meaningful resistance to static forms of aesthetic, historical, and philosophical 
understanding.  The conditions of this resistance can be traumatic or overwhelming, yet 
they nevertheless prove conducive to developing the possible autonomy of aesthetic or 
creative experience.  While Keats considers the “feel of not to feel it” as a creative 
maxim that is always enabled by loss and inspired by the “sweet forgetfulness” of nature, 
Nietzsche thinks that active forgetting, an activity through which one will live and “feel 
unhistorically,” must stand against a relentless drive to historical knowledge.10  As in 
Keats, this feeling must be preserved in such a way as to elude, survive or forget the 
                                                 
10 In “On Nietzsche’s Side,” Maurice Blanchot considers the difficulty that critics face in attempting to 
tease out the relationship between thought and feeling in Nietzsche, and this difficulty is evocative of both 
the possibility and demand of thinking ahistorically as feeling: “Nietzsche’s case … demands … the 
seriousness and patience of an infinite reflection, one that never stops working while it recognizes the 
movement that escapes it. … Such is the problem: it calls into question not the individual merits of the 
commentator but the possibility of any commentary on a passionate thinker, written from the outside” (289. 
my emphasis).  Throughout Blanchot’s collection, The Work of Fire, of which this essay is a part, the 
apparent lucidity and dispassionate movement of thought after meaning is examined as a displaced passion 
or feeling for something unrealizable, as a desire.   
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experience in which it has been conveyed in order to escape the historical register into 
which it would be drawn.   
Seen through the prism of these two figures, we might say here that feeling and 
forgetting work via the same structures of resistance: the feeling of lost feeling gives to 
the “original,” phantom lost feeling its primacy by both being inspired by it and 
exceeding it (by giving it a form that it did not possess), in much the same way as the 
recollection of that which has been forgotten gives shape to memory as an active force in 
the first place: one cannot begin to feel unless one has already lost the capability for 
feeling, or, unless one has a feeling to later feel.  Accordingly, feeling must be lost or 
forgotten in order to be recollected as a feeling always already about itself.  For Keats, it 
is the feeling of (not) feeling, and for Nietzsche, it is the eternally interruptive or irruptive 
feeling of forgetting that allows a passage outside of the tautological repetition of purely 
historical recollection: to feel ahistorically is to think without seeking out an already 
established or possible truth.  For Nietzsche, it is the attempt to (re)capture a form of 
thinking as a powerful force that is woven together with, rather than acting as a rejection 
of, feeling.  As we see reflected in Eco’s later text, the power of creating feelings through 
forgetting is drawn into the human sphere via acts of poetic or ahistorical creation that 
both resist and recast human community.  
As found in the sense of being passed from the past to the present, passed from  
writers to communities of readers, a question that is to be found in the texts that I analyze 
may be formulated in the following way: what happens in the belatedly recognized 
interim of “the feel” and “not to feel it” if not feeling itself as the interim, one in which an 
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attempt to make sense literally of one’s own past or the past of others is a gesture fraught 
with a productive, affective uncertainty?  Can feeling be employed in a consideration of 
history that breaks free from a determinative historical sense without being radically 
skeptical and negative in essence?  In addressing desires for and fears of forgetting 
through self-reflecting analyses of feeling, these authors seem to struggle to move beyond 
Lockean theories of individual subjectivity based in associative patterns of recollection 
and forgetting (where the present is confirmed in affirmative analyses of the past for the 
individual, as well as the social operation of discourses of sympathy) while at the same 
time resisting to embrace proto-psychological definitions of the self that seem already 
and necessarily to augur the unanswerable guilt, repression, melancholy, loss, and trauma 
that would accompany such an abandonment of sympathetic feeling and consequent 
interpretive certainty, even as these newer psychological structures of experience already  
seem to have surfaced in their texts.11  In attempting to place these texts within a specific 
historical context, I wish to position them within a history of forgetting that passes 
through the Romantic period and that has its own unique and at time strange valences.     
In the work of Charlotte Smith, William Godwin, and, to some extent, Walter 
Scott, the relationship between pasts that cannot but must be forgotten and presents that 
                                                 
 
11 Indeed, it has proven irresistible for many critics to discuss Godwin without gesturing towards Freud, 
Lacan, or, in a slightly different context, Foucault in order to explain the strange inner workings of 
Godwin’s narrators.  That Godwin, influenced by Rousseau, was clearly interested in discussing the 
damaging effects of society upon the formation and repression of individual subjectivity is undeniable.  In a 
similar vein, what is equally fascinating about Godwin is the effect of time and language upon repressed 
memories.  Rather than employ Freud in any great detail, we might tentatively suggest that both Godwin 
and Freud are a part of a very long history of feeling or sentiment.  I also resist incorporating Freud in these 
discussions because I feel that the very closeness of Freud and Godwin would in fact limit the kinds of 
insights that we might be able to generate from a reading of Godwin that is generated, as much as possible, 
from his own strange insights into the formation of human identity. 
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seek to initiate a discourse of forgetting in order to inscribe this past as past in a proper, 
healthful sense, is never fully established from a safe distance.  For these authors, the 
difficulties with forgetting are representative of their difficulties in engaging with their 
own contemporary worlds and the value of recollection within them.  Of course, not 
every author from this period has invoked forgetting or oblivion as a questioning of 
memory or history as an inability to (truly) feel.  Keats, Nietzsche, and Eco occupy later 
moments in this history of forgetting and offer responses in their own way to the deep 
skepticism directed towards forms of Romantic memory through forgetting as found in 
Smith, Godwin, and Scott, even as forgetting is seen by these earlier writers as a 
necessary gesture fraught with its own uncertainties and untimeliness.     
In proposing a reading of this kind, I am not attempting to dislodge one of the 
dominant ideas regarding the fundamentally rehabilitative use of memory in British 
Romanticism, but mark evocations of it as exceptional to the period.  In the memory-
fragment of 1799, William Wordsworth acknowledges his desire to create poetry that 
seeks to regain pasts that have been lost: “feeling, as I fear, / The weakness of a human 
love for days / Disowned by memory.”  In this fragment, Wordsworth aligns feeling with 
“weakness” and forgetting with the act of being “disowned by memory;” it is crucial to 
recognize here that “disowned” amounts to a refusal by memory to acknowledge 
forgotten pasts.12   
                                                 
12 In Disowned by Memory: Wordsworth's Poetry of the 1790s, David Bromwich has explored 
Wordsworth’s early poetry as exploring memory and the fleetingness of originary feeling: “Wordsworth 
believed we are humanized by a process in which thoughts become habitual.  But a feeling or sympathy 
itself makes itself memorable in its first moment—always a moment of shock when it comes from an 
unexpected source” (5-6). 
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Famously, in the “Preface” to the second edition of the Lyrical Ballads (1800), 
Wordsworth appears to acknowledge the negative power or “weakness” of feeling, and 
consequently attempts to restore a past that has been “disowned” with something other 
than feeling.  Initially, Wordsworth notes with aversion that, in his contemporary social 
world, the literature of English culture has been “driven into neglect by frantic novels, 
sickly and stupid German Tragedies, and deluges of idle and extravagant stories in 
verse,” much in the same way (although for completely different purposes) that Nietzsche 
dismissed the “sickness” of history.  For Wordsworth, the “frantic” and “sickly” works of 
literature that have flooded the world produce an infernal, Tantalus-like and impossible to 
quench “degrading thirst after outrageous stimulation” such that he is “almost ashamed to 
have spoken of the feeble endeavor made in these volumes (of the Lyrical Ballads) to 
counteract it.”  The passage in which Wordsworth works out his own rehabilitation, a 
remarkable mnemonic engine for the production of “pure” feeling, is justly noted as a 
hallmark of Romantic sensibility, and I quote it below at length:  
All good poetry is the spontaneous overflow of powerful feelings: and though this 
be true, Poems to which any value can be attached were never produced on any 
variety of subjects but by a man who, being possessed of more than usual organic 
sensibility, had also thought long and deeply. For our continued influxes of 
feeling are modified and directed by our thoughts, which are indeed the 
representatives of all our past feelings; and, as by contemplating the relation of 
these general representatives to each other, we discover what is really important 
to men, so, by the repetition and continuance of this act, our feelings will be 
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connected with important subjects, till at length, if we be originally possessed of 
much sensibility, such habits of mind will be produced, that, by obeying blindly 
and mechanically the impulses of those habits, we shall describe objects, and utter 
sentiments, of such a nature, and in such connection with each other, that the 
understanding of the Reader must necessarily be in some degree enlightened, and 
his affections strengthened and purified.13 
In this passage, Wordsworth considers the development of a habitual relationship of 
feeling to thought as the basis for the foundation of a community based in reading.  While 
the famous phrase that begins this passage, that poetry is the “spontaneous overflow of 
powerful feelings,” seems to assert a purely affective register for poetry, Wordsworth 
quickly turns and attempts to achieve balance: “spontaneous” becomes fodder for “long” 
rumination, while “overflow” recedes and settles into the solidity of depth (“deeply”).  
Poetry may be “good,” but it has no “value” without a corresponding “thought.”  How is 
this value of good poetry discovered?  Wordsworth pivots from poetry as something 
produced by “a man of more than usual organic sensibility” (a veritable “man of 
feeling”) in an “overflow,” to the “influx” of feeling that may come from thoughts shared 
amongst others (“our continued influx,” “all our past feeling”) in thinking about the 
feelings transmitted via poetry itself.  By repeating and continuing this “act” of 
“contemplation,” of thinking long and deeply about the feelings contained within good 
poetry, the social value of poetry as a dialogic foundation for community will be 
established.   
                                                 
13 William Wordsworth and Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Lyrical Ballads, eds. R. L. Brett and A. R. Jones, 
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A poetic evocation that corresponds to this engine of the transmission of shared 
feelings through a kind of forgetting can be found in the later Prelude and Wordsworth’s 
“spots of time”:  “there are in our existence spots of time, / That with distinct pre-
eminence retain / A renovating virtue.”14  The passage refers to a memory that 
Wordsworth recollects from childhood in which he strains with expectation as he waited 
to be taken home for the Christmas holidays, scrambling up a “crag overlooking two 
highways to see whether he can spot the horses that should be coming” (168).  As he 
recollects this event from his past, he begins to expand imaginatively the scope of his 
memory.  Wordsworth shifts suddenly to the fact that his father died within ten days of 
his return from school.  In concluding this sequence of recollections, he states, “the event 
/ With all the sorrow that is brought, appeared / A chastisement” (309-11); as a 
“chastisement,” Wordsworth considers that he was to blame, in some sense, for his 
father’s death simply by desiring to return home.  Geoffrey Hartman has commented on 
these lines by suggesting that “spots of time” provide a feeling of consolation for 
Wordsworth as he considers a traumatic event from the past.  Hartman’s reading of this 
passage in The Unremarkable Wordsworth suggests further that this passage poses a 
problem of time in which an absence of causality between one event and another 
generates a powerful feeling in the act of recollection: “there is no hint of anything that 
would compel the mind to link the two terms, hope against time and its peculiar 
fulfillment.”15  At the same time, if this absence also proposes a “sin against time” in the 
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14 William Wordsworth, The Prelude: A Parallel Text, ed. J.C. Maxwell (London: Penguin, 1979), 479. 
15 Geoffrey Hartman, The Unremarkable Wordsworth (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota Press, 1987), 170. 
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way that it anticipates recollection in the future, the recollected events recorded in The 
Prelude also allows Wordsworth to promote two different modes of understanding 
temporality.  On the one hand, Hartman suggests that Wordsworth employs “an 
anticipatory, proleptic relation to time, intensified to the point where there is at once 
desire for and dread of the end being hastened,” such that “there is a potential inner 
turning against time, and against nature insofar as it participates in the temporal order” 
(167).  In this sense, Wordsworth employs a revolutionary stance against time that both 
looks forward to and fears the ending of time.  On the other hand, according to Hartman, 
there is a sense of time in the passage that evokes “a perfectly ordinary mood (which) is 
seen to involve a sin against time” (170).   
In other words, there is no ahistorical register of experience, and failing to 
understand that every event and experience is connected to a larger web of individual, 
temporal, and moral significance results in future damnation.  The “value” of “good” 
poetry, we see here, is discovered in the way that feelings (symbolically represented, I 
would argue, as categorically traumatic to both thought and time) are positioned within a 
temporal, causal chain that is designed to neutralize their interruptive, ahistorical 
“overflow.”  In thinking “long” and “deeply” about his past as a child anticipating 
returning home, then, there exists the possibilities of his complex complicity in his 
father’s death, discovered in an unknowable, unconscious wish for the death of his father 
that can be later recollected and seen as a form of prophetic punishment.   
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At the same time, in the Scars of the Spirit, Hartman argues that “spots of time” 
also provide moments of consolation from the unpredictable sense of causality that 
informs conscious recollection: 
A “spot of time” is “an unforgettable marker in consciousness that incites 
troubling yet vitalizing flashbacks.  Place (“spot”) and that moment in time fuse 
as an indelible memory.  The forward looking, natural intensity of a childish hope 
turns into a moment of terror. … The assumption of a causal link between his 
impatient hope and the father’s death has induced an illogical guilt in the boy.  
Seen through Freudian eyes, strength of imagination in this premature mode is an 
instance of the omnipotence of thoughts.  Yet the event’s traumatic effect, as it 
reaches through time, consoles the poet because it evokes a power he once 
experienced more purely. … The scene, as Wordsworth says in the episode’s 
continuation, becomes a fountain with a refreshing, reparative effect on his 
relation to rural nature.16 
For Hartman, drawing on the “strengthened” and “purified” nature of feeling as it passes 
through memory, the act of recollection is able to draw connections between experiences 
from the past that were not apparent or non-existent during the time in which they 
occurred; it is only in retrospect that causality can and must be established.  Indeed, 
causality must be established for Hartman, as the comfort or consolation provided for the 
guilt that accompanies the past is established through predestination: “Such incidents of 
loneliness and feelings of terror akin to the sublime render Wordsworth’s nature poetry 
34 
quite different from verses in the georgic tradition … The episode opens onto an 
eschatological backdrop in which the boy’s innocent and impatient longing for home 
anticipates a not-so-innocent burden: the poet’s orphic mission” (184-5, my emphasis).  
As such, a religious language or sentiment accompanies Wordsworth’s invocation of the 
powers of recollection.   
In much the same manner as Eco’s ironic ars oblivionalis or even Nietzsche’s 
balance of remembering and forgetting in the drive to “feel ahistorically,” Wordsworth’s 
ars poetica transfers the powerful sense of an absent or inexplicable causality between 
his actions and his father’s death, registered as the impossibility of knowing what he was 
doing or of what he was culpable, into a glance backwards that makes sense or explains 
this absence of causality as unconscious desire.  Tragedy, found in the haunting, 
unacknowledged absence of a connection between two moments in time, is turned into 
transcendent comedy, a happy marriage of past and future, such that Wordsworth’s act of 
recollection gives to the past a direction and sense of purpose that did not exist before.  In 
this sense, Wordsworth does not merely re-present scenes from the past from the 
perspective of the present; he also invests them with a moral and personal significance 
that legitimates the exigency of his own poetic activity.17  For Hartman, the necessity of 
forgetting to the activity of Wordsworthian recollection is found in the erasure and 
consequent re-inscription of a past event suffused with moral feeling that both generates 
                                                                                                                                                 
16 Geoffrey Hartman, Scars of the Spirit: The Struggle Against Authenticity (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2002), 184. 
17 See also Abrams’ classic distinction between mimic representation and the creative imagination in The 
Mirror and The Lamp: Romantic Theory and the Critical Tradition (London; New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1971). 
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and is produced by the activity of memory.18  Considered in this light, another famous 
phrase from the 1800 “Preface,” “poetry is emotion recollected in tranquility,” is not 
merely (and perhaps not at all) a definition but a narrative illustration of the tension that 
poetry both recollects and renounces, to some degree, from a position of necessary 
disinterest or disinvestment.     
While Wordsworth seems to suggest that the poetic employment of recollection is 
meant to both arouse and defuse particular emotions that arise in a “spontaneous 
overflow,” he also ties very tightly together emotion and memory in a way that 
encourages us to consider a dynamic configuration of these two concepts in which both 
depend upon the other for their significance.  In beginning to consider what we might call 
an intertwining of forgetting and feeling, Frances Ferguson, in “Romantic Memory,” has 
questioned Hartman’s construction of Wordsworth’s transformative poetic recollection 
by examining the way that guilt plays a central role in producing poetic power.19  In 
Ferguson’s estimation, Hartman’s reading of Wordsworth’s “spots of time” seems to 
argue too passionately for the overcoming of guilt: “neither the purest of motives nor the 
greatest of attention to things apparently indifferent would protect one from the 
experience of illimitable guilt in the face of any negative outcome or undesirable event” 
(527).  For Ferguson, Hartman misrecognizes the apparatus of memory in Wordsworth as 
a process of reaffirmation in the present that links together disparate events without 
                                                 
18 In some ways, the deeply ambiguous phrase from the “Preface” regarding the status of moral feeling in 
the reader (“if we be originally possessed of much sensibility”) is exploited and amplified by Keats’s 
temporal contortions in the “feel of not to feel it.”  In other words, in Wordsworth’s case, how can one be 
possessed with sensibility “originally” unless this original sensibility is discovered most powerfully in a 
retrospective glance that affirms the present absence of that originary feeling? 
19 Frances Ferguson, “Romantic Memory,” Studies in Romanticism 35.4 (1996),  
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breaking free of them.  Feeling, in this sense, cannot be therapeutically forgotten.  Rather 
than discovering a source of power in poetic consciousness that transcends the 
mechanical passage of time by insisting on a linear chronology, “Romantic” memory for 
Ferguson heightens a continuing sense of moral obligation that one must bear for the past 
as a repository of feeling: “like … techniques of spiritual and material development, 
(Romantic memory) involves subjecting one’s own experience to a standard more 
demanding than that of truthfulness or even accuracy, because it makes every individual 
memory stand in the same relation to experience as Rousseau’s general will does to the 
individual.  It requires a continual review of actions through the lenses of a variety of 
different sets of consequences” (527).  Ferguson argues that there can be nothing 
pleasurable about Wordsworth’s recollection of the past because it intimates his 
culpability in his father’s death.  Rather, “what Wordsworth’s ‘spot of time’ enables us to 
track is not just Romanticism’s stress on memory as memory solicits a consciousness of 
what one has done – in so far as one judges oneself by the actions that one has performed.  
It also registers the increasing pressure that Romanticism will come to put on the memory 
that can provide convincing evidence that one hasn’t acted” (528, my emphasis).  
Ferguson offers a new name for this operation of “Romantic memory” as circumstantial 
memory: “circumstantial memory provides a kind of balm to the potentially corrosive 
memory that might seem to make an individual responsible for all the events that he was 
capable of knowing about from experience or report. … The good news of the memory of 
these clustered elements is that there is no news, that nothing has happened” (529).  The 
power of childhood recollection as found in the Prelude can be perceived in the way that 
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Wordsworth’s acts of recollection in the present produces “a transcript of images that 
never cohere into a causal pattern” (529).  Rather than basing the power of Romantic 
memory in a repressed sense of possible guilt, Ferguson finds it in a sense of relief that 
there is nothing to find in the past to link it to the present.  The past reaffirms the present 
because the present, in this sense, is the direct consequence of both a path avoided in the 
past and its morally justifiable denunciation of the road not taken in the present.   
For Hartman and Ferguson, Romantic memory as defined through Wordsworth 
produces a feeling of “consolation” or “balm” for very different reasons.  Hartman finds 
Wordsworth deriving consolation in remembering “troubling yet vitalizing flashbacks” 
that legitimates the present as connected to the past.  Ferguson feels that the guilt of these 
“troubling” flashbacks could never be contained by poetic recollection because it would 
overwhelm the desire to remember; rather, “Romantic memory” confirms the process of 
time by establishing a lack of a connection between events in the past (childish desire to 
return home and the death of Wordsworth’s father) that is appropriately felt as a kind of 
haunting; like a ghost, it is a feeling both of something and nothing.  To this degree, 
Wordsworth’s “spots of time” designate loci of moral obligation that the poet constructs 
with his own past; for Ferguson, the exigency of the act of recollection denotes a sense of 
propriety with the past that opens it up for inspection yet without impinging on the 
present.   
At play in the analyses of both Hartman and Ferguson is a sense of possible guilt 
concerning traumatic experiences in the past that Wordsworth must both recognize and 
dismiss.  For Hartman, the gap between two moments of time that is overcome in the acts 
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of a transcendent memory is diagnosed as a rupture that has been repressed through 
feelings of guilt.  The episode from the Prelude both creates and salves a traumatic event 
and, in a more general sense, assuages the guilt that consciousness feels innately in an 
attempt to make sense of time outside of the passage of natural time.  In other words, for 
Hartman’s Wordsworth, one must not forget, even if nothing can be represented as 
having taken place.20   
As many critics have noted, the sense of guilt that suffuses Wordsworth’s 
recollections appears traumatic, and any study of the feelings of forgetting or 
forgetfulness in the Romantic era must pay heed to recent work in trauma studies.  The 
word “trauma” is from the Greek word for “wound,” and refers to an injury that has been 
inflicted on the body.  In later medical, psychological and psychoanalytical usage, 
however, the term is understood as a wound inflicted not upon the body but upon the 
mind.21  More recently, trauma studies have become concerned with the historical  
construction of trauma from one generation to the next.22  Cathy Caruth has argued that 
the signs of trauma can be discovered in the delayed, belated or repetitive appearance of 
hallucinations or other kinds of strange phenomena, indicating the inability to process or 
                                                 
20 My earlier reference to the article by Sara Guyer on Wordsworthian insomnia and the relationship of 
Romantic to post-Holocaust writing comes into play here.  For Hartman’s Wordsworth, the past as feeling 
must not be forgotten, even and especially if the past (as in many theoretical evaluations of possible 
impossibility of representing the Holocaust as ‘event’) is somehow beyond representation, as if it never 
“happened” in a verifiable sense.  Read through this lens, Ferguson’s version of Wordsworthian and 
Romantic memory as circumstantial memory seems less generous to Wordsworth, as if traumatic guilt must 
leave behind traces in the historical record that can be verified by oneself and others or it is not guilt at all. 
21 Freud’s exploration of trauma is usefully explored in Figley’s Trauma and its Wake (New York: 
Brunner/Mazel, 1985).  For Hartman, unlike Ferguson, perhaps, the “scars of the spirit” are by nature 
invisible. 
22 See Marianne Hirsch, “Family Pictures: Maus, Mourning, and Post-Memory,” Discourse: Journal for 
Theoretical Studies in Media and Culture (15:2), 3-29.  Hirsch discusses the ways in which second-
generation or children of those who perished in the Holocaust attempted to reconstruct the experiences of 
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represent an experience that eludes representation.23   Caruth argues that not only is this 
inability to represent or give a figure to a particular experience a sign of a damaged 
psyche, it is also representative of history itself: “The historical power of the trauma is 
not just that the experience is repeated after its forgetting, but that it is only in and 
through its inherent forgetting that it is first experienced at all.  For history to be a history 
of trauma means that it is referential precisely to the extent that that it is not fully 
perceived as it occurs; or, to put it somewhat differently, that a history can be grasped 
only in the very inaccessibility of its occurrence” (17-8).  For Caruth, the belated 
representational structure of trauma is a symptom of a psychological disorder due to 
extreme suffering, yet it also informs the most basic and fundamental characteristics of 
human experience as mediated by language.  Aligning the experience of trauma with the 
Jewish experience of the Holocaust, Caruth suggests that history itself is made up of 
historical crises that demand “the passing on of a survival that can only be possessed 
within a history larger than any single individual” (71, my emphasis).  As Hartman 
himself will admit, in discussing the Holocaust testimony project in Scars of the Spirit, 
“an active if belated response, relays terrible stories, yet in a bearable way, most of the 
time. … In the hearing of it the listener, who as interviewer enables the telling, is a 
partner an act of remembering forward that obliges us to receive rather than repress 
inhuman events” (79).   
One of the historical anxieties that Smith, Godwin and Scott all seem to share is 
that acts of dialogic communication must be constituted as a shared witnessing of the 
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present; furthermore, that these acts are fundamental to the generation of a community 
whose sole function is to attempt to give shape to events from the past that have or 
threaten to disfigure those who are or have been the witnesses of these events.  The way 
in which these communities are formed is through a “remembering forward,” an anxious 
and skeptical passage to a future that retains the minimal form of the present to which 
they owe their possible existence beyond the bounds of individual memory or experience.   
In one sense, these communities operate according to an ars oblivionalis: identity 
through self-forgetfulness and mediated acts of passive self-sacrifice to a future that is 
uncertain and fundamentally, formally contingent.  Caruth’s definition of trauma, 
indicated through the sharing or passing on of unrepresentable events by those who have 
“survived” particular experiences, even (and especially) if it is the experience of others, 
provides a clue into the ways in which the texts with which I am concerned transmit 
through feelings and the epistemology of sympathy rather than thoughts defined as the 
“general representatives” (Wordsworth) of feelings.  Considered through the 
philosophical paradigms of eighteenth-century Enlightenment empiricism, feelings are 
made to be cognitively forgotten as they are inscribed into the bodies that experience 
them.24  Yet Smith, Godwin and Scott attempt to articulate a belief in the ability of 
feelings to transcend lived experience and find a form of existence in the texts that both 
contain and threaten them.    
                                                                                                                                                 
23 Cathy Caruth, Unclaimed Experience: Trauma, Narrative, and History (Baltimore : Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1996). 
24 John Locke and David Hume, arguing against a Cartesian seventeenth-century rationalism, argue that 
empirical existence both defines and limits human experience.  Hume tried to place this notion of empirical 
understanding to use in an “attempt to introduce the experimental method of reasoning into moral 
subjects,” as the subtitle of his Treatise of Human Nature indicated. 
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For Smith and Godwin, sympathy is at odds with a rational, epistemological 
understanding of the past as a site of knowledge; rather, sympathy extends a shared sense 
of human feeling that must be imaginatively projected into both the past and the future in 
order to make it recognizable.  Unlike Wordsworth, Smith bases her own poetic practice 
on the inability to use poetry for any kind of consolation except in the effacement of 
personal experience.  Through Hartman and Ferguson, Wordsworth can be seen to 
anticipate a future state that has an element of moral or apocalyptic certainty to it; for 
Smith, a future based on shared feeling is categorically unknowable.  As a poet, Smith 
imagines that she might be able to discover some sense of consolation in her future 
readers; on the other hand, the means through which this imaginary connection is 
established is always through the representation of her voice in texts.  Indeed, Smith, 
Godwin and Scott all employ a paradoxically mediated immediacy that the discourse of 
sentiment offers to an analysis of the past through textual artifacts rather than 
remembered events.  Modifying Caruth via Keats, we might say that it is only in and 
through the inherent forgetting of memories that they are first experienced at all; yet the 
first experience of these forgotten memories is always by others.  In a roundabout way, 
the Lethean logic of this form of Romantic forgetting resembles Wordsworth’s poetic 
recollection, yet it directly transfers the site of possible remembrance from the self to 
others. 
 The authors studied in Feeling Forgotten address anxieties about the ability of 
language to both represent and deform the past, to recollect and forget; at the same time, 
they refuse to fully submit these anxieties to an analysis that defuses or reduces them to 
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moments within an overarching historical pattern.  In other words, the literature that they 
leave to history is not made up of simple moral or cultural statements; rather, they take 
the form of urgent questions posed to an uncertain future.  In order to study these texts as 
questions, then, I argue that it is essential to leave certain questions unanswered in order 
to attempt to discover the feelings that seem to run up against the limits of knowledge as 
a form of individual or collective security.   Many critics have found that Wordsworth, in 
railing against Godwin’s belief in the power of reason, made a case for a form of 
thoughtful “general representation” of individual feeling in the Lyrical Ballads when he 
stated that “our meddling intellect / Mis-shapes the beauteous forms of things: / we 
murder to dissect” (“The Tables Turned”).  Rather than avoiding the problem of the 
“meddling intellect” which “murder(s) to dissect,” the writers whom I consider in Feeling 
Forgotten seem to confront the murderous intellect head-on and still refuse to abandon its 
importance to an unknown future.  Indeed, the relationship between reason and feeling in 
the texts studied in Feeling Forgotten is not based on a dialectical process of one 
overcoming or pre-dating the other; rather, these terms are deeply intertwined and reveal 
a struggle for primacy with each other.   
This dissertation charts a Romantic literary and critical tradition in which the 
representation of self-forgetfulness in and through literature, defined as a consoling 
escape from or transcendence of present emotional turmoil, is displaced or lost.  
Traditional accounts of the role of feeling and memory argue that the writers of this 
period use literature to transform traumatic impressions of the past.  As I have suggested, 
one of the essential elements of Romantic creativity was to be found in the reconciliation 
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between the experience of the natural and spiritual worlds.  The device used in most 
cases, from poems such as Coleridge’s “Aeolian Harp” to Wordsworth’s monumental 
Prelude, was a recollection of a chain of images from the poet's memory that acted 
analogically to assist the reader to establish an emotional connection between natural and 
spiritual reality.  In the Romantic tradition, the poetic employment of memory was the 
crucial link between disparate parts and the whole, between the poet and reader, and 
between the temporal, specific moment and the eternal, universal truth.  The authors that 
I discuss acknowledge that sentimental literary reflections on a troubling or traumatic 
past are meant to provide a balm, whether for individuals or communities, for these 
experiences.  Yet the subject of their works directly highlights the failure of literature to 
provide this form of consolation to either the author or reader.  Using literature to 
demonstrate the inadequacy of literary experience as a form of consolation, these authors 
imagine a new role for feeling, which comes to be defined as a sense of alienation and 
isolation. 
Admittedly, while I have chosen to discuss authors and texts that do not appear to 
fit together into readily available patterns of critical or cultural analyses, I find that an 
examination of their works from the perspective of feeling and forgetting reveals new 
possibilities for study in the period.  While I suggest that there are connections to be 
found in comparing these authors, earlier studies would position these authors against 
each other.  Charlotte Smith has been designated as a proto-Romantic or Romantic poet 
who is decidedly sympathetic to the proto-feminism of the period.  It has been argued, for 
example, that Godwin’s memoir of his wife, Mary Wollstonecraft, was incredibly 
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misogynistic and revealed his own disdain for women.25  In addition, it could not be more 
obvious that Scott’s beliefs in national cultural authority and Burkean conservatism 
against a radical, revolutionary politics are strongly and demonstrably antithetical to 
those held by Smith and Godwin.  Given these oppositions, then, what would an analysis 
of Smith’s poetry, Godwin’s texts from the early nineteenth century, and Scott’s poetry 
reveal?  More so than a direct engagement with the various genres that these authors 
employ, I am concerned with the ideas that connect them and that are explored across a 
variety of aesthetic forms.  Indeed, what I hope to reveal by my work here is that these 
authors are less concerned with remaining true to specific genres and more interested in 
testing their use of particular genres as fit vehicles for the representation of feelings that 
deeply question the value of the literary to act as an objective, historical repository of 
memories.  For these authors, this form of questioning becomes the substance of the 
literary itself, one in which the literary becomes a mode of communicating anxieties and 
self-doubt that literature itself appears unable to address.     
What must also be acknowledged is that these authors were very familiar with 
each other’s work, and, at times, admiringly so.  Based on her use of the Petrarchan 
sonnet and references to Goethe’s Sturm und Drang novel, Werther (1774), Smith’s 
poetry gives voice to a melancholy that directly questions gender boundaries and the 
relationship between writers and readers based on feelings of intense, self-forgetful 
melancholy.  Godwin also employs Goethe in his own work, yet he repositions the ‘man 
                                                 
25 Joanne Shattock notes that Godwin’s attempt to be brutally frank about Wollstonecraft’s troubled life in 
the memoir defamed her reputation: “in their (historians of feminism) view Godwin committed a double 
murder of Wollstonecraft’s reputation, firstly by his misguided candor and secondly by his unwitting 
undermining of her intellectual credentials” (14).  
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of feeling’ into a political and cultural environment for the purposes of broad social 
critique, one that makes feeling itself both necessary and deeply suspect.  In his work for 
the Edinburgh journal, The Monthly Review, Scott displays a great affinity for Smith’s 
and Godwin’s novels.  Indeed, in his own literary productions, Scott borrows extensively 
from both.  Pierre Bourdieu’s analyses regarding the relationship between cultural 
practices and broader social processes, including the social position and role of the 
intellectual, provide an initial framework for examining the ideas that hold these writers 
together in a field that is at once open to mutual admiration and contention.26  Bourdieu 
posits a “field of cultural production,” a space that has its own laws and functions outside 
of the political and economic fields in which it appears to be enmeshed.  Literature is 
clearly one such field, in which writers compete for position and prestige, and struggle to 
define the aesthetic value of the literary work.  Bourdieu states that, “what is at stake (in 
the field) is the power to impose the dominant definition of the writer and therefore to 
delimit the population of those entitled to take part in the struggle to define the writer”  
(42).  Their struggle to define the writer as a producer of personal and cultural memories 
that cannot or ought not to be represented also redefines the role of the literary in 
preserving a past as one that directly contradictions or comes into conflict with the beliefs 
of the present, and that historicizes events from the past that nevertheless must be 
remembered even if the present desire of the writer is to forget them.   
For Smith, this struggle is resolved in a negation of self through poetry that 
projects traumatic feelings forward to future readers.  Smith attempts to dislodge feelings 
                                                 
26 Pierre Bourdieu, The Field of Cultural Production, ed. Randal Johnson (New York: Columbia 
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that overwhelm individual thought from her own experience and transmit them to the 
bodies and consciousnesses of others who may act as witnesses to her suffering.  In 
Present Past: Modernity and the Memory Crisis, Richard Terdiman argues that “memory 
and exchange have been ‘facts’ throughout history, but in the ‘long nineteenth century’ 
each underwent an epochal reconfiguration. … Goods move and are transformed in their 
circulation; memories are displaced and transformed with the passage of time or in the 
course of an increasingly dense and highly organized process of information exchange.”27  
For Smith, when memories are atomized and cut loose from specific individual 
experience, or, in other words, when sonnets are acknowledged as units of economic 
exchange (as they very much were in journals that reprinted Smith’s work without her 
permission), then the illusory act of intimate communication between poet and reader can 
be based upon the loss of this very intimacy.   
In the second chapter of Feeling Forgotten, I argue that a close analysis of 
Charlotte Smith’s Elegiac Sonnets reveals the degree to which her poetry anticipates a 
shift in nineteenth- and twentieth century modern poetry from a mournful compensation 
of loss to one of inconsolable melancholy.  For Smith, the loss of feeling is explored from 
the perspective of an aesthetic forgetting, and so from the viewpoint of the individual 
poet and the effect of her poetry on her readers.  Smith’s poetry of forgetting, 
underwritten by an amplification of Petrarchan paradoxes that disrupt poetic subjectivity 
and memory, attempts to establish a future community of readers who sympathetically 
                                                                                                                                                 




feel the poet’s suffering for her through her proto-Keatsian disappearance from her own 
verse.  Unlike the memorial communities that Wordsworth or Coleridge will later attempt 
to construct through a return to Christian faith, the fundamental principle of Smith’s 
poetically constructed community is based on accepting human mortality and finitude as 
an inextricable condition of the possibility of poetic representation.  Analogically relating 
recollection and forgetting with the shifting positions of poetic subjectivity (as found in 
the poet’s eye/I) and objectivity (the object of the poetic gaze), Smith invests the 
eighteenth-century aesthetic experience of self-forgetfulness and desire for oblivion with 
a radically destabilizing force. 
As Smith’s Elegiac Sonnets give voice to a traumatic psyche that nineteenth-
century writers struggle to contain and displace, so Godwin’s mixture of rational, utopian 
skepticism and sentimental fiction provides a mixed literary heritage for his nineteenth-
century followers to exploit.  In my third chapter, I address what might be called the 
wages of political forgetting, and argue that Godwin’s anti-sentimental sentimental novel, 
Fleetwood, or, The New Man of Feeling (1805) is a keystone to the edifice of nineteenth-
century realist, anti-Romantic fiction.  Casimir Fleetwood, the novel’s first-person 
narrator, recounts episodes from his life and attempts to locate in his past the reasons for 
his misanthropic feelings.  His relentless self-analysis appears to dismiss the possibility 
of retaining any sense of sublime Romantic feeling in a corrupted, fallen world.28  
                                                                                                                                                 
27 Richard Terdiman, Present Past: Modernity and the Memory Crisis (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1993), 1. 
28 Thomas Pfau, Romantic Moods: Paranoia, Trauma, and Melancholy: Paranoia, Trauma, and 
Melancholy, 1790-1840 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005).  Pfau discusses Godwin’s 
understanding of feeling in similar terms.  Godwin’s works demonstrate “how early romantic history is 
experienced as an unrelenting condition of anxious hyperlucidity or paranoia. … Social and political 
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Godwin takes Smith’s radical unhinging of the relationship between poetic subjectivity 
and objectivity and turns it into his life’s work by producing texts that can be aligned one 
against the other.  Whereas his political tract, Enquiry Concerning Political Justice 
(1793), calls for a revolutionary sense of rational utopianism to overturn the superstitions 
of existing cultural institutions and habits, his first novel, The Adventures of Caleb 
Williams, or, Things as They Are (1794), demonstrates that such a future state may only 
be possible at the expense of the very humanity that it seeks to preserve.  In other words, 
a future that has been cleansed of the stagnating or discriminatory institutions that 
suppress the operation of reason will be unfamiliar and strange to the person who by 
necessity must be endowed with reason, who successfully enacts the revolution, and must 
exist in that new world.  Indeed, while many of Godwin’s writings demonstrate a vast 
historical knowledge and awareness of English culture, he often directed his writings 
towards the destruction of historical myths, such as the ideals of the Burkean feudal past 
or the enlightened, sympathetic codes of conduct of the eighteenth-century.  I also cite 
Godwin’s Life of Geoffrey Chaucer and his “Essay on Sepulchers” and suggest that they 
are harbingers of forms of historical fiction that promote an imaginary yet impersonal 
relationship with literary history, one that is based on the use of the imagination to 
connect sympathetically with the past in such a way as to confront, question, and disrupt 
the ideologies of the present.   
Although Smith’s ungrounded Petrarchan poems and Godwin’s Gothic tales of 
instrumental reason seem to constantly reinscribe a loss of a sense of history that could 
                                                                                                                                                 
knowledge proves inextricably entwined with its emotional phenomenology. … The experience of the real 
hinges on one’s constant preparedness to distrust the reality of experience and to expose the latter as so 
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contain a hopeful or happy future, such that their “Romantic,” proto-modern experience 
entails learning to live in a permanent condition of moral insecurity, there are also 
elements that seem to gesture beyond.  In my fourth chapter, I contend that Walter Scott 
recognizes these radical elements as found in Smith and Godwin, and then transports 
them to the realm of fiction that is written and recorded impersonally.  Unlike the 
aesthetic or political forgetting that Smith and Godwin explore, Scott crafts a sense of 
national or cultural forgetting that gives shape to what we might recognize as the effect 
of nostalgia.  I begin the third chapter with a recapitulation of Scott criticism before 
moving to an analysis of Scott’s first poetical romance, The Lay of the Last Minstrel.  
Published in 1805, the same year as Godwin’s Fleetwood, Scott’s poem emphasizes the 
degree to which historical amnesia must inform the recollection of the past: in the 
absence of physical presence or material knowledge of the past, the present, figured 
through the voice of a wandering bard, is reduced to evoking vague and nostalgic feelings 
for a past that is threatened with being forgotten.  At the same time, Scott presents this 
form of forgetful memory as a cure to the immersive and labyrinthine models of reading 
that have, in his estimation, led authors such as Smith and Godwin astray: to become 
embroiled in sentimental or sympathetic communion with the past risks blurring the 
distinctions between past and present, as well as fiction and reality.  For Scott, the past 
must resist being changed by the present; the bard, who “tells the tale as ‘twas told,” 
gives voice to history as based on repetition, such that it is everywhere and at every time 
the same tale.  As such, the past must become a possession that is transmitted into the 
                                                                                                                                                 
many ideological frames conspiring against our genuine access to the real” (20).   
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future rather than that which possesses and inhabits the reader as a dominant idea (as the 
mere idea of revolution had become that which drove the eponymous hero of his first 
novel, Waverley (1814), to participate in the Jacobite revolution).  Shifting from the 
moral basis of Wordsworthian recollection, in which past is revisited in order to examine 
its unacknowledged ethical contributions to the present, to a nostalgic principle of 
iterability, in which the virtue of the past that is remembered is that it is always already 
what has been said, Scott relinquishes his claim to investigating the past as anything other 
than a transmission.   
In the end, Feeling Forgotten attempts to chart a shift in late eighteenth- and early 
nineteenth-century English literature that is noticeable as a crisis of memory, one in 
which the vestiges of eighteenth-century theories of sympathy are transformed into new, 
and not always successful, ways in which the self relates to its own past and to that of 
others, as well as to its historical and political milieu.  Keats, Nietzsche, and Eco, among 
others, are the inheritors and transmitters of these reconfigurations.  Through texts that 
depict the need to overcome individual and cultural loss, this shift is discernible through 
the displacement of the melancholic loss of the feeling of lived memories into the fiction 
of an impersonal historical plenitude that acts to preserve the past in such a way as to 
answer unavoidable loss of feeling by asserting that the past, one’s own and others, can 
be felt (again) in the aesthetic or historical experience of reading about the past.  While 
Smith and Godwin image the survival of their own identities in the own versions of 
Romantic memory in the figure of a future reader who will remember them in mourning 
their loss, Scott attempts to shut down the trauma of the recurring past by constructing a 
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more pleasant feeling of forgetfulness in nostalgia, or, in Scott’s formulation, a form of 
melancholy that itself becomes subject to history.   
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Chapter Two 
Charlotte Smith and the Poetics of Oblivion 
 
 
One of the central concerns of feminist critics of late eighteenth- and early 
nineteenth-century women poets has been that of poetic lineage.  Traditionally, the poetry 
of the Romantic period is considered to begin with the publication of the first edition of 
the Lyrical Ballads in 1798, and its theoretical framework is given shape with the 
publication of the second edition and preface of the Lyrical Ballads in 1800.  Yet, as 
current criticism has been at pains to demonstrate, women poets that seemed to have 
inspired the foundational aesthetic concerns attributed to Romanticism have traditionally 
been given relatively little attention or marginalized to the realm of the “pre-Romantic”1 
or “poetry of sensibility.”2  Critical gestures of dismissal are also present in the mythic, 
founding moments of Romanticism itself.  In a pamphlet printed in 1796, Coleridge 
admits a preference for the sonnets of William Bowles, but he also pays tribute to his 
                                                 
1 As early as 1928, James R. Foster recognizes critical amnesia with regard to Charlotte Smith, but in a way 
that seems to legitimate that very forgetfulness:  “time and the critics have dealt but scurvily with Charlotte 
Smith, since she has been completely forgotten, being neither as bad as the Minerva Press nor as striking as 
Ann Radcliffe” (Foster 463).  Marshall Brown, in Preromanticism, focuses primarily on male authors and 
provokes the question of lineage by employing a Hegelian view of history.  He stresses that the period is 
preromantic “precisely because it was not yet romantic” (2).  To the possible objection that this kind of 
thinking leads to a rigorous teleology, Browns states, “the term ‘preromanticism’ has always been attacked 
for its teleology, but that is the very reason I welcome it.  The great authors were striving ahead for 
something new, and when they failed to identify a goal, they were left powerless.  The real problem with 
earlier studies of preromanticism is that they are not teleological enough” (3).  Overarching Brown’s 
discussion is the belief that Romanticism perfected the aesthetic and philosophical developments of 
Preromanticism and the Enlightenment. 
2 Like Foster, Jerome McGann, following in the footsteps of Northrop Frye in attempting to reignite 
interest in the period preceding Romanticism in his seminal essay, “Towards Defining an Age of 
Sensibility,” attempts to recover the revolutionary potential of the female “poetics of sensibility.” At the 
same time, McGann seems to argue for the necessity of reading these female poets while to preserving the 
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early fascination with Charlotte Smith, stating, “Charlotte Smith and Bowles are they 
who first made the Sonnet popular among the present English: I am justified therefore by 
analogy in deducing its laws from their compositions.”3  In 1835, Wordsworth remarked 
that Smith was "a lady to whom English verse is under greater obligations than are likely 
to be either acknowledged or remembered.”4 
The issues facing women poets in their own time have been carried over into 
contemporary critical attempts at resuscitating their legacy.  Kari Lokke summarizes the 
problems facing the critic who wishes to revive the female poets of the Romantic period 
by noting how there appears to be little room to create an alternate poetics of the period 
alongside the dominant, masculine aesthetics of sublimity.5  Lokke suggests that a more 
complete picture of poetry emerges if we consider the ways in which women responded 
to their “uniquely vulnerable and troubled sociopolitical position as women writers in a 
revolutionary and post-revolutionary age” (86).  If anything, both the older and more 
recent attempts to give shape to the period immediately preceding or impinging upon 
Romanticism are fraught with a kind of aesthetic and critical anxiety that was marked out 
from the very beginning. 
In this chapter, I will explore how Smith’s poetry gives voice to a traumatic loss 
of individual identity by disabling the traditional forms of poetic consolation they appear 
to reference.  The paradox of this problem is that the representations of a desired self-
                                                                                                                                                 
aesthetics and seriousness of the masculine poetic projects of Romanticism. 
3 Quoted from Daniel Robinson, "Work Without Hope": Anxiety and Embarrassment in Coleridge's 
Sonnets,” 81.  
4 William Wordsworth, Wordsworth: Selected Prose (Harmondsworth, Eng.: Penguin, 1988), 403. 
5 Kari Lokke, Rebellious Heart: British Women Writers and the French Revolution (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 2001). 
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forgetfulness and oblivion that populate these poems can only happen when the poet is 
forgotten and left behind.  For Smith, oblivion represents a strange kind of freedom from 
the necessity of communicating incommunicable suffering with an audience, even as the 
passionate need for sympathy from others for a tormented life lived outside of poetic 
communication, for the life that is both hidden by and motivates the formation of Smith’s 
poetic persona, appears as the sole, motivating desire.  The appeal of self-forgetfulness, 
an appeal rooted in the impossible, imaginary possession of death within life, promises a 
momentary respite from pain and suffering; for Smith, the proleptic moment of self-
forgetfulness defines poetic duration as an impossible interruption into lived existence 
and an evasion of life’s ills from within life itself.   
At the same time, the melancholic awareness conveyed in Smith’s poems that the 
moment of self-forgetfulness must be purely illusory and without real existence or 
duration is represented as a moment of insight from within the scope of a poetic 
utterance.  The freedom of the lyric “I” from the illusory self-forgetfulness of poetic 
experience and duration leads to its desire to abstain from the insufficiency of poetry as a 
balm or consolation because suffering as a real feeling must be fleeting and not 
artificially perpetuated by the figures of poetry.  As with Keats’s evocation of the “feel of 
not to feel it” and its temporal contortions, feeling takes place both before and after the 
“lost” feeling that poetry seeks in vain to (re)capture in evoking a past that is inaccessible 
and impossible to retrieve.  From ironic evocations of eighteenth-century poetic tropes of 
sentiment to parodies of the Romantic sublime, Smith seems to retreat into an 
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inconsolable silence that is heard only in the negating of poetic voice altogether.6  To this 
degree, I will argue in this chapter that Smith’s Elegiac Sonnets stage poetic self-
forgetfulness as an impossible way out of the self’s pain of existence.  Indeed, modern 
critics have found the benumbing repetition of melancholic sadness in Smith’s poems to 
be a barrier to reading the majority of her poems, and this dispassionate inability to read 
her poetry is an ironic, yet fitting testament to poems that contain within them a silent 
suffering too great to be endured by the illusory consolations of a self-forgetfulness found 
within poetry.   
My argument begins with the claim that the poetry of Charlotte Smith cannot be 
understood without an investigation into its aesthetic complexity and the critical, 
historical forgetting to which it has been subject.  The questions that drive my analyses 
are the following: why are we always “recovering” Charlotte Smith?  In what sense does 
this constant recovery displace or rewrite Smith’s poetics?  In what way is Smith’s 
melancholy presupposed as the basis for a mournful recovery and re-inscription in 
                                                 
6 In The Romantic Poetess: European Culture, Politics, and Gender, 1820-1840, Patrick Vincent provides 
powerful readings of women poets from a later period that nevertheless draws on themes and constructions 
of lyric subjectivity that I find prevalent in Smith.  Referring to Smith as a forbearer to Felicia Hemans and 
Letitia Landon, Vincent notes, “women poets’ sentimental elegies, more tender, more self-conscious, 
ultimately more self-destructive than male poets’ elegies, turn every poem into a last song; the anagnorisis 
or self-discovery so central to the elegy often comes in the form of a Sapphic death-wish” (37).  There can 
be no doubt that death plays a part as the real equivalent to the self-forgetfulness or oblivion that occupies 
the time of aesthetic experience.  Yet in the case of Smith, it is the poem itself that is constructed as that 
which holds the fulfillment of this “death-wish” at bay and provides an ideal foundation for a poetic 
community of readers who bear this burden.  In Deathbound Subjectivity, Alphonso Lingis explores a 
similar idea within an ethical register: “our mortal community, our community in mortality more 
fundamental than every commonplace established by understanding, than every work we can externalize, 
has no purpose save to render present the serving of the other unto the abysses of his or her dying, in order 
that the other be not lost into solitude, into the night and fog” (190).  Lingis states earlier that the concern 
with one’s own death is shifted to an Other, such that one sympathetically would “join the other in his or 
her dying” (188).  In many respects, Smith invokes a language of sentiment and sympathy, based on a sense 
of shared feelings found in eighteenth-century literature, amplifies it through a Petrarchan poetics of 
existential self-doubt and hopeless melancholy, and arrives at positions that I feel are similar to the ethical 
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contemporary criticism?  Isn’t this belated response already written into the temporal 
fabric of Smith’s poems?  I shall attempt to argue below that Smith’s complex evocations 
of forgetting and forgetfulness forge a poetic language of forgetting that is used to 
express what cannot be forgotten because it ought not to be remembered.  Given this 
aversion to memory, Smith seems to intimate that the survival of her poems and the 
feelings contained therein depend upon a future community of forgetful readers who will 
be able to come to grips with her traumatic feelings.     
Indeed, I would argue that the most adequate figure for the poet, as given shape 
by Smith in her unfinished final poem, Beachy Head (1807), is to be found in the 
“strange and foreign forms / Of sea-shells” found as fossils upon the chalk cliffs of East 
Sussex.  Smith’s poet at first considers their presence on the cliff, and wonders if nature 
can “mimic” these “fantastic shapes / Of bivalves, and inwreathed volutes.”  Yet in this 
moment of suspected natural mimicry, Smith’s poet finds reflections of herself and her 
own suspected “natural” activity.  The shells are displaced, both temporally and spatially, 
yet it is only as relics or ruins that they are available for contemplation.  In addition, the 
fossils of both the bivalve and the volute close or curl upon themselves, folding inwards 
towards a hollow center; only the absence of life remains, then, and it is this absence that 
the figure of Charlotte Smith occupies within her poems.  Like the ruins of white, marble 
scrolls on Roman columns from which it draws its name, the blanched, “calcified” volute 
that Smith’s poet discovers turns towards the symbolic significance of her own poetry 
and her relationship to it in a way that is not or no longer public, no longer recoverable as 
                                                                                                                                                 
discussions concerning the possibilities of achieving sympathy with the Other as found in contemporary 
literary theory and philosophy.   
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evidence of a life once lived heroically in the face of suffering, but written always around 
an absence that is both fragile and “inwreathed.”  
From the beginning, the revival of interest in the poetry of Charlotte Smith has 
attempted to negotiate her position within a Romantic canon of male poets.  With the 
publication of Smith’s Collected Poems in 1993, Stuart Curran argued that Smith’s 
poetry was essential for understanding the importance of Romantic women poets working 
both within and against masculinist traditions.  According to Curran, women writers of 
the Romantic era were more emphatically interested in the beautiful than the visionary 
and sublime aesthetics normally considered as essential to the poetic projects of the 
canonical male poets of Romanticism such as Wordsworth, Coleridge and Shelley.7  This 
is not to say that Curran places Smith outside the purview of the Romantic aesthetics of 
male writers.  Rather, Smith provides access to an “alternative” Romanticism that is both 
attracted to and troubled by a vision of nature that is familiar and strange, one that resists 
the transcendent experience and vision of the poet.   
Critics who followed Curran emphasized the degree to which writers like Smith 
need to be seen outside patterns of gendered discourse.  Jacqueline Labbé and Sarah 
Zimmerman note that Smith creates poetic personae which make sentimental rhetorical 
appeals to readers of her poems.8  Labbé seems to summarize these positions by stating 
                                                 
7 In “The Material Sublime of Women Romantic Poets,” John Pipkin argues that Smith’s poetry inhabits 
both spheres: “Charlotte Smith's poetry demonstrates how the material sublime provides a means of self-
empowerment for women working within the discourse of Romanticism. Smith's sonnets neither 
domesticate the sublime in order to express a "feminine" unity with nature, nor do they exhibit the 
transcendence characteristic of many male-authored poems” (610). 
8 See Jacqueline Labbé, Charlotte Smith: Romanticism, Poetry, and the Culture of Gender (New York: 
Palgrave, 2003), Sarah Zimmerman, Romanticism, Lyricism, and History (Albany: State U of New York 
Press 1999), and Paula Backscheider, Eighteenth-century Women Poets and their Poetry: Inventing 
Agency, Inventing Genre (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005).  Backscheider ties Smith to 
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that she wants “to avoid pigeonholing (Smith) as a ‘woman writer.’  To do so suggests 
that everything that Smith writes emanates from her position as an embodied female, in 
the thrall of her own cultural positioning.  And yet, Smith’s poetry shows instead a writer 
able to play with gender as simply another aspect of identity, and by extension suggests a 
more self-conscious society than we have often wanted to admit” (167).  Labbé draws 
Smith closer to a conception of Romanticism that is representative of a “self-conscious 
society.”  For Labbé, this means that Smith’s poetry attempts to complicate the notion of 
masculine poetic identity without, at the same time, re-naturalizing or re-hierarchizing 
gender as the unspoken site of difference.  Seen from this perspective, Smith gives shape 
to a mode of resistance to or critique of the implicitly gendered position of the Romantic 
poet.  This consideration of Smith’s appeal to feelings and the sentimental codes inherent 
within particular audiences resonates deeply with the attempt to recover a feminist 
poetics that has gone unacknowledged because, in Labbé’s estimation, it is not tied 
specifically to gender as the determining factor. 
Zimmerman’s insight, that Smith’s widespread popularity during the late-
eighteenth century is to be found in her indirect appeals to readers’ emotions, highlights 
the importance of forgetfulness to an understanding of Smith’s poetics: appearing to be 
absorbed in her own suffering in order to establish a self-conscious forgetfulness, Smith 
appealed to the sentimental nature of her readers who, witnessing her distress, became 
                                                                                                                                                 
an eighteenth century tradition of female poets, stating, “we should read the sonnets on their own terms, as 
we would those of a man, and a man writing a sonnet sequence.  Taking as the perspective the lonely 
wanderer, the bard who can travel and see, Smith derives power from this moral, solitary, traditional figure.  
She can understand and paint melancholy and the tradition best in her solitary wanderer because she feels 
it” (329).   See also Sitter, Literary Loneliness, pp.77-103, for an ample discussion of a perceived retreat 
from history in post-Augustan poetics. 
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more interested in her, leading to a greater demand for her work.  Other critics have 
followed her path in analyzing the theatrical performance of Smith’s poetic identity.9  
Zimmerman notes how Smith, by appearing self-forgetful as a writer, or, by appearing to 
transcend the form of her poetry, makes her readers feel less like readers and more like 
listeners or viewers: 
The illusion of being ignored has an unexpected side-effect – the beholder may 
experience the sensation of entering the picture, precisely because he or she is not 
made self-conscious in the act of watching, an awareness that can produce 
resistance.  Smith’s sonnets achieve a similar effect, via the poet’s apparent 
obliviousness to an audience.  What seems to be a desire on her part to turn away 
from social scenes as she wanders, “alone and pensive,” proves captivating.  … 
Fried’s paradigm helps make explicit what is implicit in Elegiac Sonnets: just as 
on the stage, the social world is not excluded by the gesture of turning one’s back 
to an audience.  Like a member of a theater audience or the beholder of a painting, 
the reader of a lyric poem must lose the self-consciousness of spectatorship, must 
feel forgotten in order to forget himself or herself and make the necessary leap of 
identification.  (109-10) 
For Zimmerman, Smith’s readers were able to “make the necessary leap of identification” 
in sympathizing with the plights of Smith’s poetic personae.  According to Zimmerman, 
Smith’s later attempts to write explicitly political texts were met with hostility because 
Smith had already ingrained into her readers a certain set of expectations that were 
                                                 
9 In “Charlotte Smith’s Melancholia on the Page and Stage,” Kathryn Pratt argues that the appeal of the 
Elegiac Sonnets lay in “representing theatricality … as the inescapable mode of experience” (564). 
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aligned with her sentimental, autobiographical poetry; these later attempts revealed a 
much different “Charlotte Smith” than readers had come to know. 
While I agree with Zimmerman’s insight into the importance of forgetfulness to 
Smith’s work, I would also like to disengage this term from critical estimations of Smith 
that implicitly relate forgetfulness to biography.  Indeed, if there is one defining, and 
ultimately limiting, connection between eighteenth-century and contemporary readers, it 
is in the attempt to discover the source of Smith’s vaguely defined desire for oblivion in 
discourses that are more easily comprehensible, such as the functioning of sentimental 
discourses within the literary marketplace or in the story of her own sad life. At the same 
time, the use of Smith’s life as a basis for understanding her poetry as evocative of an 
“alternative” Romanticism that is comprehended along the lines of gender or the literary 
marketplace may also be an indirect acknowledgement that Smith deserves a place within 
the canon of Romantic poetry.  These efforts have not gone unacknowledged by the 
defenders of a more traditional Romantic canon.  Jerome McGann and Marshall Brown 
have argued forcefully for the need to acknowledge a revolutionary “poetics of 
sensibility” or “pre-romanticism;” these efforts, however, to police the boundaries of a 
more traditional field of male Romantic poets serves to displace alternative forms of 
Romanticism that were contemporaneous with the productions of male Romantic poets to 
a period prior to the concrete historical moments of Romanticism, repeating a narrative 
that both Wordsworth and Coleridge seem to initiate.  While it is important to recover 
Smith as a woman who suffered, it is equally as important to discover ways to recover 
Smith as a powerful poet without reducing her poetry to the allegorical representations of 
her own life.   
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In almost every critical reading of Smith’s work, then, one finds repeated the 
same sorrowful biography, in which is related her failed marriage to an irresponsible 
profligate who dragged her along to prison in France while being unable to provide for 
the basic needs of their twelve children.  Admittedly, Smith gestures towards these 
incidents in her various prefaces to the Elegiac Sonnets, which was published in ten 
different editions from 1784 to 1811.  As Esther Schor has argued, Smith needed to 
continue to produce new editions and new justifications for her continued sense of 
melancholy in prefaces and editions that were longer and more comprehensive.10  Yet 
Smith’s prefaces do not specifically identify the source of her sense of sorrow.  Initially, 
then, this lends credence to Zimmerman’s attempt to locate the source of Smith’s 
performance of self-forgetfulness in her own life story as a basis for economic 
recompense.  At the same time, using Smith’s biography as the basis for understanding 
her poems has served to detract from the complex, literary nature of Smith’s poetic 
experiments and reduced close readings of the poems to little more than attempts to tie 
together an abstract, poetic grief and autobiographical events.  Daniel White has argued 
that the very vagueness of Smith’s “real” melancholy promotes an endless fascination 
with her poetry as ambiguous evocations of those kinds of feelings.11  White notes that 
eighteenth-century critics hardly ever reviewed her poems without commenting directly 
                                                 
10 See Esther Schor, Bearing the Dead: The British Culture of Mourning from the Enlightenment to 
Victoria (Princeton : Princeton University Press, 1994), 48-73.  
11 Daniel White, “Autobiography and Elegy: The Early Romantic Poetics of Thomas Gray and Charlotte 
Smith,” in Early Romantics: Perspectives in British Poetry from Pope to Wordsworth, ed. Thomas 




on her personal life, and this observation could easily be applied to her contemporary 
critics.   
Both Janet Todd and Adela Pinch have attempted to move beyond 
autobiographical readings of Smith.12  According to Todd, the close connection between 
literature and biography was an established feature of sentimental literature.  Works of 
literature were not transparent representations of events from the life of the author; rather, 
the discourses of sentiment highlighted the ways that works of literature furnished moral 
examples for life through narratives that involved difficult ethical choices.  Pinch moves 
closer to embracing more nuanced readings of Smith’s poetry that pay attention to her 
craft as a poet and Smith’s awareness of the effect of her poems on readers.  Pinch 
explains that “Smith’s sonnets highlight the literariness of the melancholy they express.  
From the first sonnets onward, they seem to argue that their melancholy may indeed be 
caused by the strange effects of reading and writing” (201).  Employing Earl 
Wasserman’s description of Pope’s allusive Augustan style, Smith’s poems are “like echo 
chambers, in which reverberate direct quotations, ideas, and tropes from English poetry,” 
such that “the fundamental unit around which Smith’s sonnets seem to be built is not so 
much the image, or even the individual word or line, but rather the artful, pathetic phrase” 
(201).  “Borrowing” lines from other poets, Smith was routinely accused of plagiarism.  
In order to defuse accusations of plagiarism, Smith responded by footnoting her poems 
with citations to even the most well-known phrases.   
                                                 
12 See Janet Todd, Sensibility: An Introduction (London: Taylor & Francis, 1986), and Adela Pinch, 
Strange Fits of Passion: Epistemologies of Emotion, Hume to Austen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1996).   
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Similarly, Susan Wolfson and John Anderson have outlined more sympathetic 
and complex models of reading Smith’s deliberatively allusive style of writing.13  Indeed, 
Smith’s poems seem to make the breakdown of containment both a narrative and formal 
necessity, such that the inability to retreat into a vaguely defined, yet comforting space 
that is far from the troubles of the world is already a comment on the inefficacy of the 
sonnet form as a poetic model of containment.14  As we shall see, the failure of poetry to 
provide a feeling of consolation for the individual reader or writer drives Smith to 
embrace a more diffuse community of readers and writers in place of the evanescent 
feelings of an empirical and finite individual; in this sense, Smith’s poetry alludes to and 
calls upon other poets from the past and present and holds them together in sympathetic 
and dialogic communication.  This allusive practice founds a more complex form of 
interaction between Smith and her readers than one based on the interpretive strategies of 
biography.  While Smith’s poetic personae’s powerful desire for oblivion and forgetting 
is a melancholic acknowledgment that individual memories cannot be erased from 
individual consciousness except through death, a sympathetic sharing of these feelings 
generates a form of communication based not on the viability of individual memories, but 
within a shared sense of the inevitable loss of individual identity.  While Smith posits that 
the experience of absolute forgetting is impossible except in the loss of individual 
memories in death, Smith’s poetry, which highlights the failure of poetry to console its 
readers or provide ethical models of behavior, gestures towards the construction of a 
                                                 
13 See Susan Wolfson, “Charlotte Smith's ‘Emigrants’: Forging Connections at the Borders of a Female 
Tradition.” Huntington Library Quarterly 63.4 (2000), and John Anderson, “‘Beachy Head’: The Romantic 
Fragment Poem as Mosaic.” Huntington Library Quarterly 63.4 (2000).  
14 See Robinson, “Elegiac Sonnets: Charlotte Smith’s Formal Paradoxy.”  Robinson’s exemplary analyses 
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melancholic, self-forgetful community of readers that is exiled from the comforts of 
poetry.   
The forms of self-forgetfulness found in Smith’s work can be traced back to her 
use of the Petrarchan sonnet and its complicated embrace and rejection of poetry as an 
adequate representation of real feelings.  In Smith’s hands, the poetic persona of the 
Petrarchan sonnet, as a disembodied voice that haunts, interrupts, and displaces 
individual memory and existence, is subtly reorganized, and the temporal paradoxes 
contained within are radically amplified.  Through Petrarch, Smith suggests that poetry is 
communicated and sustained by a constant speech to silent objects, such as the speechless 
female figure.  Indeed, eighteenth century writers argued over the alleged tediousness of 
Petrarch’s poetry (ironically, in much the same way that Smith’s own poetry was 
dismissed).  Smith employed this critical perception of a kind of mute masculinity, 
wherein the usefulness of poetry is exposed while femininity becomes elusive.  The first 
edition of the Elegiac Sonnets (1784) employs this reversal of gendered distinction in 
order to give shape to a disembodied voice; as we shall see, this is the initial development 
of a poetics of self-forgetting found in later poems. 
For Smith, the reversal of traditional gender roles is counteracted by a silence that 
cannot be gendered at all, a blankness that relates all poets, male or female, to exiled 
wanderers who can never fully enter into the fullness of language or public utterance that 
confirms historical and embodied identity.  As Zimmerman, Labbé and others have 
noted, the representation of self-forgetfulness that Smith employs while appearing to be 
                                                                                                                                                 
expose the way that Smith breaks down the sonnet form in her early poems. 
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overwhelmed with grief becomes the medium through which Smith succeeds in 
conveying her general, allegorical identity or character as “suffering wife” or “mourning 
mother” to an audience of readers.  At the same time, the poet that is able to represent 
feminine, allegorical personae and silent masculine objects also positions this identity 
beyond or prior to the gendered bodies marked with memory that populate her poems.    
Smith’s poems demonstrate a complicated relationship to both the Petrarchan tradition 
and to the “spirit” of Petrarchanism in the eighteenth-century.  It is this complication, in 
fact, that brings Petrarch into view for the development of the Romantic sonnet and 
Romantic poetry in general.15  Following Petrarch, Smith creates feminine abstractions 
that becomes model for poetic identity and give her poetry a constant source of self-
reflective speech and examination.   
The use of Petrarch as a guiding spirit throughout the Sonnets allows Smith to 
posit a sympathetic poetic tradition, one that is constituted by different poets, real and 
imaginary, male and female, who transform the melancholic unattainability of a dead 
beloved figure into an apostrophe to absence itself, as well as to the futility of poetry to 
console the poet.  Smith is one of the first Romantic poets to recognize the rich 
possibilities inherent with Petrarch’s fragmentary and self-negating poetry, one which 
oscillates between the subject and object of poetic enunciation.  Smith’s absorption and 
amplification of Petrarch’s style, initially found in her translations and then within her 
own elegiac contexts, emphasizes an elusive intersection between love and grief that 
deeply questions the stability of individual identity.  From Petrarch, Smith learns that 
melancholy resembles desire, and that absence resembles presence.  What, then, is the 
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significance of Smith’s Petrarchan oscillation between love and grief, one that never hints 
at a literal cause for the speaker’s sorrow aside from vague discontent and melancholic 
longing for the past?  
 
“Sorrows that Sense refuses to forget:” Smith’s Elegiac Sonnets 
As a representation of absence, Petrarch’s attempt to recollect the past or preserve 
an image of Laura is constantly compromised by his inability to provide an image of 
Laura that is objective and untainted by his own conceptions of her.  For Petrarch, Laura 
becomes a figure that stands at the limits of his own memory, yet nevertheless, Petrarch’s 
recollection of Laura as his beloved compels him to return to the site of this melancholic 
recognition as a paradoxical sense of pleasurable grief.  While Smith utilized the 
Petrarchan sonnet form to subvert the gender distinction of the poetic voice by placing 
herself in Petrarch’s position of poet, she also employed this deeper sense of a 
fundamental groundlessness of poetic identity as itself something that challenges gender 
distinctions.  As such, Smith “contains” within her poems different versions of Petrarch’s 
paradoxically pleasurable grief.       
Judith Pascoe discusses how, for Smith, “the tight formal control of the sonnet 
form served as a haven in the midst of a storm of wild feeling.”16   Yet at the same time, 
Smith’s poems serve as warnings for the attempt to turn poems into metaphoric sites of 
containment, for turning the imagination and “wild” or untamed feeling into a poem that 
                                                                                                                                                 
15 See Edoardo Zuccato, Petrarch in Romantic England (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 53-60. 
16 Judith Pascoe, “Female Botanists and the Poetry of Charlotte Smith,” in Re-Visioning Romanticism: 
British Women Writers, 1776-1837, eds. Carol Wilson and Joel Haefner (Philadelphia: U of Pennsylvania 
P, 1994), 17. 
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mollifies the loss it records.  Smith deconstructs the sonnet’s formal containment by 
exploring how the desire for the containment of melancholy, in a number of different 
contexts, inaugurates the overwhelming feelings of melancholy.  Smith’s poems invoke 
the poetic imagination only to extinguish it, allegorically putting into question the 
efficacy of her own poems as distractions from melancholic grief.  As much as Petrarch’s 
attempts to stabilize a beautiful image of Laura in his poetry are undone by the very 
attempt, Smith’s poems seem to deny the consolations of poetry. 
Smith early poems ranged widely, from translations of Petrarch to poems written 
by fictional characters.  What binds them together was a shared sense of alienation and 
grief that transcended their real and imaginary states.  As we shall see, Smith also 
responds to poets who, in the critical lineage of Romanticism, are aligned after her.  In 
“The Glow-Worm,” Smith uses an image that is familiar to readers of Wordsworth to 
discuss the efficacy of the poetic imagination.  It should be noted, however, that Smith’s 
poem first appears in the fifth edition of the Elegiac Sonnets in 1795; Wordsworth had 
already used the glow-worm in 1794 as a poetic image of Milton as a sympathetic 
revolutionary figure, and will use the image of the glow-worm again in 1804 in a Lucy 
poem. 
Smith’s glow-worm owes much of its tropological and symbolic function to one 
of her favorite pre-texts, Thomas Warton’s ode, “Sent to a Friend, on his leaving a 
favorite village in Hampshire” (1750).  Smith did not accept that the physical world 
remained barren of beauty unless transfigured by the poetry.  For Smith, the power of the 
imagination, recorded as a natural world that is inaccessible and unpredictable yet 
everywhere present, does not fit into the narratives of the development of poetic genius.  
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Rather, the attempt to contain the natural world within an inner space that is illuminated 
by the displaced representative of nature is the cause of its destruction. 
When on some balmy-breathing night of Spring  
The happy child, to whom the world is new,  
Pursues the evening moth, of mealy wing,  
Or from the heath-bell beats the sparkling dew;  
He sees before his inexperienced eyes  
The brilliant Glow-worm, like a meteor, shine  
On the turf-bank;—amazed, and pleased, he cries,  
"Star of the dewy grass!—I make thee mine!"—  
Then, ere he sleep, collects "the moisten'd" flower,  
And bids soft leaves his glittering prize enfold,  
And dreams that Fairy-lamps illume his bower:  
Yet with the morning shudders to behold  
His lucid treasure, rayless as the dust!  
—So turn the world's bright joys to cold and blank disgust.17 
 
Initially, the “happy child” is outside “on some balmy-breathing night of Spring,” 
resonating with wind imagery that initially blows with hope and calls to mind the wind 
that inspires Petrarch in the poem that Smith had translated in early editions of the 
Sonnets.  The three images the child sees are not merely a coincidental catalogue of 
natural objects, but are all parts or pieces of a systematic image of nature: the flying, air-
bound “mealy” moth, the sparkling “dew” that falls from the heath to the ground, and the 
glow-worm shining “on the turf bank” all suggest that the “inexperienced” child has 
learned through his random playfulness that his pursuit of these objects has given them a 
kind of overall coherence, and that his seemingly chance activities have given him a 
window into a transformative image of nature of which he is now a part.  As much as 
Petrarch’s poetic pursuit of his memory of Laura is figured according to dispersion and 
                                                 
17 All of Charlotte Smith’s poems are taken from The Poems of Charlotte Smith, ed. Stuart Curran (New 
York : Oxford University Press, 1993).  
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recollection, the child in Smith’s poem initially discovers himself as the center of a 
natural world that is organized around his discovery and recognition of its order.  
Following this imaginative logic, it is his recognition of the air-bound, dull 
colored moth that has caused it to fall through the sparkling dew and become “like a 
meteor:” as a stone that falls through his own newly-discovered “sparkling” imagination, 
the glow-worm falls because it assumes the plenitude of meaning of the natural world 
which seems to give it a material weight.  His first speech, indeed, his first words, “Star 
of the dewy grass – I make thee mine!,” connects the glow-worm to his own activity of 
beating the heath.  His speech confirms what he seems to already believe, and naming it 
“mine” gives him a particular power over the totality that he believes to see.  The child 
becomes, in this way, a poet who feels power over a natural world to which he no longer 
belongs.  Smith gives the imagination of the child a poetic power to reinstate the fallen 
meteor into the sky, or, in other words, to reify his own imagination by raising the meteor 
back into the sky.   
The first section of the poem, then, is an elaborate tribute to the powers of poetic 
imagination.  Circulating through the poem is an image of the glow-worm in all its 
constituent parts.  The child believes that he can reconstitute the image of the glow-worm 
from this circulation through an act of the imagination.  The next three lines cause 
another kind of descent: “Then, ere he sleep, collects "the moisten'd" flower, / And bids 
soft leaves his glittering prize enfold, / And dreams that Fairy-lamps illume his bower.”  
From depictions of an exteriority over which the child believes himself to be master, the 
poem transforms the child himself into the glow-worm, continuing the natural transitions 
inherent from the moth, as a chrysalis, to the glow-worm, to the child.  The “soft leaves” 
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that enfold his “glittering prize” now morph, in his sleep, into the leaves of “his bower” 
that enfold him.  The “Fairy-lamps,” his dreams and his imagination, are the final form of 
the glow-worm, bringing the natural world “into” the child, who analogically creates the 
container or receptacle of his imagination through a construction of the natural totality 
from its fragments. 
However, as the break of the final line of the poem indicates, the power of the 
imagination does not last.  The child awakens “with the morning” and the light of the sun 
to discover that his symbol of inner light, the glow-worm, has been extinguished.  The 
poem, at this point, seems to encourage the reader to re-read the poem with “cold and 
blank disgust,” as the hopes that appear at the beginning of the short narrative in the re-
collective power of the child’s imagination are dashed.  The process of creating an inner 
world that is illumined from within is associated with the evanescent temporality of an 
idle fantasy that the cyclical time of the natural world destroys.  The entire process of 
unifying the natural world takes on the appearance of a hollowed-out aesthetic exercise, 
centering on the “Fairy-lamp” which is itself merely the source of a dream from which he 
has awoken.  Turning the poem inside out, and fragmenting its fragile, narrative unity, the 
natural world and its temporal rhythms return to reclaim its powers with a vengeance.   
Based on the unstable foundations of poetic subjectivity found in Petrarch, Smith 
posits that the exclusions of the poet, allegorically represented as the child, from the 
consolation promised to poetry are revealed in the very work of poetry itself as subject to 
the irretrievable passage of time.  Like the child, the poet is unable to adequately 
“contain” the inner space of the poetic retreat because the power of maintaining the 
illuminating lamps of imagination is beyond her control.  Like Petrarch, Smith’s poets are 
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doomed to repeat the futile gesture of establishing a basis of identity in and through 
poetry.  At the same time, the “glow-worm” is also a politically motivated symbol.  In 
“The Glow-Worm,” the poet describes a situation that is, in effect, an allegory of her own 
condition that is everywhere marked with the anteriority of her own suffering: thus, the 
child figuratively represents the poet’s own past, even as the child is not her, and merely 
a figure of her alienation from poetic consolation.  Telescoping the child of “The Glow-
Worm” outwards to Smith allows us to see that the effect of the benumbing, Petrarchan 
melancholy of the Elegiac Sonnets is to be found in repeated attempts by the poems to 
invest poetry with a significance that it cannot sustain, one that infects the ability of the 
poet to indicate an unavailable reality beyond her own aesthetic figuration.  Rather than 
considering these repeated attempts as a way of performing self-forgetfulness before an 
audience of readers, as Zimmerman has suggested, we might instead consider that Smith 
shares with her readers a sense of shared alienation from the consolations of poetic 
mourning and perhaps even from political efficacy.  While Smith silently repeats 
hallucinatory, ghostly invocations of grief, both political and personal, that hypnotize her 
readers, there are voices from the haunting, revolutionary past, such as Milton’s, that 
cannot be fully reanimated even as they are evoked 
 
Interrupted Consolation  
Earlier in the chapter, I had suggested that the traditional conception of 
Romanticism as an aesthetic associated with specific male poets serves to displace a 
historical complexity, one in which Wordsworth and Smith could be considered as 
responding to each other, rather than merely participating in a historical development of a 
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Romantic ideology, such that Wordsworth re-lights the glow-worm that Smith had 
extinguished.  The evocations of forgetfulness in the Sonnets are representative of the 
illusory powers of poetry, and the desire to escape the cares and anxieties of the world 
within the spell of an oblivion that cannot last.  In “Verses supposed to have been written 
in the New Forest, in early spring” and “The Sleeping Woodman,” the “real” interrupts 
the poet’s momentary rest, but only as that which highlights the artificiality of poetry and 
its evanescent consolation. 
In “Verses supposed to have been written in the New Forest, in early spring,” 
Smith appears to find some consolation by offering images that will overcome feelings of 
melancholy in order to discover a sense of temporary rest in the imagination.  Here, 
Smith attempts to stave off feelings of “black despondence” by presenting a scene in 
which the poet looks upon the natural world for comfort: 
As in the woods, where leathery Lichen weaves  
Its wint'ry web among the sallow leaves,  
Which (through cold months in whirling eddies blown)  
Decay beneath the branches once their own,  
From the brown shelter of their foliage sear,  
Spring the young blooms that lead the floral year:  
When, waked by vernal suns, the Pilewort dares  
Expand her spotted leaves, and shining stars  
And (veins empurpling all her tassels pale)  
Bends the soft Wind-flower in the tepid gale;  
Uncultured bells of azure Jacynth's blow,  
And the breeze-scenting Violet lurks below:  
So views the wanderer, with delighted eyes,  
Reviving hopes from black despondence rise,  
When, blighted by adversity's chill breath,  
Those hopes had felt a temporary death;  
Then with gay heart he looks to future hours,  
When love shall dress for him the summer bowers.  
And, as delicious dreams enchant his mind,  
Forgets his sorrows past, or gives them to the wind. 
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The poem recreates a natural scene that appears to be objective even as it becomes 
allusively descriptive of the wanderer’s state of mind.  The Petrarchan dissemination of 
images is caused yet again by the wind: from “blown,” “Wind-flower,” ‘tepid gale,” 
“blow,” “chill breath,” the poem finally wanders back towards the wind to which the 
wanderer’s cares is given.  The wind also refers to the seeming impossibility of divorcing 
an imaginative scene of nature from the interests of the wanderer or the poet.  The wind 
that blows through the poem and that gives it aesthetic coherence symbolizes the “chill 
breath” of death from the “cold months” of winter and threatens the coherency of the 
natural scene that is being presented to the reader as the wanderer’s subjective gaze.  
Interrupting the alliterative structures of the first few lines, “as in the woods, where 
leathery Lichen weaves / Its wint'ry web among the sallow leaves, / Which (through cold 
months in whirling eddies blown),” “decay,” falling after the first wind image of the 
poem, “blown,” reconfigures the temporality of the poem’s association of “temporary 
death” with the imagination, suggesting that the poet’s interaction with nature not only 
defaces its apparent objectivity, but also, that imagination suffers some form of “decay” 
from the interaction.  In a way that perhaps anticipates Keats’s odes and the sublime, 
monumental objectivity before which the poet’s identity is dispersed or radically 
questioned, Smith’s wanderer is entranced by an ability to witness the passage of time in 
cyclical nature through an imaginative projection into that cycle, sheltered within 
perpetual “summer bowers.”   
The two images that begin the poem (“as in…,” “when, waked by vernal suns…”) 
become the mirrors of the wanderer’s desires, constructed through his feelings.  Thus, it 
becomes difficult to tell if the natural cycle of “young blooms” rising from the decay of 
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the lichen inspires the wanderer to feel the same about his or her feelings of “hope” 
arising from “black despondence,” or, if indeed the cyclical “view” of nature arises from 
the wanderer’s desire for hope.  As in “The Glow-Worm,” the figurative distance 
between seemingly natural processes and the work of the imagination is overwritten with 
the allegorical identification of the two activities.  This hope, however, proves to be 
imaginary; the allegory itself comes to inhabit the wanderer’s sense of self, in that 
“delicious dreams enchant his mind” and he “forgets his sorrows past, or gives them to 
the wind.”  Literalizing the phrase of giving sorrows to the wind means that the wanderer 
has become entranced by the image of his own seemingly natural making; his ability to 
see himself at work in nature makes him adept at constructing these kinds of analogies, in 
which nature in its objectivity, reinforced by the specific biological names of plants and 
insects, reflects to him an image that appears to be true, foretelling his own future 
happiness.  “Forgetting his sorrows past,” then, indicates a slumber that is reminiscent 
more of reverie and conscious forgetting, a forgetting that is figuratively associated with 
the wind as the unheard words of the poet, who may have used the poem to display a 
private feeling that proves to be the sign of an interrupted withdrawal inwards into 
imagination. 
The feeling of withdrawal, then, found here as an essential element of Smith’s 
poetry of forgetfulness, is quite distinct from the ways in which Zimmerman had referred 
to Smith’s theatrical portrayal of the futility of self-forgetfulness.  In making this 
distinction, however, we need to gain some control over the proliferating allegories or 
comparisons that are at stake.  First, let us recall that Zimmerman’s assertion regarding 
the association of theatricality and vision with the act of reading a poem: “just as on the 
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stage, the social world is not excluded by the gesture of turning one’s back to an 
audience.  Like a member of a theater audience or the beholder of a painting, the reader 
of a lyric poem must lose the self-consciousness of spectatorship, must feel forgotten in 
order to forget himself or herself and make the necessary leap of identification.”  Implicit 
in this act of “identification” is a transcendent principle, one that works to leap over the 
way in which identification is established.  What is leapt over in Zimmerman’s analysis is 
that the object of vision deliberately neglects being seen; theatrical productions, the 
natural world and poems are related, we might say, because they turn their backs on us.  
By extension, the “necessary leap of identification” becomes possible only through our 
generous attribution of feeling towards the object or individual with which we are 
concerned; additionally, it is this investment of feeling in the object of sympathy that 
maintains the distance between the viewer or reader and the object.  As I have attempted 
to show in reading “Verses,” however, this distance is not established in Smith’s works as 
the contextual field in and across which sympathetic feelings are communicated via 
works of art, be they plays, paintings, or poems; rather, it is the poem, or work of art, that 
discounts the objective reality of this contextual field that binds together sympathetic 
transactions and exposes it as illusion (“delicious dreams”).  In other words, the way in 
which Zimmerman establishes her analysis of the self-forgetful mechanics of Smith’s 
poems vis-à-vis her audience or readers is already an allegory of the way that Smith 
accounts for poetic illusion as the fit subject of poetry; in other words, for both 
Zimmerman and Smith, the question becomes whether or not the interpretation of poetry 
displaces our desire to read poetry and exhausts its utility as a source of consolation, such 
that reading becomes an immersive, self-forgetful experience that partakes of “temporary 
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death” in evanescent, “delicious dreams” which are immediately subject to immanent 
“decay.”     
Inasmuch as “Verses” reinforces the way that Smith inscribes withdrawal beneath 
the surface of her poems, “The Sleeping Woodman” seems to give an impression of hope 
that is allusively tied to images that undermine that hope. 
Ye copses wild, where April bids arise  
The vernal grasses, and the early flowers;  
My soul depress'd—from human converse flies  
To the lone shelter of your pathless bowers.  
Lo!—where the Woodman, with his toil oppress'd,  
His careless head on bark and moss reclined,  
Lull'd by the song of birds, the murmuring wind,  
Has sunk to calm though momentary rest.  
Ah! would 'twere mine in Spring's green lap to find  
Such transient respite from the ills I bear!  
Would I could taste, like this unthinking hind,  
A sweet forgetfulness of human care,  
Till the last sleep these weary eyes shall close,  
And Death receive me to his long repose. 
 
William Richey has noted how this poem is different from other Smith sonnets, in that 
there is a distinct absence of the sympathy that the poet seems to feel for the suffering 
other.  According to Richey, “In ‘‘The Sleeping Woodman,’’ … (Smith’s) primary goal 
is to illustrate her own personal misery, and, since it would be virtually impossible to 
describe in detail both her own misfortune and that of the woodman within the sonnet’s 
fourteen lines, Smith keeps the focus squarely on herself, using this peasant figure merely 
as an ‘‘unthinking’’ foil to her own all too conscious self. Thus, in each case, her basic 
goal is to elicit sympathy from her readers, but she adapts her approach to best exploit 
what the poetic form will allow. Whereas in her more explicitly humanitarian poems she 
largely subordinates her own suffering to that of her poetic subjects, in ‘‘The Sleeping 
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Woodman’’ she gives her readers only the information that is necessary to highlight her 
own misery.”18  Richey’s identification of the poet’s misery in “The Sleeping Woodman” 
points towards the deeper structure of the poem and its presentation of a voice of abject 
suffering.  For Smith, the distance that separates the Woodman from the poet marks out a 
seemingly insurmountable distance from others in both space (isolation, solitariness, 
exile, wandering) and time (the past as asserting itself within the present as a recollection 
that cannot be forgotten).  These spatio-temporal considerations infect everything beyond 
the origin of the voice, as other writers, nature, other figures, are leveled within a field of 
epistemological alienation.   
For Smith, the desire to partake of the “sweet forgetfulness of human care” is an 
echo of a line from Pope’s translation of the Odyssey, in which Odysseus’s crewmen 
have just passed through Scylla and Charybdis and complain of their ceaseless 
wandering.  While the opening of Smith’s poem is suggestive of a contrast between 
nature and Smith’s melancholy, the language of the poem at this point suggests that the 
“lone shelter” and “pathless bowers” are representative of an imaginary scene and a 
retreat inward to the “shelter” or “bower” that her melancholy seems to necessitate and 
figure as possible receptacles of rest or forgetfulness.  Yet the “momentary rest” of the 
woodman also suggests that the “sweet forgetfulness of human care” is not destined to 
last, further developing the notion that the retreat into the bower is itself momentary and 
imaginary.  For Smith, the poem is itself a kind of shelter or bower that is only a harbor 
of “momentary rest,” and, indeed, not a rest at all, but a desire for rest and forgetfulness 
                                                 
18 William Richey, “The Rhetoric of Sympathy in Smith and Wordsworth,” European Romantic Review 
(Dec 2002; 13 (4)), 432. 
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that cannot avoid the interruption of lived experience.  Smith signals this function 
through the indirect quote from Pope’s Odyssey: 
Then, where a fountain's gurgling waters play, 
They rush to land, and end in feasts the day: 
They feed; they quaff; and now (their hunger fled) 
Sigh for their friends devour'd, and mourn the dead; 
Nor cease the tears' till each in slumber shares 
A sweet forgetfulness of human cares.   
 
Smith’s text calls attention to its constructed nature and its origins in an imagination that 
is itself a repository of texts and pieces of poetry, figuring its “transient” or “momentary” 
respite from the sorrows of the “real,” seen as that which the poem, like Odysseus 
himself, appears to always already avoid.19   
 
Oblivion: The Joys and Sorrows of Forgetfulness 
So far, I have argued for the importance of the Petrarchan thematics of the failure 
of poetry to give permanent shape or consolation from the passage of time.  In “To 
Oblivion,” Smith presents forgetfulness and oblivion as figures that oscillate between 
direct addresses and averted gazes.  To a certain extent, this poem recalls the allegorical 
and Janus-faced “partial Muse” of the first sonnet of the first edition, as well as the poet’s 
“earliest hours:” 
Forgetfulness!  I would thy hand could close  
These eyes that turn reluctant from the day; 
So might this painful consciousness decay, 
And, with my memory, end my cureless woes. 
                                                 
19 As I have already suggested, Susan Wolfson and John Anderson remark on the literary allusions of 
Smith’s poems.  Discussing The Emigrants (1793), Wolfson remarks that it is “a canny intertextual 
performance, and its deepest polemics are about tradition itself” (510-1).  For Anderson, Smith’s Beachy 
Head is “a very modern work of art, an elliptical and self-referential collage.  Smith builds her fragments of 
fragments, fashioning a mosaic of broken tiles” (551).       
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Sister of Chaos and eternal Night! 
Oblivion! take me to thy quiet reign, 
Since robb’d of all that gave my soul delight, 
I only ask exemption from the pain 
Of knowing “such things were” – and are no more; 
Of dwelling on the hours for ever fled, 
And heartless, helpless, hopeless to deplore 
“Pale misery living, joy and pleasure dead:” 
While dragging thus unwish’d a length of days, 
“Death seems prepared to strike, yet still delays.” 
 
In the apostrophe to forgetfulness, Smith’s poet sets up a paradox that is suspended 
throughout the poem.  Balancing a desire for absolute ending, death and loss of memory 
with a gradual fading out consciousness, Smith’s poem evokes a desire to discover a state 
of exemption from memory that may or may not be possible.  Asking for some form of 
relief from her incurable sadness, Smith initially asks forgetfulness to “close / These 
eyes” and “with my memory, / end my cureless woes.”  At the same time, Smith does not 
ask for the end of consciousness itself: “so might this painful consciousness decay.”  
Within the logic of the poem, decay, as a gradual wasting away or wearing out, is 
associated with “eyes that turn reluctant from the day” in the second line in that both 
refer to a movement that is not completed.  The ambiguity of this line, in that either the 
eyes will themselves become reluctant to gaze on anything at all, as in “turn reluctant 
from (gazing on) the day,” or that the eyes will “turn reluctant (as if averse) from the 
day” yet still gaze on something else that is not the day, implies that the decay of 
consciousness that is asked for in the appeal to forgetfulness is itself suspended by these 
two possible readings.  On the one hand, to consider this line as invoking “eyes that are 
reluctant to gaze,” or, eyes that struggle against (re-luctar: to struggle against) seeing, 
would seem to indicate that the poet’s eyes no longer wish to look but that they must, for 
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some reason, gaze.  On the other hand, to turn reluctant from the day indicates the poet’s 
wish to turns without reluctance away from the day.   
 In turning away from the desire to look or to look upon the day, Smith’s poet 
turns towards mythic figures of forgetfulness: “Sister of Chaos and eternal Night! / 
Oblivion! take me to thy quiet reign, / Since robb’d of all that gave my soul delight.”  Yet 
again, in turning towards these figures, the poet encounters another difficulty.  The 
figures, “Sister of Chaos and eternal Night” and “Oblivion,” are now invoked to take the 
poet to “thy quiet reign.”  The next line, “Since robb’d of all that gave my soul delight” is 
ambiguous, yet it appears to be attached to the “quiet reign” of the previous line.  On the 
one hand, while it is certainly possible that the poet is stating that he or she has been 
“robb’d of all that gave my soul delight,” it is more likely that it is the “quiet reign” that 
has been “robb’d of all that gave my soul delight.”  The underlying sense of the poem, 
however, through the compounding ambiguities of turning reluctant from the day and 
desiring to return to a “quiet reign / Since robb’d of all that gave my soul delight” turns 
the poet simultaneously into two mythic figures: Demeter and Persephone.  The final 
lines of the poem, “dwelling on the hours for ever fled, /  And heartless, helpless, 
hopeless to deplore / ‘Pale misery living, joy and pleasure dead:’ / While dragging thus 
unwish’d a length of days, / ‘Death seems prepared to strike, yet still delays’,” indicate 
that the speaker could be either Demeter, who must wait to see her daughter as she 
spends time with Hades in the Underworld, or Persephone, who would “deplore / ‘Pale 
misery living’.”  In both cases, as the poem seems to keep both possibilities open, as the 
desire for oblivion opens up a separation between mother and daughter in which both 
wish to be elsewhere and with the other.  For example, Demeter’s eyes would “turn 
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reluctant from (or struggle against) the day” because her daughter is in the underworld; 
alternately, Persephone would “turn reluctant from the day” in re-turning to the 
underworld.  The structure of the poem serves to displace these two from each other, to 
confuse the subject and object of the lament, while constantly turning them towards each 
other within the same metaphorical space of the poem.  In this sense, the desire for 
forgetfulness as evoked through the poem is a turn towards a separation as the only 
common ground that they share.       
Indeed, this turning and twisting appears throughout the successive editions of 
Smith’s Sonnets, which return again and again to the task of giving an impression of an 
identity that is always formed, contested and dispersed through the very process of 
writing poetry, one that attempts to discover a communal feeling that does not necessitate 
illusory consolations of self-forgetfulness.  The dispersal of individual identities that are 
in search for one another across and through poetry is also the only possible articulation 
of a community that keeps the individual ends at bay.  Smith employs a Petrarchan 
oscillation between poetic subjectivity and objectivity as an oscillation between the 
poet’s ability both to construct images of consolation and interrupt them or announce 
their failure.  Smith’s poets seem to wonder if there is a way to avoid this kind of 
oscillatory movement.  Through a desire to establish a distance between the melancholic 
past and a hope for the present, Smith’s poetry is unable to constitute a self that is 





Addicted to Feeling, Interrupted: Artificial Forgetfulness 
After investigating the limits of these attempts to interrupt of the “real,” Smith 
finally considers, or returns to consider, the forgetfulness that poems contain as a drugged 
experience or anesthetized numbness for a pain that will not cease, constructing an image 
of a time outside of time that will pass without memory and without the ability to 
remember.  The first indication of this alteration is in sonnet 48, “To Mrs. ****;” here, 
Smith outlines the illusory forgetfulness that does not transcend the limitations of the 
body, but, rather, is a constant reminder of the temporal embodiment of the poet. 
No more my wearied soul attempts to stray  
From sad reality and vain regret,  
Nor courts enchanting fiction to allay  
Sorrows that sense refuses to forget:  
For of calamity so long the prey,  
Imagination now has lost her powers,  
Nor will her fairy loom again essay  
To dress affliction in a robe of flowers.  
But if no more the bowers of Fancy bloom,  
Let one superior scene attract my view,  
Where heaven's pure rays the sacred spot illume,  
Let thy loved hand with palm and amaranth strew  
The mournful path approaching to the tomb,  
While Faith's consoling voice endears the friendly gloom.  
 
Smith’s poetic persona here exhibits a sense of benumbed resignation and final 
exhaustion with life.  The negations of the first four lines (“no more,” “nor courts 
enchanting fiction,” “sorrows that sense refuses to forget”) indicates the embodiment of 
the poet’s identity.  The “soul” is tied down to “sad reality,” and the material world of 
experience, the world of the body as aging, wearied, and attached to the passage of time, 
refuses to “court” enchanting fiction.  At this point, it should be clear that the Petrarchan 
motif of courting Laura through poetic images has been expanded to include an 
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inaccessible world of happiness that lies at a far remove from a melancholic reality and 
the ineffectual images that Smith’s poets have built.  In this sense, the poem is a 
meditation on Smith’s own poetic work as an attempt at self-consolation.   
 The poet begins this process through a series of replacements.  The ineffectual 
bowers of Fancy turn into a hope for the consolation of the “tomb,” which is shrouded 
with a Petrarchan, paradoxical “friendly gloom.”  The image of the imagination as a 
glow-worm that shines in the darkness, as relayed in “The Glow-Worm,” is replaced with 
“heaven’s pure rays.”  A final substitution, less clearly made in the poem, occurs at the 
end.  Within the tomb, Smith wishes to hear a voice; for readers familiar with Smith, the 
recording of a voice within her poems is strange, as the typical narratives are descriptions 
of silent encounters between a poet and a pastoral natural world or figures within it.  I 
would argue that “Faith’s consoling voice,” which “endears the friendly gloom,” acts a 
replacement for the poet’s own voice of imaginary friendship to her readers that endears 
the gloom of “sad reality.”  Later, I will describe in more detail how Smith envisions the 
possibility of a hope for the future in a voice that appears felt in its absence or silence that 
Smith’s poet cannot hear while alive, (re)marking an overwhelming sense of the 
inescapable recurrence of hopelessness. 
As we have seen, the earlier poems and editions of the Elegiac Sonnets were 
concerned with poetry’s role in consoling the poet’s feelings of melancholy and loss 
through an impossible forgetting of the past.  Although these earlier poems about the 
failure of poetry to console provide for moments of self-reflection and self-critical 
analysis, later poems allow us to discover how Smith imagines the ways in which poetry 
is not linked to the worlds that provide the settings of these poems, but, rather, linked to 
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the transitory experience of artificial stimulation.  In “Nepenthe,” Smith explores how 
peace and freedom from the disturbing effects of memory may be overcome through 
artificial means that are self-consciously employed against the “sad reality” of life.  
Earlier poems had emphasized that the consolation provided by poetry was necessarily 
and naturally inevitable according to the cycle of life and death as found in nature.  The 
title of “Nepenthe” indicates a drug, one which Smith references in a footnote to the 
poem as being procured by Helen of Troy.  In this poem, as with “To Mrs. ****;” Smith 
explores the relationship between sympathy and oblivion through the female body.  As 
we have seen already, Smith’s poetry frequently operates within a dense web of literary 
allusions; here, Smith signals authors who have been held up as political and aesthetic 
opposites in eighteenth-century literary history: Pope and Milton.20  The “Nepenthe” 
episode is found in Pope’s translation of the Odyssey, yet Smith also references Milton’s 
masque, Comus.  As with Smith’s earlier invocation of real and imaginary authors, Pope 
and Milton are aligned together within a discourse of sentiment.   
Oh! For imperial Polydamna’s art, 
Which to bright Helen was in Egypt taught, 
To mix with magic power the oblivious draught 
Of force to staunch the bleeding of the heart, 
And to Care’s wan and hollow cheek impart 
The smile of happy youth, uncursed with thought. 
Potent indeed the charm that could appease 
Affection’s ceaseless anguish, doom’d to weep 
O’er the cold grave; or yield even transient ease 
By soothing busy Memory to sleep! 
--Around me those who surely must have tried 
some charm of equal power, I daily see, 
But still to me Oblivion is denied, 
                                                 
20 See Robert Griffin, “The Eighteenth-Century Construction of Romanticism: Thomas Warton and the 
Pleasures of Melancholy,” for an account of how Pope’s affinities with Milton were displaced by mid-
eighteenth century critics and poets. 
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There’s no Nepenthe, now, on earth for me. 
 
The poet emphasizes the doubled significance of “nepenthe” by leading the reader to the 
footnotes in Pope’s translation on the “dispute” over the nature of the poison.  The note 
explores the historical evidence for such potions in the ancient world, but also points out 
that “some take Nepenthe allegorically, to signify History, Music, or Philosophy.”  Thus, 
we can take the subject of this sonnet to be both the care of the self and the art of the 
intellect.  At the same time, Smith indicates that Nepenthe can be taken in a number of 
ways and by different authors for various reasons.  Nepenthe, the drug that leads to 
oblivion and “sweet forgetfulness of care,” can be taken physically or allegorically.  In 
which ways can on take allegories?  Can one take poems?  And how long does the sense 
of consolation last?   
How can one take allegories, then?  Or, in another sense, how does one take or 
imbibe the memories of others?  Can memories, which are tied to individual, empirical 
existence, circulate beyond one’s sight, or, be heard otherwise and elsewhere?  Through 
“Nepenthe” and the inclusion of a poem, “Ode to the Poppy,” by a dead poet, Smith 
explores how an addiction to the pleasures of forgetfulness of poetry, through the 
metonymic association of allegory with poetry, such that one takes allegories, provides 
both consolation and the impossibility of consolation.  In these poems, Smith hopes to be 
able to both construct and consume the fatal drug of forgetfulness that is present in the 
poetry of both Pope and Milton.  This gesture towards her literary precursors links them 
together as poets who evoke the despair of melancholy even as the work of eighteenth-
century literary history and, indeed, Romantic literary history, sought to keep them 
separated.  The discourse of a desire for oblivion, which is a familiar mark of Smith’s 
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poetics, carries with it a form of consolation that cannot be consciously experienced by 
the poet, who desires the “art” to write poems that effectively “staunch the bleeding 
heart.”  Employing allusions to Pope and Milton, “Nepenthe” is a complex meditation on 
how Smith’s poet becomes associated with these earlier poets by imaging herself in their 
company.   
The force that subtends this illusory company of dead and dying poets can be seen 
if we consider the allegorical personages of forgetfulness.  As “Nepenthe” demonstrates, 
the poet imagines a past that has no visible signs in the present in order to gain some form 
of control over memory and enact the least possibility of a conscious forgetting; while the 
poem of consolation, the elegiac, is meant to turn aside melancholic suffering through 
mourning, Smith’s poetry interrupts the elegiac consolation in favor of a more intense 
feeling of the impossibility of forgetting within a poetic longing for forgetfulness.   
 
Epitaphs for Identity: From Forgetting to Forgotten 
The brief narrative of critical forgetting to which I alluded earlier in this chapter is 
a testament to this questioning both within and about Romanticism and its origins.  As a 
privileged mode of memory and recollection, the traditional critical evocation of 
Romanticism has difficulty dealing with modes of forgetfulness that neither turn inward 
as opportunities for self-reflection or meditation nor form bases for creativity and artistic 
self-definition.21  The momentariness of self-forgetfulness in Romantic lyricism acts as 
                                                 
21 David Haney alludes to the possibility of reading more deeply in Coleridge’s famous line from the 
Biographia Literaria regarding “that willing suspension of disbelief for the moment, which constitutes 
poetic faith.”  The term of the suspension of disbelief, “for the moment,” is not an innocent or ambiguous 
element of this phrase.  Rather, the “moment” of suspense is redeemed when the suspension ends.  Tracy 
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an origin for creativity which is founded on the impossibility of its meaningful 
interruption.  For Smith, forgetting and oblivion, impossible retreats from the world of 
experience, are already compromised by the self-forgetfulness that poetry is meant to 
provide as the means of retreat.  Thought of as a retreat, then, the poetics of self-
forgetfulness and oblivion are concerned with the spatial or conceptual positioning 
between or amongst writers and readers, rather than actors and spectators, and their 
position in relationship to a mode of being in the world that is mutually alienating.       
As that which drives and troubles the commodification of mourning in the literary 
marketplace, Smith’s poetics of oblivion situates Guinn Batten’s insight into the nature of 
melancholy within the work of the canonical male poets of Romanticism, one which is 
based in “a profound awareness of the significance of a fundamental but forgotten loss, a 
loss that persists as a “nothingness” or absence that is in fact replete with irrecoverable 
but nevertheless emotionally charged presence.”22   When melancholy becomes the 
foundation for an economics of mourning, we may perhaps glimpse the reasons behind 
the contemporary “illegibility” of Smith’s poems.  In other words, self-forgetfulness is 
associated with a kind of silence and incapacity to communicate, and its performance 
with the failure to communicate that which it is representing.  In Smith’s translations of 
Petrarch, and her use of quotations from other poems, poetry mimics speech by 
substituting itself for the inability of the author to speak for herself.  In short, we might 
say that the Elegiac Sonnets represents a life of silence and anonymity, a life that was, 
                                                                                                                                                 
discusses the “self-sacrifice” of Coleridge’s pedagogic model, stating that the value of works of art for 
ethical judgment demands a certain, or limited, form of self-sacrifice that is not absolute, but that depends 
upon an already formed ethical sense. 
22 Guinn Batten, The Orphaned Imagination: Melancholy and Commodity Culture in English Romanticism 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 1998), 19. 
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both within and without, all too determined by forces outside Smith’s control, one in 
which she was unable to speak for herself because it was difficult to discover the location 
of identity beyond these forces impressed upon her.  In the end, these forces are not the 
stuff of Radcliffean Gothic nightmares, but the daily toil of existence.  We might also say 
that the Sonnets found resonance with readers who also needed to feel self-forgetfulness 
as if it were an experience of literature and poetry, as an experience that provided a form 
of consolation in a world that did not seem to allow for the unmediated experience of 
self-forgetfulness or authentic introspection, a world in which identities, whether 
gendered, politicized, commercialized or otherwise normative, were all too present.   
This alignment of literature with isolation is not without precedent in the 
eighteenth-century.  As John Sitter notes, in reference to the literary loneliness of writers 
such as Thomas Gray, and his “Elegy Written in a Country Churchyard,” political or 
historical engagement was less essential than a retreat from politics and history: “the 
post-Augustan poetic world first evident in the 1740s is typically less rich in narrative 
analogues and more abundant in detached images of seclusion and protection; it is a 
world which is often visually indistinct or darkened; and it is a world where consolation 
is prized over confrontation, stasis over strife” (103).  In “The Sleeping Woodman” and 
“The Glow-Worm,” Smith uses mid-eighteenth century conventions of self-forgetfulness 
and transform them into impossibility of a retreat into the bower of poetic bliss.  In 
Reason in History, Hegel, along with his later critical inheritors, will judge these 
conventions as exemplifying a narcissistic emotionalism in language that is distinctly 
feminized as barren or unable to (re)produce dialectical conclusion: “it is not in the 
interest of such sentimental reflection really to rise above these depressing emotions and 
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to solve the mysteries of Providence presented in such contemplations.  It is rather their 
nature to dwell melancholically on the empty and fruitless sublimities of their negative 
result.”23  Hegel represents this seclusion or barrenness as a refusal to participate in the 
world, and as a detachment that stands back from the shipwreck of history: “out of the 
boredom with which this sorrowful reflection threatens us, we draw back into the vitality 
of the present, into our aims and interests of the moment; we retreat, in short, into the 
selfishness that stands on the quiet shore and thence enjoys in safety the distant spectacle 
of wreckage and confusion” (27).  For Smith, we might suggest that this wreckage and 
confusion, whether through legal persecution or historical gender biases, is productive of 
the empty and fruitless sublimities that recur throughout her work, and is recursively 
present as a kind of cultural melancholy that comes to mistakenly represent female 
identity itself as a retreat from the world.  At the same time, her poems are not simply 
representations of melancholic feelings; rather, they give voice to a refusal to accept the 
illusory consolations of poetry as sufficient for the world of “real” suffering beyond the 
poetic frame.  Conveyed through a familiar Petrarchan paradox, Smith’s poetics of 
forgetfulness and oblivion record memories that “sense refuses to forget.”   
 
The Emigrants and the Limits of the Sympathy of Communities 
Even as these identities in the Sonnets experiment with the bare survival of 
identity within and through encounters with the poetic imaginary, Smith also calls on 
specifically gendered images to explain the relationship that she will have with the future.  
                                                 
 
23 Hegel, Reason in History, trans. Robert S. Hartman (New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1953), 27. 
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The Emigrants, Smith’s long blank verse poem of 1792-3, describes a melancholic 
female wanderer’s conflicted reaction to the suffering of French émigrés in the wake of 
French Revolution and the exile of French aristocrats during the Terror, structuring an 
opposition between the artificiality of sight and the authenticity of sound.  Sound and 
hearing voices, for Smith, subtend community, which was indicated earlier in Nancy’s 
notion of a community composes of being-together.  Near the beginning of The 
Emigrants, Smith’s poet, a solitary wanderer lost in thought upon the beach at Brighton, 
describes a group of émigrés approaching her from a distance.  Within this group, 
Smith’s poet sees a figure that closely resembles Marie Antoinette, the banished wife of 
the French king, Louis XVI.  The description of this “Mother” and her state of mind is a 
complex evocation and fitting conclusion to Smith’s own melancholic considerations of 
forgetfulness as a form of poetic activity.  As her children play, Smith observes the 
Mother: 
Their Mother, lost in melancholy thought, 
Lull’d for a moment by the murmurs low 
Of sullen billows, wearied by the task 
Of having here, with swoll’n and aching eyes 
Fix’d on the grey horizon, since the dawn 
Solicitously watch’d the weekly sail 
From her dear native land, now yield awhile 
To kind forgetfulness, while Fancy brings, 
In waking dreams, that native land again! 
Versailles appears – its painted galleries, 
And rooms of regal splendor; rich with gold, 
Where, by long mirrors multiply’d, the crowd 
Paid willing homage – and, united there, 
Beauty gave charms to empire – Ah! too soon 
From the gay visionary pageant rous’d, 
See the sad mourner start! – and, drooping, look 
With tearful eyes and heaving bosom round 
On drear reality – where dark’ning waves, 
Urg’d by the rising wind, unheeded foam 
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Near her cold rugged seat … (lines 213-32) 
 
For the Mother, the shock of the real is found in “drear reality,” in its emptiness and 
pointlessness.  Like Smith’s earlier poetic personae, she attempts to recall a pleasant past 
that is suffused with the signs of artifice, such that the “painted galleries” and “long 
mirrors” which multiplied “the crowd” who paid “willing homage.”  The Mother unites 
the multiplicity of the crowd in her figure at the center of court of artificiality.  This rings 
especially true if we recall the ways that Petrarch often invokes mirrors as symbolic of 
his own poems to Laura.   
The second part of The Emigrants draws Smith’s poet into the poem.  Like the 
Mother, the poetic voice begins to doubt whether or not forms of poetic consolation are 
available to her.  Smith then begins to construct a new form of identity from the 
wreckage of the old: 
Yet there are those, whose patient pity still 
Hears my long murmurs; who, unwearied, try 
With lenient hands to bind up every wound 
My wearied spirit feels, and bid me go 
“Right onward” – a calm votary of the Nymph, 
Who, from her adamantine rock, points out 
To conscious rectitude the rugged path, 
That leads at length to Peace! – Ah, yes, my friends 
Peace will at last be mine; for in the Grave 
Is Peace – and pass a few short years, perchance 
A few short months, and all the various pain 
I now endure shall be forgotten there, 
And no memorial shall remain of me, 
Save in your bosoms; while even your regret 
Shall lose its poignancy, as ye reflect 
What complicated woes that grave conceals! (lines 364-79) 
 
In this passage, Smith alludes to a passage in Milton’s L’Allegro, in which the Nymph on 
the “adamantine rock” is Liberty, and James Beattie’s “On Liberty,” both of which 
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indicate the degree to which Smith takes on the role of the minstrel and prophet.  For 
Smith, allusion creates a link not only between poets of the past and herself, but also 
models the transfer of feelings to a community of listeners who sympathetically and 
literally feel for her through “Faith's consoling voice.”   
In opposition to a poetic construction of the world through the “long mirror” of 
the imagination in Petrarchan artifice, the “long murmurs” of Smith’s haunting voice 
reaches an audience that will forget her “complicated” feelings of grief in the face of their 
own mortality and the passage of time.  In the Elegiac Sonnets, Smith had invoked the 
experiences of the child of “The Glow-Worm” in order to demonstrate the uselessness 
and transitory nature of poetic consolation.  Smith imagines that the reader of The 
Emigrants is also doomed to find that a “lucid treasure,” a living work that speaks to 
present “complicated woes,” will become “rayless as the dust.”  At the same time, this 
admission of the inevitability of material forgetting, such that the intentions and feelings 
metaphorically contained within the written representations of the grief-stricken narrator 
are lost in the transmission, is also a call to not forget.  This call is also a reflection of the 
way in which Smith continues to modulate her positions regarding the usefulness of 
poetic forgetfulness as a means to reflect upon the transitory nature of individual 
experience and historical calamity, and the need for both to be inscribed and left behind, 
even if the original feeling is forever lost in the irreproducible nature of individual 
experience.  Smith’s own poem contains the traces of a “complicated” past that marks a 
literal break, from one book to the other in The Emigrants, between the French 
Revolution to the traumatic suffering of the Terror, in which sympathy for others, found 
in representations of universal human suffering of the French émigrés, runs up against a 
93 
lack of sympathy for members of a fallen aristocracy that, in Smith’s own phrase, 
“deserve the woes they feel.”    
 What remains most fascinating about Smith’s construction of a forgetting 
community (and so not an ideal community of aesthetic forgetfulness), a community that 
will have always been bound together through poems that are in the process of already 
being forgotten, and made up of individual readers who hear her ghostly voice when 
reading her, is that it anxiously models in advance the critical, and occasionally 
embarrassing, problem of allusiveness as it is found in Romantic criticism.  James 
Chandler, in “Romantic Allusiveness,” discusses the way in which critics who were 
interested in authorial intention, such as Harold Bloom and Earl Wasserman, were 
challenged by poststructuralist critics who sought to replace allusion with the 
linguistically driven concept of the intertext.  As related by Chandler, Wasserman finds, 
in Pope’s allusions in The Rape of the Lock, traces of authorial intention that speak to a 
specific audience who is to respond to Pope’s poem: 
If this has been an admissible commentary on The Rape of the Lock, it would 
imply that the mode of existence of Pope’s poetry … ought to be defined broadly 
enough to include a creative act by the reader.  For it suggests that the reader is 
not only to appreciate the poet’s invention in finding appropriate allusions but is 
actively invited by them to exercise, within poetic reason, his own invention by 
contemplating the relevances of the entire allusive context and its received 
interpretation. … Such literature as this is constituted not only by its own verbal 
texture but also by the rich interplay between the author’s text and the full 
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contents it allusively arouses, for these allusive resonances are not peripheral but 
functional to the meaning of the artistic product.24 
According to Wasserman, this passage refers to Pope’s belief that his text will find 
resonance among a group of readers who will “have the kind of ready knowledge Pope 
demands” (427) and the “facts known to any serious reader” (429) of his era.  Against 
this historicist reading, Chandler offers (and chastises) the intertextual analyses of Michel 
Riffaterre, who seeks “to disavow authorial intention while freely employing the concept 
of allusiveness” (464).  Smith’s poets straddle these two worlds of reading: on the one 
hand, Smith’s poets employ the voice of the Augustan poet speaking to “serious readers” 
who will understand the tropes and allusions being employed within her poems; on the 
other hand, however, the voice of Smith’s poets appear to recognize that it is doomed to 
the same fate as these earlier texts and allusions, all of which are namelessly fitted into a 
larger, more inclusive text that brings them anonymously in a “system” of linguistic 
structures.  Wasserman’s “eighteenth-century echo chamber” (to which Pinch will herself 
allude), in which what is said is literally repeated within an informed group of readers, is 
reformulated by Smith into an echo chamber that gradually wears away the intentional, 
living sources of a call-and-response echo.  Smith’s modes of allusion convey, in the 
wearing away of a present community of readers, the traces of passionate, intense 
feelings, all of which are divorced and wandering away from their material experiences, 
to a future community of readers that may not recognize the exact connection between 
speaker and sound, author and written word.  Even though Smith’s poetry seems suffused 
                                                 
 
24 James Chandler, “Romantic Allusiveness,” Critical Inquiry (Spring 1982; 8 (3)). 443-4. 
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in hopelessness, she still has hope for a world to come that will be utterly different from 
her own.  She alludes to herself by calling upon her own poem and literally transforming 
images into sound, such that the “long mirrors” that impotently reflect the exiled Mother 
of Book 1 are changed into “long murmurs” that are still heard by others, even as this 
sound is lost and turned again into images (“as ye reflect / what complicated woes that 
grave conceals”).  Smith’s sympathetic construction of her own identity against the 
artificiality of the French Mother anticipates M.H. Abrams’s seminal work of Romantic 
criticism, “The Mirror and the Lamp.”  For Abrams, Enlightenment poetics was 
characterized by reflection and the exterior reality of things: “objects . . . derive their 
influence not from what they are actually in themselves, but from such as are bestowed 
upon them by the minds of those who are conversant with or affected by those objects."  
The powerful voice that Smith imagined as possible for her future readers is meant to 
transcend the limitations of these forms of Enlightenment poetics even as she recognized 
herself in the imaginative work of the French émigré Mother. 
The sorrows that her senses “refuse to forget” in the first poem of the Elegiac 
Sonnets are not worn away by a long and painful life.  Smith, like many of the characters 
that inhabit her later novels, seems constantly reminded that the experience of the present 
is defined by and constrained to an impossibility to escape or forget about the past.  At 
the same time, Smith is able to position her own feelings of suffering within a poetics of 
oblivion that founds a community of readers.  As we will see in the next chapter, William 
Godwin’s novel of 1805, Fleetwood, or, The New Man of Feeling, extends the interrupted 
consolation of the genre of the elegy into an authorial identity that is constituted by the 
feeling of coming constantly into contact with its own limitations.  For Godwin, 
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sympathy is no longer constructive of a transparent feeling of community based upon a 
rejection of aesthetic consolation, but of political power over others.
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Chapter Three 
The Fate of Feeling: 
William Godwin and Post-revolutionary Sentiment 
 
Consciousness … appears to be one of the departments of memory. Now the nature of memory … is 
exceedingly obvious. An infinite number of thoughts passed through my mind in the last five minutes of 
my existence. How many of them am I now able to recollect? How many shall I recollect tomorrow? One 
impression after another is perpetually effacing from this intellectual register. Some of them may with great 
attention and effort be revived; others obtrude themselves uncalled for; and a third sort are perhaps out of 
the reach of any power of thought to reproduce, as having never led their traces behind them for a moment. 
If the memory be so capable of so many variations and degrees of intensity, may there not be some cases 
with which it never connects itself? If the succession of thoughts be so inexpressibly rapid, may they not 
pass over some topics with so delicate a touch, as to elude the supplement of consciousness?  
-William Godwin, An Enquiry Concerning Political Justice 
 
Forget the suffering / You caused others. / Forget the suffering  / Others caused you. / The waters run and 
run, / Springs sparkle and are done, / You walk the earth you are forgetting. 
-Czeslaw Milosz, “Forget” 
 
 
In the previous chapter, I argued that Smith’s poetry gave a definition for oblivion 
that was designed to strip feeling, which confounded the lived experience of the past and 
the present, of the irresolvable trauma with which it had became categorically associated 
by sharing these feelings among a community of readers.  Smith’s poetry alters the 
eighteenth-century epistemological purpose of recollecting feeling as explored by Locke 
wherein to affirm one’s identity means re-affirming the existence of past experiences in 
the present in a closed circuit exchange with oneself.  Transforming feeling into 
something that is constantly divested or disavowed in a repeatedly expressed desire to 
forget feeling, Smith’s poets project their anticipated material absence and death to future 
anonymous readers through imagined acts of sympathy that they cannot share.  They 
cannot feel Smith’s suffering except, as in Keats’s formulation, in not feeling it.    
Sympathy, in this sense, creates the illusion of feeling by denying the reality of feeling 
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for others; Smith’s poets and, at times, Smith herself explicitly identify with the suffering 
figures of the stock sympathetic passages found in sentimental literature, such as Sterne’s 
A Sentimental Journey and Mackenzie’s Man of Feeling, and discover that sympathy is a 
one-way street for the observer of suffering rather than its victim.   
In this chapter, I will argue that William Godwin, in both his literary and 
theoretical writings, addresses the question of feeling and forgetting in the Romantic 
period from a more overtly political perspective.  Rather than forging the bonds of a 
community based on the sharing of feelings too traumatic for the individual to bear, 
Godwin’s exploration of forgetting seeks to expose the political utility of forgetting as a 
subversive means for gaining individual power in appealing to the mercy of an audience 
or group of readers.  In The Life of Geoffrey Chaucer, Godwin attempted to free the form 
of historiography from an overtly totalizing narrative, and, instead, draw the reader into 
the affective atmosphere of the past that in many ways will come to resemble Nietzsche’s 
attempt at active, historical forgetting.  In Antonio, Godwin’s 1800 play about the ghostly 
yet harrowing effects of self-forgetting before the law of the father, this theme is explored 
through the psychopathology of politics and power.  In Fleetwood, or, The New Man of 
Feeling, Godwin’s 1805 novel, these two earlier evocations of forgetting are fused 
together in a devastating critique of sentimentalism in the guise of a novel of sentiment; 
in Fleetwood, forgetting is always at work as a destabilizing force within personal and 
historical memory, yet this force is never wholly disinterested or ethical in nature.  In the 
political reading that Godwin describes, the desire to forget or exonerate guilt that one 
feels is made in a universal appeal to human emotions that nevertheless is always 
motivated by an attempt to accrue power.  In many respects, Fleetwood is an admission 
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by Godwin that his utopian dreams had, in the wake of the French Revolution, gone 
terribly astray; it is also an indictment directed at counterrevolutionary ideology that had 
appropriated the language of sentiment as a way to excuse injustice.  For Casimir 
Fleetwood, it is sympathy that allows him to forget suffering, to rework the events of the 
past along the lines of his own “development” as an individual within the totalizing 
narrative of his identity formation, and to erase the specificity of the past as it is written 
into the present.  Finally, I turn to a brief pamphlet, written shortly after the publication 
of Fleetwood, in which Godwin gives a possible shape to the ways in which memories 
may be able to survive outside of their potential appropriation by political forces.  In 
“Essay On Sepulchers,” Godwin explicitly addresses the question of the survival of 
memories.  From an individual perspective, Godwin discusses how one might keep alive 
the memory of someone who has died without allowing that memory to be altered by 
one’s own perception.  At the same time, however, in order to still live on in memory, the 
dead must not be allowed to control the actions of the survivor.  Godwin posits the 
creation of an impersonal history driven by a feeling for the past rather than the factual 
recording of past events because, for Godwin, both objectivity and excessive sentimental 
attachment is always and inevitably a disguise for attempts to assimilate political power.   
What is the nature of this strange feeling or the impersonal?  As an idealist, 
Godwin discovers that it is only possible to refer to this kind of feeling in an 
unimaginable future in which our necessary attachment to the past is not distorted by our 
own self-interested desires.  In many ways, it makes of history a text always waiting to be 
written and fundamentally incomplete.  For Godwin, if there is indeed a true or ideal 
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structure of feeling regarding the past, it must come to resemble a form of critique that is 
not constrained by a search for absolute meaning.    
As one of the most powerful early influences on the revolutionary sympathies of 
canonical English Romantic poets, Godwin enjoyed a great measure of fame during the 
late eighteenth-century for his own investigations into a radical philosophy that posited 
the formation of ideal republican communities and communication based upon mutual 
sympathy.  He had inherited the intellectual and cultural tradition of English Dissent, and 
adapted it to the needs of the decade following the French Revolution.  Rousseau was 
very appealing to Godwin because his Dissenting upbringing had prepared him to accept 
the radical, yet highly rational, criticism of society and government that were found in 
Rousseau’s texts.  Godwin’s first and most profoundly influential work, the Enquiry 
Concerning Political Justice (1793), attempted to provide a rational demonstration of 
virtue and good works, and to deduce the values of the French Revolution from essential 
human nature.  Contemporaries were highly enamored of Godwin’s positions: 
Wordsworth remarked, “Throw aside your books of chemistry, and read Godwin on 
necessity.”  Jacobins, the English supporters of the ideals of the French Revolution, were 
deeply invested in Godwin’s theories of the perfectibility of humanity through the free 
employment of reason and the rejection of the “superstitions” of religion and national 
institutions.  Later Jacobin sympathizers were also very interested in Godwin’s work.  
From novelist Thomas Holcroft, to Elizabeth Inchbald and Godwin’s wife Mary 
Wollstonecraft, to later figures such as Shelley, Byron, and Keats,1 and Godwin’s 
                                                 
1 Ford Keeler Brown, The Life of William Godwin (London: J. M. Dent & sons, ltd., 1926).  In his 
biography of Godwin, Brown states, “Keats admired (Godwin’s second novel, St. Leon), and Shelley and 
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daughter and Shelley’s wife, Mary Shelley, Godwin’s influence on the English reaction 
to the French Revolution and its aftermath was extensive. 
For Godwin, the promise of the French Revolution was to be found in the 
recovery of a deep, cultural memory of the public wisdom in the social body itself, a 
rediscovery of the power of rational thinking as the motor to the engine of progress.  It 
was also a specific political event that ratified the foundation of his Dissenting beliefs 
and, indeed, Whiggish Dissenting beliefs of the eighteenth-century.  As the French 
Revolution turned to the Terror and the Napoleonic era of the First Empire, however, 
Godwin, along with Smith and a number of their contemporaries, began to see how much 
the rational philosophy that he had constructed would not be an effective method for 
creating permanent change in social or political institutions.  At the same time, a number 
of his allies who stood in support of the French Revolution began to reconsider their 
positions; several of these figures began to openly attack Godwin in speeches and 
sermons.  Gary Kelley has argued that Godwin discovered that his political theories were 
more “a rationalization of his own emotional and intellectual experience.”2 
At the same time, it may be more appropriate to state that Godwin discovered the 
limitations of his reform efforts not through failure, but through the effective social 
quarantining and ostracizing of individuals who offered any form of dissent.  Indeed, the 
slings and arrows that Godwin suffered during the Revolutionary era did not cease during 
                                                                                                                                                 
Byron praised it extravagantly.  The story of Byron’s admiration was told many years afterwards in 
Maginn’s articles in Fraser’s.  ‘Why do you not write a new novel?,’ he asked Godwin, then in his old age.  
The philosopher replied that it would kill him.  ‘And what matter?,’ Byron returned; ‘we  should have 
another St. Leon.’” (146-7).  
2 Gary Kelly, “'The Romance of Real Life': Autobiography in Rousseau and William Godwin,” in Man and 
Nature: Proceedings of the Canadian Society for Eighteenth-Century Studies, eds. Roger Emerson, Gilles 
Girard, and Roseann Runte (London, Ontario: Faculty of Education, Univ. of Western Ontario, 1982.), 94. 
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the post-revolutionary years and beyond; rather, they increased as Godwin was 
transformed into the scapegoat for the perceived failures of the Revolution.  The 
intensification of this antagonism can be found in the success of the counterrevolutionary 
ideology that Burke employed.  Jerome Christensen argues that Burke had constructed a 
crisis of sorts in English society and, at the same time, provided a model for overcoming 
it: “the first step that Burke took towards ending ‘differences of all sorts’ was to condense 
differences into an antithesis of on sort, pro- or anti-Jacobin; the second, to personify 
difference as the general threat to an individual and national integrity that must be 
protected at all costs.”3  Godwin did not shy away from constructing a problematic 
identity between tyranny and revolution, however, even if his purpose in dealing with 
these extremes was to point out their shortcomings.  Burke’s aggressively antithetical 
construction of the political scene left little room for any practical application Godwin’s 
enquiring spirit of rational investigation.  As we shall see, the effect of this kind of loss of 
place within the social and political, a kind of exile from the public sphere had a direct 
effect on the portrayal of psychological damage that Godwin represented in Fleetwood.   
 
On the Possibility of Sympathetic History: The Life of Geoffrey Chaucer 
In 1803, two years before the publication of Fleetwood, Godwin published his 
Life of Geoffrey Chaucer, a text that Walter Scott would criticize in The Edinburgh 
Review for its lack of narrative and general confusion of historiography and biography.  
Scott’s satiric barbs hide a deeper concern and a recognition that Godwin is 
                                                 
 
3 Jerome Christensen, Romanticism at the End of History (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 2000), 80 
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experimenting with the writing of history in a way that resembles his own.  In his review, 
Scott mocks the “unfeeling prolixity” of Godwin’s text by noting its inability to focus on 
Chaucer himself, instead ranging over a number of topics: according to Scott, Godwin 
proceeds to “give a minute detail of the civil and common law, of the feudal institutions, 
of the architecture of churches and castles, of sculpture and painting, of minstrels, of 
parish clerks, &c., &c., while poor Chaucer, like Tristram Shandy, can hardly be said to 
be fairly born, although his life has attained the size of half a volume.”4  In a final insult, 
Scott jokes that he “was at a loss to know how a whole edition” could be disposed of, “till 
I conjectured that, as the heaviest materials to be come at, they have been sent on the 
secret expedition … for blocking up the mouth of our enemies’ harbors” (219).  In 1804, 
these enemies’ harbors are French, and, as Scott recognizes, the feeling that a French 
invasion could take place was very keenly felt.  Yet the joke also hides a refusal to 
acknowledge that Godwin would ever change from his radical, dissenting views; by 
stating that the texts could be used in “blocking up the mouth of our enemies’ harbors,” 
Scott aligns Godwin with the idealism that threatens England, and alleges that the text’s 
chaotic character gives voice to the chaos that France would perform on England and 
English history.  While The Life of Geoffrey Chaucer, then, would block an invasion by 
putting words into the mouths of the invaders, it also suggests that the enemy is already 
within.   
In many respects, Godwin’s Life is an example of sentimental history in the mode 
of Susanna Dobson’s 1775 translation of Life of Petrarch by the Abbé de Sade, uncle of 
                                                 
 
4 Cited in Edgar Johnson, Sir Walter Scott, The Great Unknown (New York: Macmillan, 1970), 218. 
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the Marquis de Sade.  Yet it is also a highly ambitious scholarly study which not only 
expands upon the brief sketch of Chaucer’s life provided in Thomas Tyrwhitt’s 1798 
edition of the Canterbury Tales, but also provides, as its title promises, “sketches of the 
manner, opinions, arts and literature in England in the Fourteenth Century.”  A great deal 
of the text is devoted to sections such as, “Origins of the English stage,” “Natural 
philosophy in the fourteenth century,” and “Plague of London in the year 1349.”  In the 
midst of all these historical particulars, the details of Chaucer’s life or even speculation 
about the bearing of these events of his life are only referred to in the most oblique 
fashion.   
In his attempt to re-imagine an entire world, Godwin seems to be fully 
overwhelmed by his research into the historical era such that it seems as if the book was 
not completed but abandoned, as his publisher fairly demanded an end to Godwin’s work 
on the project.  In the “Preface,” Godwin explains his dilemma in facing the totality of 
historical events and, indeed, history itself: 
I had advanced as far as the middle of the second volume, when I saw my 
materials growing under my hand, and became sensible that, if they were fully 
treated, the work would extend beyond the dimensions originally prescribed to it. 
… In fact, less is perhaps lost by this compression, than at first I was apt to 
imagine.  It had been my object to collect generally those particulars of 
contemporary manners, literature, and story, which contributed to make Chaucer 
what he was: but the ample survey of what occurred before he was fifty-seven 
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years of age, may seem sufficient for this purpose; nor is it likely that his mind 
underwent any essential revolution after that period.5 
Godwin’s difficulty in “fully treating” these historical particulars forces him to truncate 
the volume and omit discussion of the Canterbury Tales – allegedly the work most 
responsible for Godwin’s interest in Chaucer in the first place.  Godwin himself argues 
that “there is no production of man that displays more various and vigorous talent than 
the Canterbury Tales” (xvi), and so it must have been painful for Godwin to abandon the 
Life at the end of Chaucer’s fifty-seventh year.  Yet the evolution of the book suggests 
that the Life became less of an interpretation Chaucer’s poetry and more of an attempt to 
fathom the ways in which historical context impacts the production of a work of art.  As a 
way of turning aside from the fashionable “memoir” that both Wordsworth and Coleridge 
denounce in the Lyrical Ballads, Godwin’s commitment to delving deeply into the 
historical archive and exploring the cultural and social milieu of Chaucer’s life is an 
essential contribution to the developing methodology of literary biography as a species of 
writing that focuses on the changing “character” of the times at different historical 
moments and the ways in which the present may feel more closely the felt experience of 
those who have lived in the past by recreating a vast contextual apparatus.  Eschewing the 
convenient fictions of a progressive narrative with a tidy teleology, Godwin’s Life 
employs an antiquarian methodology in telling the tale of the life of an individual. 
 In regards to the development of Fleetwood, several crucial elements of the Life 
bear mentioning.  Godwin’s inability or unwillingness to give a coherent narrative shape 
                                                 
 
5 Godwin, The Life of Chaucer (London, Printed by T. Davison, for R. Phillips, 1802), xiv-xv. 
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produces the perhaps unintended effect of underscoring the impossibility of a complete 
historical treatment of a subject, or, alternately, the ways in which narrative may be 
construed as an act of selection of personal or historical materials that is never directly 
recorded into the narrative itself.  As we will discover, Fleetwood confides in his reader 
that his process of selecting and relating the events of his life that give meaning to his 
“errors” has an element of randomness. The Life may be seen to give shape to a gulf 
between the beliefs that an individual has about the workings of history upon identity 
formation and the records of history itself. 
Yet another essential aspect of this project was the decision to produce such a 
biography at all.  While various “lives of the poets” had been produced throughout the 
eighteenth-century, and Gibbon and Hume had contributed extensive national histories, 
Godwin’s use of social and political history to give life to a writer’s productions marks a 
synthesizing moment in the way that history and sentiment are employed in imagining 
the formation of Chaucer’s character: “It was my purpose to produce a work of a new 
species” (ix).  Godwin’s choice of the “first poet in English” as the focus of history 
illustrates his conviction that England’s literary history is a vital national resource that, 
far from being outworn, continues to exert a living presence on those who would 
“befriend” writers through the works they leave to posterity, as the later “Essay On 
Sepulchers” will make clear.  Godwin uses the language of friendship to describe the 
beneficial effects of discourse and reflection: “the reader of soul proceeds, from esteem 
of the work, to friendship, to sympathy and correspondence with the author” (x).  The 
sympathy established through literary engagements with dead authors, then, forges links 
between the past and present; for Godwin, forging these links is more essential than 
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attempting to artificially shape the past from a dispassionate, disinterested, expansive, 
and necessarily incomplete, view of the materials of history.  In Chaucer’s case, it is 
“because his works live” that he, Chaucer, merits attention. 
In Godwin historical contextualization, Chaucer and works have a potent life 
because they represent in English history an essential turning point, one that moved away 
from feudalism and towards reason and Enlightenment ideals.  “When the enormous and 
cumbersome mass of the feudal system was more than half crumbled away, when the 
popular part of our constitution began to raise its head, and man in a collective sense 
learned to look inward upon himself” (317).  This moment of potential, according to 
Godwin, had been suppressed, in the wake of the civil wars of the seventeenth century, 
by the Restoration.  For Godwin, the Restoration’s suppression through “acts of oblivion” 
or hypocritical amnesty towards the revolutionary parliamentarians and Cromwell 
defines, in many ways, how the shapers of an authenticated history must forget its violent 
origins through instructions to insurrectionists or agents of information to not recall these 
hidden beginnings for the public record.  In this sense, Godwin explicitly aligns Chaucer 
with Milton and himself by associating the plague with the Terror: 
It is fallen to the lot of few poets to witness an event so awful, so desolating, and 
so astonishing as this.  If it be true, that to the concoction of a great mind are 
required, not only original stamina of a very peculiar sort, but also great and 
powerful impressions to call all the secret springs of the soul to act, then the 
plague of 1349 may well be regarded as a principle epoch in the life of Chaucer.  
Though he has left no documents on the subject of his works, we may be well 
assured that he saw many things at this time, and heard more, the recollection of 
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which could never be effaced from his mind.  There is something in a calamity of 
this sort, that irresistibly tends to remove the ordinary and plausible medium  
through which human affairs are viewed … that is calculated to lead a great and 
noble mind in particular (living and surviving amidst this human desert) to recur 
to itself for resources, and to become conscious of its worth and its powers. (410-
11) 
Chaucer’s poetic genius was sparked by the sights and sounds of the terrifying plague of 
London in 1348-9.  Chaucer is linked with Milton in this instance.  According to Godwin, 
“Milton, in the period of the plague in London in 1665, retired to the village of Chalfont 
St. Giles in the county of Bucks, eighteen miles from the metropolis; and it was here that 
he brought to a conclusion his Paradise Lost.  Chaucer, at the period of this public 
distress, was a young, and Milton an old man; but Chaucer perhaps, like Milton, retired to 
the groves, and did not cease to be a poet: he persevered a certain internal sereneness and 
activity, while the world seemed to be perishing around him” (411-2).  At the end of this 
chapter, Godwin ironically reminds his readers that a period in which people were dying 
horrible deaths during a natural disaster also gave rise to a nostalgic chivalric order: “the 
institution of the order of the Garter, one of the most splendid and sumptuous festivals of 
the reign of its magnificent founder, took place” (413).  Godwin directs his attack against 
early nineteenth-century Burkean tradition and the Reign of Terror in describing the 
procession of the Order of the Garter as a “stately march between walls of funeral 
sadness and putrefying carcasses” (414).  Godwin was “glad that Chaucer wrote no poem 
to celebrate the memorable triumph” of the English aristocracy, and his silence on this 
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issue aligned him with Godwin’s own silence to describe the historical ascendancy of the 
aristocracy.   
 In proposing this history, Godwin seem to intimate that Chaucer still has moral or 
ethical agency within the present.  The sheer vastness of the amount of history present in 
the Life serves as a lasting testament to historical difference, but Godwin seems 
determined in these works to extract or even resurrect some sympathetic, transhistorical 
element from the materials of history.  Previously, Godwin had pointed towards the 
sympathetic power of literature in the Enquirer and Political Justice, but he would more 
fully articulate his ideas regarding the moral powers of imagination in his later fictional 
and dramatic works, and these ideas would become a part of his legacy to the second 
generation Romantics.  Referring to Chaucer, Godwin states that the poet is “the 
legislator of generations and the moral instructor of the world,” a phrase that seems to 
anticipate Shelley’s statement in “The Defense of Poetry,” in which poets act as the 
“unacknowledged legislators of the world.”  Given the refusal to submit to historical 
narrative in the Life, and the repeated intimations that sympathy and friendship cannot be 
bounded by time, Godwin seems to move towards an idea of imaginative literature as 
anti-institutional and, indeed, anti-narratorial.  In other words, Godwin’s notion of 
literature as moral stands against an idea of literature as systematic, instrumental or moral 
in the reductive sense, of literature as acting as the vehicle of simple moral statement.  
The Enquirer’s rejection of Rousseauvian models of education as tyrannical, such that 
the teacher merely instills in the student a moral sense that is alien to the student’s own 
experience of the world, further explicates this position. 
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For Godwin, literary success depends on a style and subject that fostered 
conversation and critique.  As Godwin’s educational theories developed, however, he 
began to stress the necessity to read books over conversation, promoting change through 
print and the anonymous public sphere.  In “Of Learning,” an essay in The Enquirer, 
Godwin argued that books are “entirely at our devotion, and may be turned backwards 
and forward as we please,” while conversation “is fortuitous and runs wild; the life’s 
blood of truth is filtrated and diluted, till much of its essence is gone.”6  Books, in some 
fashion, speak to us.  These ideas had coalesced into The Life of Geoffrey Chaucer, a 
tribute to a poet, much like Milton or Shakespeare, who used the imagination to project 
their works to an unimaginable futurity.7       
The figure of Godwin’s Chaucer is unlike Caleb Williams, who, although 
desirous of establishing connections with the world around him and leaving behind a 
transparent record of his experiences, seems unable to effectively communicate with 
anyone at all and bemoans his irretrievable isolation.  Chaucer, on the other hand, is able 
to use his imagination to transform his “semi-barbarous” age and transport it into the 
future through writing, effectively speaking to ages that are defined by historical contexts 
that would have been impossible for Chaucer to consider.  Godwin’s Life is able to 
                                                 
6 Godwin, The Enquirer (London: Printed for G.G. and J. Robinson, 1797), 363. 
7 In general, critics have not discussed The Life of Geoffrey Chaucer or Antonio at all.  Indeed, Fleetwood 
has generally been omitted from discussions of Godwin’s work.  Clemit references The Life briefly in the 
context of Godwin’s association of the transition from the medieval to the Renaissance period with the 
transition from the seventeenth-century to the Enlightenment: “the individual’s growing capacity for self-
analysis, which is linked with freedom from political and social inequality, leads to the development of a 
specialized poetic insight: the liberating public context of Chaucer’s time enables him to perceive the world 
around him ‘with senses such as never belonged to man … who was bred a slave.’  It is this exemplary 
human sympathy that makes him a type of true poet” (82).  I would suggest that the penchant for “self-
analysis” that Clemit finds Godwin exploring in The Life as the mark of a “true poet” is the very same kind 
of rationalization that Godwin critiques in Fleetwood.  Clemit mentions Fleetwood in conjunction to The 
Life and on few pages of her study, The Godwinian Novel, without going into much detail. 
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explore ideas as to how the imagination helps articulate beliefs in a wholly improvisatory 
and fundamentally open-ended sense of individual development, such that the historian is 
able to write back to figures of history.  At the same time, Godwin’s insistence on the 
importance of reading over communication, even as reading becomes more dialogic than 
conversation itself, betrays a growing sense of isolation, and even a sense that real 
connections between contemporary individuals are almost impossible to fully establish.  
This sense of friendships or relationships that are almost, but not quite, perfect will be 
explored more fully in Fleetwood as a cause of madness and, indeed, the belief in fiction 
itself. 
 The use of the imagination in forging connections between individuals slowly 
begins to replace the priority of rationalism, perfectibility and logic in Godwin’s 
considerations.  A passage from the preface to Bible Stories elucidates this theory of the 
imagination: “Imagination is the ground-plot upon which the edifice of a sound morality 
must be erected.  Without imagination we may have a certain cold and arid circle of 
principles, but we cannot have sentiments: we may learn by rote a catalogue of rules, and 
repeat our lessons with the exactness of a parrot, or play over our tricks with the docility 
of a monkey; but we can neither ourselves love, nor be fitted to excite the love of 
others.”8  Indeed, for Godwin, imagination is the essence of humanity in the way that it 
preserves a sense of uncorrupted access to the “heart:” “Imagination is the characteristic 
of man.  The dexterities of logic or of mathematical deduction belong rather to a well 
regulated machine: they do not contain in them the living principle of our nature.  It is the 
                                                 
8 Godwin, Political and Philosophical Writings of William Godwin, vol. 5, ed. Mark Philp (London: 
Pickering and Chatto, 1993), 313-4. 
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heart which most deserves to be cultivated: not the rules which may serve us in the nature 
of a compass to steer through the difficulties of life; but the pulses which beat with 
sympathy, and qualify us for the habits of charity, reverence and attachment” (314). 
Godwin’s “sentiment” is a translation of sensibility that includes the complicating 
factors of history, and is not simply a rejection of them or of narrative progress, as 
Mackenzie’s Man of Feelings seems to do, given its fragmented structure and narrative 
based on feeling rather than temporal incidents.  Looking for an alternative to the analogy 
of rule-bound man as a “well regulated machine,” Godwin mines the methods of 
sensibility for strategies that would express impatience and protest the ways of the world.   
In many ways, this tribute to imagination sounds much like Wordsworth and Coleridge, 
with its deliberate intimations of a world to be found beyond the bounds of empirical 
observation.  For Godwin, however, the problem of granting works of the imagination a 
“living” essence that is, in many ways, not merely a figure but real, emerges when we 
consider such works as themselves textual and possessing physical existence, and, in that 
sense, subject to death and finitude.  Books, as containers of imaginative thought, might 
seem ideal for the practice of encountering a variety of opinions from a variety of places 
and times, but reading requires submission and allegiance to a thing that is neither 
conversational nor interactive.  In praising books, Godwin hopes to overcome the dangers 
of deception and subterfuge in actual relations with others while, at the same time, giving 
the reader a power to respond that is outside of the practices of time-bound conversation, 
a power that is nevertheless based on the principles of exchange rooted in conversation. 
 A clue as to how Godwin will address a problem that is in many ways insoluble 
for him can be found in the way that he begins to re-imagine the role of memory and 
113 
forgetting in Antonio, Fleetwood and the later “Essay on Sepulchers.”  The problems of 
memory become intertwined with the notion of the name as a marker of individual 
identity.  The Life of Geoffrey Chaucer addresses this question in the following manner: 
“the first and direct object of this work, is to erect a monument to his (Chaucer’s) name” 
(v).  In other places, Godwin claims that great writers such as Chaucer often will produce 
a text that is a “monument of literature” and worthy of sustained life.  In simultaneously 
describing his own work and the work of Chaucer as monuments to an imaginative 
capability geared towards the future found in Chaucer’s name, Godwin blurs a crucial 
distinction between a representation and the thing represented, between the work of the 
author and the work that commemorates that work, and between individual memory and 
the memories of others.   
 
The Law of the Name: Antonio: A Tragedy 
In 1800, Godwin’s Antonio: A Tragedy was performed at Covent Garden.  
Although it was a critical and popular failure, an analysis of the play demonstrates the 
way in which Godwin employed a version of Othellian jealousy in Fleetwood.9  Antonio 
is about the danger of politically powerful individuals remaining blind to the events of the 
everyday world, and attempting to re-write that history to suit them, no matter what the 
cost.  Yet the play also enacts a crisis of interpretation: how can one know others without 
acknowledging their existence as such?  Is it even possible to acknowledge others? 10  
                                                 
9 See Marvin Rosenberg’s “The ‘Refinement’ of Othello in the Eighteenth-Century British Theater” for an 
explanation as to the way that Othello was turned into a sentimental play in the eighteenth-century. 
10 Aside from Lamb’s review, Antonio has been woefully neglected.  The redoubtable early twentieth-
century critic and Godwin specialist B. Sprague Allen provides interesting historical context for Godwin’s 
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The play takes place in the Spanish court during the end of the Crusades and the 
beginning of the Spanish Inquisition during the latter half of the fifteenth century.  The 
narrative revolves around the return of Antonio, son of a nobleman, from the Crusades, 
and his discovery that his sister, promised to marry a fellow crusader, has instead married 
a Spanish courtier.  Antonio becomes enraged when he discovers the marriage, and 
accuses his sister of forgetting her virtue: “oh, let me then remind thee, nor be thou deaf 
to the sound, of what thou owest thy father, what to society, to virtue, and thy God!”11  
Antonio’s sister Helena stands her ground, however, and this act of rebellion is directly 
addressed to the Enlightenment historians, and to the aristocratic Burke, who are unable 
to discover anything new in history, and to Robespierre, Saint-Juste, and the instigators of 
the French Terror: “thou fool, how dar’st thou thus address thyself to me?  Thou soldier, 
sophist, dissertating pedant!  Who think’st to chain the sallies of the heart; and to seek’st 
                                                                                                                                                 
theatrical productions in “William Godwin and the Stage.” Allen, like much of the early critics of 
Romanticism, such as Abrams, Bloom, and others, situates Godwin in an international context: “I shall not 
be concerned with the anarchic radicalism of Political Justice, but with the relationship of some of 
Godwin’s novels to certain isolated dramas in England, France, and America” (359).  Recent interest in 
Romantic drama may provide a new context for study of Antonio.  In an article on Thomas Holcroft, 
Pixérécourt, and Romantic melodrama as developed in England and France between 1800 and 1802, Diane 
Long Hoeveler argues that, “Holcroft is not a name one frequently cites or sees cited, and certainly if he is 
remembered at all today it is as a writer of Jacobin novels, a compatriot of Wollstonecraft, Inchbald, 
Godwin, and Helen Maria Williams. But it would appear that it is more accurate to see Holcroft as the man 
who wrote—or more accurately stole—the first British melodrama from France” (49).  Of course, Holcroft 
had been writing letters to Godwin in 1800 on drama (“‘Has your Tragedy (Antonio) been performed ? I 
think it would suit the German stage; but the German stage, honour excepted, is almost barren of 
emolument.  Of my Comedy, according to your account, there is little hope.’” [quoted in Paul 2:18) and 
was in the audience for Antonio’s single performance in December of 1800, the same year he saw 
Pixérécourt Coelina and two years before his own translation of the French work.  Hoeveler’s concluding 
remark provides an interesting commentary on Godwin’s work at the time: “Holcroft revealed the moral 
vacuity at the heart of “the temple of morality” that aristocratic Britain had constructed for itself, while he 
attempted instead to erect an alternative “temple of morality,” a nascent Jacobin stage presided over by a 
sharp-tongued maid who was morally centered enough to understand that society was based not on 
outmoded codes of rank and privilege, but on forgiveness, generosity, and human decency” (69).  Antonio’s 
Helena is indeed portrayed on a “nascent Jacobin stage” and is as perceptive as the heroine of Holcroft’s 
translation of the French melodrama, but she finds herself trapped in a “temple of morality” that allows no 
escape. 
11 Godwin, Antonio: A Tragedy in Five Acts (New York: D. Longworth, 1803), 36. 
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to change the warm realities of this fair globe, into a scenic show of empty motions, 
figures without souls.  How I despise thee!  How I laugh to scorn thy lordly 
wisdom!”(36).  Through Helena, Godwin states that Antonio would see the world as “a 
scenic show of empty motions, figures without souls” (36-7), of a history, as it were, 
already enacted, of a marriage already performed before it had taken place.   
In the language of Stanley Cavell, Antonio is incapable of “acknowledgement;” 
he is unable to see his sister except as a character of a particular history that must take 
place.  According to Cavell, “it isn’t as if being in a position to acknowledge something is 
weaker than being in a position to know it.  On the contrary: from my acknowledging that 
I am late it follows that I know I’m late … but from my knowing I am late, it does not 
follow that I acknowledge I’m late … One could say: acknowledgment goes beyond 
knowledge (Goes beyond not, so to speak, in the order of knowledge, but in its 
requirement that I do something or reveal something on the basis of that knowledge.”12  
Cavell’s skepticism is quite similar to Godwin’s definition of skepticism, in that both 
posit a mistrust of the power of reason to define existence: “The Claim of Reason 
suggests the moral of skepticism to be that the existence of the world and others in it is 
not a matter to be known, but one to be acknowledged.  And now what emerges is that 
what is to be acknowledged is this existence as separate from me, as gone from me … 
The world must be regained every day, in repetition, regained as gone” (172).  Not only 
is Antonio late for his sister’s wedding, one might say, he is also much more profoundly 
too late to do anything at all except acknowledge what he is incapable of accepting; 
ironically, this has been foreordained by his new step-brother, Gusman, who predicts 
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Antonio’s eventual madness: “how most ingeniously the human mind devises means of 
torment” (5).   
In the play, the failure to acknowledge others results in the collapsing of the 
boundaries between knowledge and violence, exposing the hallucinated limit that seems 
to separate the two.  The play further complicates the value of imaginary monuments to 
the past by exploring it in a tale about the recovery of patrimony through the living 
presence of the name of the dead father.  Paying close attention to theatrical conventions, 
the play demonstrates the abuse of the powers of the imagination that Godwin seeks to 
establish in other contexts.  In the Life, Godwin writes a monument to Chaucer’s 
monument, and this is an act of imaginary dialogic communication between Godwin and 
Chaucer; Antonio seeks to enact vengeance for the dead father and absent fiancée of his 
sister, yet Antonio has no guarantee that the dead father or absent fiancée would wish to 
have their names associated with the acts of murder and violence that Antonio authorizes 
in their name.  In this sense, Antonio is a play about the Terror as a historical event that 
bases its own authority in a revolutionary moment that is recalled, in Godwin’s terms, 
through acts of forgetting about the moral strictures of the revolution. Antonio 
underwrites the power of the name of the dead and absent to organize the fate of the 
living.     
At the same time, while Antonio appears to be a monster of instrumental reason 
and the law, it is also the case that the language of sentiment at the beginning of the play 
is also couched in languages that seeks out the truth through conversation rather than the  
                                                                                                                                                 
12 Stanley Cavell, The Claim of Reason (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 256-7. 
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discovery of a shared sense of feeling.  The first lines of the play, “Why are these tears?  
What means that smothered sigh? (a pause) / Am I no more the partner of thy heart? / 
Hast thou then ceas’d to love me?” (1).  Later, awaiting a reply from Helena, Gusman 
asks, “Whereof this pause? How dost thou torture me?” (2).  Communication, as in the 
Enquiry and The Life of Geoffrey Chaucer, forms the basis of both real and imagined 
communities, yet the abuse of communication transforms sympathetic feeling into 
demands for knowledge. 
The play makes it clear that Antonio is in a world that seems to have passed him 
by; he is forced to relinquish his mythic status as a national hero in order to become a 
detective who searches after the truth in evidence.  At the same time, the world “as it is” 
is complicit in the creation of Antonio, as it appears that their social world has grown out 
of Antonio’s sense of honor; indeed, for society, Antonio is already more a figure than a 
man, and Antonio, in his own eyes, must assume the role of a figure, of an abstract law, 
that returns to seek vengeance on a world without grounded principles except the shifting 
terrain of feeling, which can and has changed.  To this degree, the sentimental world 
against which Antonio rails is no less guilty than the aristocratic one he thinks he is 
defending.   
The ending of Antonio enacts the tragedy of the play through physical violence 
and death, which Godwin seems to suggest as being the only means of resolving the 
fundamental epistemological similarity of sentimental and rational language.  The 
violence at the end of the play also signals a historical shift: if Antonio’s father cultivated 
tranquility and familial happiness, then Antonio delivers the catastrophic end to that 
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period of time in the present.13  In the midst of a confrontation between Antonio and 
Helena in the final act, Antonio murders his sister as she has refused to give up her 
marriage to Gusman and retire to a convent.  Unable to change history to suit his 
purposes, Antonio eliminates the cause of his grief, killing in one motion history, the past 
and time itself.  This act also demonstrates that Antonio has always felt that his sister was 
his enemy; and, in failing to acknowledge her, he discovers a voice that will haunt him 
forever: “Revive, my Helen: live a little longer!  I cannot lose thee yet!  Bless me again 
with that angelic voice! – This is indeed the pageantry of justice!” (52).  We realize that 
brother and sister are bitter enemies when Godwin has Antonio state, after another failed 
attempt to make Helena follow his commands, “did I not seek this conference that I might 
pour in Helen’s ear conviction?”  Altering Hamlet, wherein Claudius murders Hamlet’s 
father by pouring poison into his ear, Godwin aligns poison and death with conviction, 
with the knowledge of being correct and “just.”  In the language of the Enquirer, Godwin 
states that universal history’s cancellation of the possible, unrealized futures prohibits us 
from conceiving “what it is of which social man is capable, sentencing us “to dance in 
fetters,” “blighted in every grander and more ample development of the soul” (364-5).    
                                                 
13 In one of the many characteristic reverses that he enacts on Godwin’s narratives, Scott will turn this 
historical pattern around: while Godwin’s texts tend to move from an ideal or utopian past, a Rousseauvian 
state of nature in many ways, to a chaotic, amoral present, Scott will locate violence in the past in order to 
narrate the ways in which the present escapes the past (see Ian Duncan’s analysis of Guy Mannering and 
Old Mortality, for example, in his Modern Transformations).  In both Godwin and Scott, however, the past, 
whether real or imagined, has a strong, alluring effect on the present.  This similarity also explains, in many 
ways, their mutual admiration for Henry Mackenzie’s Man of Feeling.  Everett Zimmerman explains 
Scott’s fascination with Mackenzie in the following manner: “in this space between the sense of history as 
what happened and history as our construction is room for the development of the historical novel, with 
Mackenzie’s admirer Scott as its chief practitioner.  Scott inserts the fiction of a private person (Waverley) 
into the context of historical events, thus allowing us to follow the character’s process of construing those 
events through the impediments of bias, accident, and limitation” (299).  The framing of the constructed 
nature of “history” in Scott answers to the inability of Fleetwood, for example, to establish any distance at 
all between the past and present and “to become (his) own historian” (237).   
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The effect on the outraged theater audience of the first and only performance of the play 
was striking.  According to Charles Lamb, who attended the opening with Godwin, the 
effect of the killing of Helena “was, as if a murder had been committed in cold blood.  
The whole house rose up in clamorous indignation demanding justice. … I believe at that 
instant, if they could have got to him, they would have torn the unfortunate author to 
pieces” (quoted in Paul 2:37).  Attempting to perhaps pacify his friend, Lamb speculates 
that it was not the action of the play that produced this effect, but rather that it was the 
poor performance by John Kemble, the famous actor and playwright playing Antonio, 
and that the audience had not been paying attention to the words of the play, but to 
Kemble’s inappropriately calm demeanor.  The audience, then, “found themselves 
betrayed into the accomplishment of a murder, a perfect misprision of parricide” (quoted 
in Paul 2:55).  Reading through Lamb’s report, however, reveals that the play worked all 
too well: while the introduction of the unforeseeable into history can have catastrophic 
effects, introducing the unexpected into a theater-going experience can awaken the 
audience from the “fetters” of predictability and probability.  The shock that the audience 
felt at the only sudden and decisive act in the whole play, reserved for the end of the 
drama, and the effect of the famous John Kemble as the actor who delivered the blow, a 
casting decision for which Godwin had fervently pleaded, demonstrate Godwin’s 
awareness of the moral effect of his play to condemn his own audience.14 
                                                 
14 In a series of letters, Godwin pleaded with Kemble to play Antonio: “You anticipate, sir, the application 
of all this eager, but I hope not ungentlemanlike, expostulation. The truth must be spoken, though with 
modesty, yet firmness. The play can have no justice done it, unless the character of Antonio be in your 
hands. By how much the bolder is the pencil with which I have pourtrayed him, by how much the nearer I 
have suffered his character to border upon what has scarcely a precedent, by so much the more does he 
require the support of an eminent performer” (quoted in Paul 2:50).   
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Seen through the dual lenses of the Life and Antonio, Godwin founds the act of 
communication on the desire to possess something that does not exist, or, more 
cryptically, that no longer or cannot exist.  In this sense, the desire for a form of 
transparent communication, one that is distinct from the artificiality and conventionality 
that Romantics found in the poetry of eighteenth-century, is driven by desires that are 
similar to those which lead to jealousy.  Jealousy is clearly visible in Antonio through 
allusion and plot.  As with Hamlet and Caleb Williams, Othello haunts Antonio; the play 
set in Moorish Spain, and Antonio is rumored to be a great hero, with an eloquent and 
persuasive speaking voice.  Antonio’s feelings for his sister could be attributed to a 
repressed incestuous jealousy, a feeling that could only be resolved through her death; 
absent and gone, like his father and friend, Fleetwood is authorized to feel for his sister in 
a way that her life and living presence before the law precludes.  Yet this reduction to 
latent, illicit and repressed feelings is only adequate as an explanation of Antonio’s 
character.  The play demonstrates that, somewhere in the past, feeling and reason were 
aligned against each other for reasons that are impossible to discern.  Like Gusman and 
Antonio, who both search out the reasons behind their feelings of alienation, Godwin 
directs the meaning of the play outward to a silent audience that, like the King’s guards 
who appear to ring in the action in the final scene, silently witness the horror that takes 
place.  Godwin critiques the audience’s complicit silence, figured in the guard’s silent 
spectatorship of the action on stage, by shocking them with the final, irresolvable 
violence of the play. 
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In the Life, Godwin attempts to reconstruct a vivid historical context that supports 
his imagined sense of sympathy for Chaucer.15  In Fleetwood, objective historical context 
is decidedly missing in the midst of the real that his narrative voice seems to record so 
intensely.  It is the challenge that Godwin poses to his reader to recognize within 
Fleetwood’s elaborately constructed edifice of confession and autobiography other kinds 
of absences, sacrifices and losses that have symbolic currency beyond the figural 
transpositions of Fleetwood’s narrative that seek to contain them.  Although Fleetwood 
acts as a moral monster in his acts of disinterested torture, we must see that these acts are 
contained within a narrative that reduces them to the sympathetic unfolding of his own 
identity, and that turns the people in his life and their tales into personal tableaus.  
Wondering, then, whether Fleetwood really feels terrible about what he has done is 
ultimately less important than in considering how he recollects the value of these past 
events.   
In this sense, Godwin responds, as it were, to the criticism leveled at him by Scott 
in his review of The Life of Geoffrey Chaucer.  The disinterested historical perspective 
that Godwin attempted to construct, wherein the picture of the past is represented in all its 
                                                 
15 I note Godwin’s sympathy with Chaucer here in order to provide insight into the way in which Godwin 
navigated the distinctions between history and fiction as between sympathy and empathy.  The distinction 
between sympathy and empathy is notoriously difficult to trace out in eighteenth-century aesthetics and 
ethics.  Whereas sympathy keeps a distance from the object that it contemplates, empathy involves a more 
direct sense of substitution and a blurring of the boundaries between self and other.  According to Bate, 
“the sympathetic imagination grasps, through a kind of direct experience and feeling, the distinctive nature, 
identity, or ‘truth’ of the object of its contemplation” (132).  Sympathy had a “broad moral application” 
(132).  Empathy, on the other hand, or the German eighteenth-century version, Einfühlung, sprang from a 
direct sense of fellow feeling that was so powerful that it could be imagined as being anterior to or 
overwhelming of morality.  Indeed, the reaction of readers to Goethe’s Werther, who felt so powerfully for 
Werther, was often described using Einfühlung.  Although I have argued for Smith’s blurring of 
distinctions between poetic subject and object in a Petrarchan register, it would not be incorrect to sense 
this mode of Einfühlung at play in her poems (especially considering that one of her first poems was 
addressed to Werther himself).  
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complexity in order to establish an imaginative connection with the past, was turned, by 
Scott, into an example of Jacobin historiography, disconnected from a clear narrative and 
chaotic; the only valuable use of this very long text would be, ironically, to stop up the 
mouth of French harbors, silencing the French influence in England by symbolically 
silencing the fears of a French invasion.  Scott’s critical maneuver intimated that real 
invasion from France could be overturned by a metaphoric silencing of English writers, 
as if Godwin’s texts were covert messages to France that, if silenced, would prevent the 
French from arriving.  The disinterested historical becomes the interested political 
through this symbolic diversion of Godwin’s text from the hands of his reader to the 
harbors of France.  In Fleetwood, Godwin parodies sentimentalism by denouncing its 
attempts to involve everything, even all its alleged “errors,” into a totalizing historical 
narrative structure that assigns meaning to events only in reference to an individual 
economy of confession and redemption.  Through Fleetwood, Godwin demonstrates how 
the personal displaces the political through a process of self-sympathetic selective 
remembering.     
 Godwin, as we have seen, was deeply concerned with the possibility of using 
transparent communication as the basis for establishing morally virtuous social and 
historical worlds.  Through The Life of Geoffrey Chaucer, Godwin attempts to establish a 
connection with the medieval poet through an imaginative reconstruction of his world in 
the present.  In culling materials from the archives, Godwin attempts to give Chaucer a 
hallucinated presence before the reader.  In Antonio, we saw the dark side of this attempt 
to give life to the dead and absent.  Godwin’s resurrects the late Renaissance crisis of 
judgment, in which interpretation is hampered by the competing explanations, in order to 
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confront a late eighteenth-century world.  The post-revolutionary world of England, 
allegorically associated with the birth of the Inquisition, is characterized by a powerful 
sense of nostalgia for, on the one hand, the groundlessness and contingency of immediate 
feeling and sentiment and, on the other, the inflexible enactment of abstract, absolute 
laws that Godwin associated with the Burkean narrative of chivalric sentiment.  At the 
same time, the language employed by its characters demonstrates an interpenetration of 
the language of feeling and reason, of a passion for the law (Antonio) and lawful, legally 
sanctioned passion (Helena and Gusman).  While Antonio becomes a monster by the end 
of the play, as he kills his sister in cold blood, he immediately regrets an inability to 
speak with Helena any longer.  While the Life presents the fiction of speaking with ghosts 
as the basis for the retrieval of culture and history that has been forgotten, intimating that 
the most vivid form of communication with others in the present ought to be based on 
this kind of “reading,” Antonio demonstrates that any attempt to produce this kind of 
communication will result in horrific tragedy.  In one sense, Antonio appears as a 
monster of Enlightenment instrumental reason: a self-destructive figure that enacts the 
epochal shift to the modern world in which is law divorced from the contingent material 
world and the ideal, philosophical forms struggle with the world it is meant to govern.  
Within the Gothic Spanish scene of the play, Godwin melds together the chivalric, the 
sentimental, and the rational in the figure of Antonio, such that the birth of instrumental 
reason also signals its self-destructive life.  It may be argued that Antonio signals a 
turning in Godwin’s thought, one in which the utopian rationalism of his early tract, 
Political Justice, is both rejected and idealized beyond the realm of the possible.  For 
Godwin, figures that become passionately, unconsciously attached to the objective idea 
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of reason and its authoritative voice via personal experience are irretrievably doomed to 
speak and see only ghosts, to divorce experience itself from moral culpability, and to 
traffic in absence.         
 
Unremembering Confessions: Fleetwood, or, The New Man of Feeling 
In an effort to circulate widely the radical political philosophy he articulated in his 
first major treatise, An Enquiry Concerning Political Justice (1793), Godwin frequently 
wrote novels that exemplified the social and political injustices he addressed in his other 
works.  Although it is Mary Wollstonecraft, his first wife, who is typically remembered 
for her work in deconstructing stereotypical eighteenth-century gender roles as based on 
sentiment and feeling, Godwin appears to have shared her dedication to this project.  In A 
Vindication of the Rights of Woman (1792), Wollstonecraft argued that women were 
literally imprisoned within expectations and educational models that restricted their 
gender; in her novel, The Wrongs of Woman: or, Maria (1798), Wollstonecraft provide 
graphic demonstrations of this condition.  Godwin took a similar approach in his fiction, 
and attacked the issue from the perspective of damaged masculine identities and 
pathological social conventions as defined for men.  Although it can be argued that 
Godwin, like Rousseau, attempted to garner sympathy for his own vaguely misogynist 
tendencies in fictional form, Godwin nevertheless consistently worked to expose the 
ways in which traditional constructions of masculinity fostered aggression and jealousy 
between men that threatened the ideals of sympathy that men were supposed to uphold as 
the chivalrous exemplars of a conservative Burkean culture.  
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For Godwin, the imminent destructiveness and self-destructiveness of interactions 
between men undermined the possibility of a rational utopianism, perfectibility of human 
nature grounded in the development of an ideal political community based upon 
individual sincerity, full and honest communication, and mutual benevolence across class 
divisions and in all social relationships to which Godwin clung.  In his third novel, 
Fleetwood, or, The New Man of Feeling (1805), Godwin exposed a conception of an anti-
social masculinity, much like in Antonio, that was based, in his estimation, upon what we 
have come to define as a recognizably Romantic and self-destructive obsession with a 
lost innocence or childhood as the basis for subjective identity.16  Indicting the nostalgic 
poetics that Wordsworth devises from his recollections of the natural world and 
childhood, Rousseau’s educational models and self-forgetful reverie, and the counter-
                                                 
16 One of the more fascinating comments on Godwin’s novel comes from Stendhal.  In an 1805 letter to his 
sister Pauline, Stendhal recommends Fleetwood highly: “Try to read … Fleet Wood, the new novel by the 
original W. Godwin.  Above all, I recommend all of this last work which is possibly a masterpiece” (195).  
It is quite striking to hear Stendhal recommend Fleetwood as a masterpiece some twenty years before he 
embarked on his own course as a novelist.  It may not be an exaggeration to state the Godwin’s work is best 
be understood as a source for the complex psychological novels by authors ranging from Chateaubriand to 
Balzac that were produced in France in the early to mid-nineteenth century.  As an author compulsively 
attracted to and repelled by subjective experience, and who both values and disdains the role of the 
imagination in social and moral life, Godwin easily fits into the mal du siècle milieu of post-revolutionary 
France.  Paul de Man’s Heideggerian description of irony resembles the varieties of passionate, anti-
romantic Romanticism of authors from Godwin to Constant and Stendhal that gave birth to nineteenth-
century realism: “Irony divides the flow of temporal experience into a past that is pure mystification and a 
future that remains harassed forever by a relapse within the inauthentic. It can know this inauthenticity but 
can never overcome it. It can only restate and repeat it on an increasingly conscious level, but it remains 
endlessly caught in the impossibility of making this knowledge applicable to the empirical world” (de Man 
1983, 222).  Although there is much to say about de Man’s evocation of irony here, I would like to note 
that the rather Gothic feeling generated by and complicit in the knowledge of never being able to overcome 
but only restate inauthenticity “on an increasingly conscious level” (indeed, de Man’s transposition of 
repeating to increasingly indicates the temporal predicament of consciousness as an affective form of self-
awareness that seems to go nowhere, and highlights the vertiginous nature of [the] feeling as I am 
describing it), is a complex characteristic of novels in both England and France in the Romantic period, 
loosely defined.  Furthermore, I would assert that this characteristic is developed mutually, from British 
and French authors reading each other’s works, and not independently.  Finally, it might also be argued that 
de Man’s famous reading of the “Boy of Winander” episode in Wordsworth’s 1805 The Prelude, as found 
in his essay, “The Rhetoric of Temporality,” exposes both Godwin’s influence upon Wordsworth and 
Wordsworth’s place in the cross-Channel mal du siècle I am gesturing towards here. 
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revolutionary fantasies of Burkean feudalism,17 Godwin asserts that memories that are 
obsessively and dangerously fetishized become psychological “errors” or “blots” on the 
surface of the mind.  These instances of recollected moral deviancy, driven to a kind of 
psychological damage through Fleetwood’s intense self-analysis, become the foundation 
for his fictional construction of a purely interior world of allegorical references and 
resemblances, one that transforms his isolated memories into a coherent narrative that 
defends the anti-social tendencies he appears to condemn in himself.  Fleetwood’s 
passionate desire to find a male friend within the narrative is a reflection of his desire to 
be read by sympathetic readers; as such, the tightly constructed narrative of his 
confession of guilt is an attempt to anticipate and prevent the misunderstandings or 
misinterpretations that he may be subjected to in the future.    
To relieve intense individualistic suffering, it is certainly possible, as William 
Brewer has argued, that the homosocial nature of Fleetwood’s obsessive desire to have “a 
friend, who is to me as another self, who joys in all my joys, and grieves in all my 
sorrows” (148) expresses an intense, almost homoerotic longing for male companionship; 
yet it is clear that Godwin wishes to explore the limits of male friendship that separate 
culturally sanctioned relations between fathers and sons and externalized, narcissistic 
amour de soi.  For Godwin, this intense feeling reflects a shift from the moral aesthetics 
of sympathy as a model of social community towards a model of subjectivity build upon 
                                                 
17 Although he is frequently characterized otherwise, Tory conservative Edmund Burke, as Christensen has 
argued, was no less of a radical figure than Godwin, and, indeed, Burke was influential for both 
conservative and liberal thinkers during the era of the French Revolution.  According to Christensen, Burke 
fantasized about a return to a “quasifeudal model” of government “that had little actual pertinence to Great 
Britian, where the administrative monarchy that was the future of postrevolutionary France was already in 
place and progressively undermining privilege by the steady expansion of a fine-grained network of 
financial and social regulations” (81); indeed, this Burkean dissatisfaction with “financial and social 
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self-interested empathy, replacing a physical longing for the other towards a longing to be 
the other that constantly cares for the self.   
According to Rousseau, an infamously poor father who abandoned his own 
children, amour de soi is characteristic of a desire for commiseration, for others to feel 
for you.  For Rousseau’s self-representation, as for Fleetwood, to have or ask others to 
feel for you is both an empathetic principle and a literal truth: I know myself through the 
feelings that I lack.  In the Discourse on the Origin and Basis of Inequality Among Men 
(1754), Rousseau analyzes the difference between amour propre (desire for self-survival) 
and amour de soi-meme, and locates powerful feelings of hopeless alienation in the 
savage man trapped in an enlightened world: “Nothing, on the contrary, would have been 
as miserable as Savage man dazzled by enlightenment, tormented by Passions, and 
reasoning about a state different from his own.”18  The savage man, then, seeks out 
commiseration as a search for pity and sympathy from others: “Even if it were true that 
commiseration is nothing but a sentiment that puts us in the place of him who suffers, a 
sentiment that is obscure and lively in Savage man, developed but weak in Civil man, 
what difference could this idea make to the truth of what I say, except to give it additional 
force?” (153). In Godwin’s novel, Fleetwood states, “the desire to possess 
(companionship) was one of the earliest passions of my life … and, though eternally 
baffled, perpetually returned to the assault.”19  Fleetwood’s reference towards an 
aggressive, yet commiserating, metaphor indicating his longing for companionship aligns 
                                                                                                                                                 
regulations” will appear in Fleetwood. 
18 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Discourse on the Origin and Basis of Inequality Among Men. in Peter Gay, The 
Basic Political Writings of Jean Jacques Rousseau (Indianapolis: Hackett Press, 1987), 150. 
19 Godwin, Fleetwood, or, The New Man of Feeling (Peterborough, Ontario: Broadview Press, 2000), 149. 
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him with the Rousseauvian “savage” who is trapped within an unfamiliar world and 
searches for a “friend” who might lessen his feelings of isolation and loss of a natural 
world.  As with the creature in his daughter’s later novel, Frankenstein, or, the Modern 
Prometheus (1818), Fleetwood’s isolation within the world seems to cause him to 
commit the “errors” or “blots” that he later comes to regret.  
In historicist terms, Fleetwood provided the stakes upon which an epistemological 
crisis of sympathy was repeatedly reinvented and reoriented throughout the nineteenth 
century in a masculinist idiom.  If Wollstonecraft critiques the society in which women 
were trapped with unjust expectations or transformed into stunted social beings, then 
Godwin’s critique of stunted, deformed masculine identity, one in which a lost child that 
speaks through a man’s body and against the unstoppable passage of time, is based on the 
ways in which this form of gender identity finds ways to transform alienation and 
isolation into forms of impotent power.  In Fleetwood, Godwin constructs a figure 
imprisoned within own his mind as an act of self-induced evasion, one whose ideal 
constructions mark the point of overlap between Godwin’s and Wollstonecraft’s attempts 
to break down gender differences and find a common theme of suffering and alienation in 
both men and women, one that is both the obverse and justification of Godwin’s more 
philosophical, utopian dreams.      
Godwin begins the novel with Fleetwood’s childhood, describing how he was 
raised by his melancholic father in the wilds of Wales after the death of his mother.  As 
Gary Handwerk notes, Fleetwood’s childhood and “natural” education are those 
advocated by Rousseau: “Fleetwood is raised as a child in just the kind of setting that 
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Rousseau recommends.”20  Yet there is much more at stake in Fleetwood’s depiction of 
his childhood.  In the opening lines of the novel, Fleetwood remarks on his own divided 
past and the sign of guilt that accompanied his birth:21  
I was the only son of my father.  I was very young at the period of the death of my 
mother, and have retained scarcely any recollection of her.  My father was so 
much affected by the loss of the amiable and affectionate partner of his days, that 
he resolved to withdraw for ever from those scenes where every object he saw 
was associated with the ideas of her kindness, her accomplishments, and her 
virtues; and, being habitually a lover of the sublime and romantic features of 
nature, he fixed upon a spot in Merionethshire, near the foot of Cader Idris, for the 
habitation of his declining life. … My father loved me extremely; his actions 
towards me were tender and indulgent; he recognized in me all that remained of 
the individual he had loved more than all the other persons in the world. (53)  
In this highly compressed retelling of his own birth, Fleetwood accounts for his status as 
a cursed child and a sense of being haunted by an absent woman for whom he will  
constantly feel guilty in the face of his father’s melancholic existence.  Rather than being 
seen as a “new” individual or man of feeling, a proper son to his sentimental, feeling  
                                                 
20 Quoted from Godwin, Fleetwood, 15. 
21 Although it is beyond the scope of this analysis, the correlations between Godwin’s Fleetwood and 
Shelley’s Frankenstein cannot be emphasized enough.  The guilty births of the creature and Fleetwood bear 
uncanny resemblances, and both instances indicate how Godwin and Shelley denounce a species of 
Romantic genius that appears, in Godwin’s work, to have been constructed alongside Wordsworth’s own 
poetic experiments with natural sympathy.  Recovering the genealogy of Romanticism in these texts, a 
project that Godwin himself began, provides greater insights into the modes and varieties of the 
imagination as constructed by Wordsworth, Godwin, and Shelley.  For more work in this direction, see  
William Brewer, The Mental Anatomies of William Godwin and Mary Shelley, and David Marshall, The 
Surprising Effects of Sympathy.     
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father, Fleetwood presents himself as being haunted by a fragment of an inaccessible past 
that is outside his control.  He is indulged and loved by his father not because he is his 
child, then, but because he is evocative of his mother.  One of the marks that Fleetwood’s 
father leaves upon him will consequentially produce the doubling of his voice throughout 
the novel, a doubling that is reflective of his recollection of his past and his judgment of 
them in the present.  Indeed, the representation of language itself is crucial to the 
development of Fleetwood’s representation of himself.  As we have seen, he “was the 
only son of (his) father,” and he “was very young at the period of the death of (his) 
mother,” and has “retained scarcely any recollection of her.”  Already, Fleetwood erases 
or forgets the feminine from the scene of his birth in two senses: one the one hand, his 
mother is dead, and on the other, by labeling himself as “only son” of his father, he 
allusively acknowledges or hints that he may have sisters, but that they are unworthy of 
being remembered.   
As I have already intimated, by the time that Godwin published Fleetwood, his 
concerns with Rousseau were being driven through an engagement with depictions of the 
natural sublime as found in the poetry of Wordsworth and Coleridge.  Yet the 
descriptions of the wilderness in Fleetwood are more of a response to his feelings of guilt 
within his domestic estate than an enjoyment of its natural freedom.  Fleetwood’s early 
childhood is devoted to exploring the “wild and magnificent scenery” (17) of Wales, and 
he is attuned to the natural world like a Coleridgean “Eolian harp” (30).  Many of these 
early scenes mimic Wordsworth and Rousseau, further entrenching the split, guilty 
consciousness that marked his birth: “In Merionethshire, I had been a solitary savage.  I 
had no companions, and I desired none.  The commerce of my books and of my thoughts 
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was enough for me.  I lived in an ideal world of my own creation.  The actual world 
beneath me I intuitive shunned” (29).  Describing his activities as a child, he waxes into 
Wordsworthian lyricism: “often have I climbed the misty mountain’s top, to hail the first 
beams of the orb of day, or to watch his refulgent glories as he sunk beneath the western 
ocean” (54).  Fleetwood’s narrative voice, however, interrupts this recollection by bluntly 
stating, “I was a spoiled child” (54).  Later, we will see Fleetwood repeat this sentiment 
in judging the merits of a literary club with which he participated by evoking the 
language of the sublime, a feeling that seems to even erase his own specific past: “I was 
the spoiled child of the great parent, Nature.  I delighted only in the bold and the free, in 
what was at one and the same time beautiful and lawless” (223).  In his childhood 
recollections, we see that the evocations of the “bold and the free” arise from the natural 
world and its images, which “talk to us of that venerable power which is operating every 
where, and never sleeps.  But their speech is dumb; their eloquence is unobtrusive; if they 
tear us from ourselves, it is with a gentle and a kindly violence, which, while we submit 
to, we bless it” (54).22  Rather than acting as a Wordsworthian balm, nature becomes the 
site of a domesticated, feminized violence, one that is “gentle and kindly,” and that offers 
a displaced mirror for his own feelings of guilt and psychological disfigurement.  
Fleetwood’s delight in nature derives from his ability to give speech to this natural, 
feminine silence and to submit the real, which he constantly wishes to evade, to the ideal 
worlds of his own creation.  In this early yet pivotal sense, the feminine is a silent world 
                                                 
22 The importance of Fleetwood to more modern depictions of a perverse masculine identity cannot be 
overstated.  This characteristic of a silent natural speech can also be found in the beginning of Herman 
Melville’s novel, Pierre, or, The Ambiguities, a novel that, like Fleetwood, make use of the languages of 
sympathy in order to expose its dangerously powerful application to a world that was no longer 
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that empathizes with Fleetwood and through which he may speak or displace, rather than 
overcome, his own sense of isolation. 
Reflecting on his childhood, Fleetwood admits to dreaming and falling into 
periods of Rousseauvian “reverie” in these natural scenes, a feeling that “determined the 
color of my riper years” (56).23  Indeed, Fleetwood’s description of waking and sleeping 
dreams reveals how Fleetwood’s narrative strategy is related to this natural, unobtrusive 
and feminine eloquence that nevertheless hides a more dramatic violence than nature, and 
that is intimately connected to the language of empire and domination.  According to 
Fleetwood, the difference between reverie and the dreams of the night is based on a sense 
of power: “with the visions of the night there is ordinarily mixed a depressing sense of 
impotence; things without are too strong for us: in those of the day we are all-powerful; 
obstacles no longer present themselves than they are conquered; or, if it is otherwise, we 
willfully protract the struggle, that we may prolong our pleasure, and enhance our 
triumph” (56).  This passage is characteristic of Fleetwood’s use of language, in that 
Fleetwood’s description is presented as a fact, or, as two possible ways of understanding 
a general sense of waking consciousness and its powerlessness or lack of control during 
sleep.  Yet the language of the passage, and Fleetwood’s narrative, demonstrate that these 
two elements are deeply interconnected with each other.  As with Fleetwood’s 
descriptions of his desire to have a male companion who commiserates with him, the 
polarities between which he oscillates is a helpless impotence and struggle and 
                                                                                                                                                 
epistemologically available to sentimentalism.  For a trenchant analysis of Pierre as parody, see Robert 
Miles, “‘Tranced Griefs:’ Melville’s Pierre and the Origins of the Gothic,” ELH, 66(1), 1999. 
23 For an evocative reading of Rousseauvian reverie within contexts that mirror Godwin’s own sense of 
exile, see Paul Hamilton, Metaromanticisms (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 56-61.       
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aggression Fleetwood is an indictment of Rousseauvian and Wordsworthian natural 
education not because it shows children who are morbid failures, but because it 
demonstrates that children can gain a great deal of narrative and subjective power 
through a form of amour propre and imaginative, narcissistic sympathy for oneself.   
In the case of Fleetwood, recollecting the past does indeed awaken 
Wordsworthian “feelings … of unremembered pleasures” that are not valuable in and of 
themselves, but through their imaginative association with other events in life.  Yet the 
drive to transform these feelings into valuable knowledge or moral guidance in the 
present is fraught with difficulties for Godwin because there is no proper ending point in 
this development.  Parallel to Godwin’s consideration of the moral value of history as 
founded in ways that the potentially unremembered importance of events are discovered 
only in the imaginative chains of association between unlikely agents and actors of 
history (such as Chaucer and Godwin, for example), as well as Godwin’s description of 
the individual’s place in society as driven by his rational sacrifice of his own 
individuality to the common interest, the value of individual memories is not to be found 
in their immanent, representative content as a mimetic scene that is intuitively and 
transparently understood; rather, it is only through the development of an idea or concept 
that links them together.   
The dreams of the night, in which Fleetwood feels hopelessly impotent, come to 
resemble the helplessness he feels in the real, social world.  The most important event in 
the first period of Fleetwood’s life details the way that Fleetwood recollects his rescue of 
a young peasant boy and a lamb.  At the beginning of this scene, Fleetwood presents 
himself from a divine perspective, “on the edge of a precipice” (60).  Below, he sees a 
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young lamb “had wandered by some accident to the middle of the precipice, and a 
peasant was pursuing it, and endeavoring to call it to his arms.  I shuddered at the sight” 
(61).  Fleetwood is pulled out of his omnipotent reverie by an opportunity to display his 
ability to rescue the young peasant and the lamb, both of whom fall into a lake and are 
almost drown.  Yet, as we see, Fleetwood himself needs rescuing.  He leaps into the lake 
to rescue the two, and quickly discovers that he cannot save them himself; all three are 
saved by a young woman in a rowboat, who is the peasant’s lover, and who, as 
Fleetwood later mentions, has “a masculine intrepidity” (64), unconsciously shaming 
him.  Fleetwood discovers in this scene that he does not have the physical prowess that he 
imagines he possess in his reveries.  In spite of her assistance, Fleetwood later dreams 
about the incident in a way that validates his presence: “my heart whispered me, ‘This 
would not have existed but for me!’”(65)..  At the same time, Fleetwood exults how his 
“own gratification was forgotten” (65) while engaging in benevolent tasks.  Using his 
father’s money, Fleetwood quickly bestows upon the young man, his old father, and the 
young woman a small sum, and, economically speaking, keeps them afloat: “My 
attachment to them was that of a patron and a preserver” (67).  Throughout the narration 
of this episode, Fleetwood alters the meaning of the events as they pass: he appropriates 
the place of the “masculine” young woman and imagines himself as their “preserver.”   
Through his childhood, Fleetwood learns to manipulate a separation between the 
real world and the ideal world, discovering that it is women who frequently expose his 
helplessness and inaugurate endless streams of self-analysis.  His youthful assertion that 
he had rescued the peasant boy and the lamb emphasize that his ideal self is not only 
preferable to his real identity, but actively working to suppress it.  The characterization of 
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the young woman as “masculine” at once determines Fleetwood’s sense of competition 
with women and his later hatred of them, forming the basis for his friendships with men 
that are based on a shared repulsion with women that spills over into their own 
relationships.24  Yet by leaving this linguistic trace in the novel, by referring to her as 
“masculine” and then taking her place later in the short narrative sequence, Fleetwood 
performs a sublime narrative operation that discovers threats in the world around him that 
he is able to domesticate, excise or, in the end of the novel, unfeelingly eliminate.  
Fleetwood no longer feels sympathy for the young man and lamb, but convinces himself 
that the language of sympathy can be used to accrue a sense of individual power.  As 
such, when Fleetwood moves from Wales to Oxford and to Parisian society, he is forced 
to suppress his own idealism: “I no longer gave free scope to the workings of my own 
mind, but became an artificial personage, formed after a wretched and contemptible 
model” (32).  In all of the episodes of life after childhood, Fleetwood will harbor a secret 
animosity towards “things as they are.”  Fleetwood’s natural imagination, incipient 
charity, and love of solitude are not characteristics, but defense mechanisms driven is by 
his hatred of society and feelings of guilt, and by women that he feels drive him to seek 
solace in the company of other men in which he may reflect his own aggressive 
misogyny and lost innocence.   
At the same time, Godwin turns Fleetwood into a Rousseauvian narrator who uses 
his considerable imaginative powers in an attempt to transform his misanthropic 
                                                 
24 It is in this sense, I would argue, that Fleetwood is deeply concerned with homosocial bonds and not 
homoerotic desires, as characterized by Brewer.  The impotence and absence of fulfillment within 
masculine friendship, a source of both commiseration and aggression, is characteristic of Fleetwood’s 
friends and mentors.    
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tendencies into the basis of a strange form of sympathy.  Unlike Rousseau’s self-
proclaimed exceptionalism, Godwin, in the preface to the novel, ironically locates 
Fleetwood’s narrative act within the banal, everyday experiences of “every Englishman” 
(5), installing a profound misogynistic violence beneath a surface of chivalric sympathy 
and sentiment that suppresses the reality to which it is allergic; in other words, Fleetwood 
is like every Englishman who would excuses the suffering that he has caused through 
appeals to his own, unconscious misanthropic actions, all of which have been crafted by 
society.  The idyllic childhood that finds its apex in Fleetwood’s rescue of a drowning 
peasant and his lamb, for example, is figurally fulfilled and demolished, and thus 
rendered even more desirable, during his later time at Oxford, a period of his life that 
begins to undo his belief in a benevolent world, and that anticipates his own madness and 
jealousy.  The impact of society on Fleetwood turns his idyllic past into a form of 
resistance against the world and, at the same time, transforms his narrative into an 
interlocking series of events that gloss and bring to light the lost possibilities of earlier 
events.  
At Oxford, Fleetwood falls in with students who symbolize counter-revolutionary 
figures.  He discusses how he began to associate with a group of young reprobates and 
became involved in a cruel trick against a new student, Withers.  Withers, a proto-
revolutionary poet, has written an epic poem about the Fifth Labor of Hercules, in which 
Hercules cleans out the mountains of manure in the Augean stables.  The students ask 
him to read his piece, all the while mocking him behind his back.  Indeed, Fleetwood’s 
unconscious rivalry with Withers as an artist induces him to invite the reader to mock 
Withers by repeating the poem within his own narrative.  Then, the students trick Withers 
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by arranging for him to listen to a puppet they have built of the headmaster, 
ventriloquized by one of the students, who “expels” Withers.  At first, Withers, the naïf 
from a country town, believes that the puppet is, in fact, the headmaster.  He finally 
discovers the series of tricks, becomes despondent, and devolves into madness.  Finally, 
he commits suicide by throwing himself into the Thames.   
It is clear that Withers’ poem is an allegory of the defeat of Godwin’s radical 
reform movement, as the ridiculous poem about the cleansing of the stables becomes a 
historicized version of the impossibilities of reform in a post-revolutionary age that see 
an idealistic hopefulness for the future as a sign of weakness.  In the economy of the 
novel, Withers’s madness serves to prefigure Fleetwood’s eventual madness over an  
imagined jealousy.  On its own, however, the scene in Oxford reads Fleetwood’s later 
madness as an attempt to contain the resonances that this scene has on the reading of the 
novel as a whole, demonstrating that Fleetwood is not, in fact, mad, but is himself 
constructing a scene of madness as a means of explaining his later jealousy. 
Fleetwood’s feelings of beneficial power in Wales is immorally realized and punished by 
the ambiguous, almost unstated belief that he in fact contributed to the fall and drowning 
of Withers.  The vaguely erotic “sigh” (59) that brings William, the peasant from 
Fleetwood’s youth, back to life is fulfilled in the silence and ravings of Withers’s 
madness; indeed, both of these uses of language reappear in Fleetwood’s own scene of 
Othellian jealous rage in response to an imagined infidelity by his wife.  After saving 
William, Fleetwood silently tells himself, “this would not have existed but for me!”  
(64); during the tormenting of Withers’s by his classmates, however, Fleetwood finds 
himself comparing it to his childhood in Wales negatively.  Oxford, in this sense, is his 
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first experience of the cruel world beyond his childhood retreat.  Reflecting on his youth, 
Fleetwood is able to compare these two events, one as the fulfillment of the other, and to 
wish that he would have made different decisions; his early life, and the visual, theatrical 
tableau that he witnesses after rescuing William taught him, in the manner of Diderot, 
that spectatorship is a position of god-like power.  Yet Fleetwood’s sympathy for 
Withers, his feeling for Withers’s suffering, which takes place in the narrative present, 
attempts to make up for his silent acquiescence to Withers’s plight by seeing it through 
the lens of his idyllic childhood.  The lyricism of his youth, and the vision of nature, is 
replaced by what we might call the performance of disinterestedness and the always 
belated nature of sympathy, such that Fleetwood, the objective narrative chronicler of his 
own story, finds again that it is always too late to relieve suffering.  For Fleetwood, the 
failure of sympathy as a way of understanding the world is transformed and raised into a 
fictional ideal: the narrator is necessarily distant in space and time from his objects of 
analysis, and “the failure of sympathy,” its sheer uselessness, fosters a narrative principle 
of objective realism that is conveyed with the passionate immediacy of the traditional 
novel of sentiment.    
In the progress of the narrative of Fleetwood, Withers loses his individual identity 
by becoming the immoral antithesis to William in Wales, and so is the first “fall” of 
Fleetwood.  On the surface, Fleetwood feels pity for Withers; but it is clear that 
Fleetwood is not only not helpless, but is also an active participant in the psychological 
torture of Withers and feels some guilty satisfaction in his demise.  Language once again 
plays a role in Fleetwood’s recollection of these events at Oxford.  Appearing to critically 
reflect on his experience, Fleetwood uses the paradoxical relationship of sympathy and 
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suffering to justify the benevolence of his narrative acts and the particular kind of 
education that he sees his confession as providing for humanity in general.  As we have 
seen, Fleetwood presents the Wordsworthian lyricism of his childish responses to nature, 
and his preference of the ideal world of the imagination to the real, only to ironically 
admonish them as foolish; he is, as he states, much more naturally fitted to be a “judge” 
in life.  In yet another seemingly timeless maxim, Fleetwood states, “youth, if once it has 
broken through the restrains of decorum, is the minister of cruelty.  Even in me, whose 
disposition was naturally kind and humane, there was too much of this” (90). Fleetwood 
then goes on to describe sympathy not as a means of bringing individuals closer together 
outside the bonds of society, but, like the voice of the law, custom or reason, as a kind of 
narrative trick; as much as one can speak in the voice of reason, one can also 
convincingly speak in the voice of sympathy and suffering.   
Through the scene of ventriloquism, Godwin notes that sympathy is a flawed 
epistemology for understanding or improving the world because it can be performed 
through a language of feeling that is merely a performance of feeling, even and especially 
through the language of immediacy and passion that carries with it a kind of cultural 
authority from sentimental novels and Godwin’s own philosophical beliefs.  Specifically, 
as a thrown voice, ventriloquism plays a central role not only in Fleetwood’s description 
of Withers’ tale and subsequent demise but also in the representation of his own voice in 
the present as a constructed fiction.  Godwin’s criticism of political ideology as a kind of 
ventriloquized voice that speaks through individuals is both a sign of his allegiance to 
Rousseau’s denunciation of the artifices of society and his critique of Rousseauvian 
education found in Emile as a replication of that ventriloquism, such that the student 
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“sees” a world that the mentor has prepared for him and through which he communicates 
with him.  Pamela Clemit has noted how Charles Brockden Brown, the late eighteenth-
century American novelist who was heavily influenced by Godwin and who influenced 
Godwin in turn, employed ventriloquism in Wieland, or, The Transformation (1798) as a 
way to demonstrate “the misappropriation of scientific knowledge for personal 
gratification” (133).  According to Clemit, the main character in Wieland employs 
ventriloquism to spy on and “feed his obsessive curiosity” (133) about the heroine of the 
novel.   
Placing ventriloquism in Fleetwood’s experiences at Oxford allows Godwin to 
blur Brown’s use of ventriloquism as a sign of “obsessive curiosity” with Coleridge’s 
consideration of “Reason as a ventriloquist” in a social and institutional sense: if “reason” 
or even feelings can speak through any “uncouth vessel,” they can also be tainted or 
disfigured by speaking through one.  As the schoolboys speak through the wooden figure 
of the headmaster and cast judgment on Withers, they come to symbolize the inability to 
trust the origin of the voice in the mouth of the speaker.  Replicating Fleetwood’s split 
personality, or, rather, speaking for it, the meaning of language that represents events in 
Fleetwood’s recollected experiences becomes disassociated from the ethical authority of 
voice that speaks it.  Indirectly, this scene draws attention to Fleetwood’s motives and his 
unreliability as a narrator.  Building on the social criticisms of his earlier novels, Godwin 
uses ventriloquism to dislocate the origin and moral authority of the voice: as in Antonio, 
where the imaginary voice and auratic power of the father spoke and acted through 
Antonio, Godwin here points out that English institutions may speak as if they have some 
basis of traditional legitimacy, but the results of their actions display a lawless 
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vindictiveness masquerading as the law, one that is directed towards change or agents of 
reform like Withers.  As we shall see in later passages of Fleetwood, however, it becomes 
impossible to discover beneath the masquerades or misrepresentations of the law, or from 
the authorial or fictional voice that ventriloquizes, any vestiges of an original, morally 
just authority or point of reference that is not acting as the most perfectly disguised or 
mimicked voice, or, as “misrepresentations” or “ventriloquism” that are no longer 
possible to discern as such.  The Wordsworthian innocence in the natural world or 
instances of charity as chronicled in Fleetwood’s early narrative merely orient the reader 
to the beginning of a moral and personal fall that will have already transformed these 
recounted scenes into the ballast which Fleetwood will use to stabilize his attempts to 
regain or simply attain them.  That the tyrannical and seductive power of language is 
allied with and driven by the perversion of feelings that “Fleetwood” himself embodies 
and ventriloquizes stands over and above what language is meant to accomplish as an 
instrument in recollecting images of probable or possible events from the past. 
 Unable or unwilling to fully recognize his own participation in Withers’ suicide, 
Fleetwood finds that his ability to judge a world that is so abhorrent to him is made both 
more palatable and compromised by his pride.  After leaving Oxford, Fleetwood goes to 
Paris with Sir Charles Gleed, a fellow student.  In Paris, Fleetwood is swept up in the 
artificiality of French life, yet he finds that he is unable to fit in.  Fleetwood compares 
himself with Sir Charles, who is discovered to be a “man of simple perception” as against 
Fleetwood, who is a “man of imagination” (83).  While Sir Charles revels in salon 
society, Fleetwood flatly denounces his friend’s worldly ambitions: “to express the 
difference in one word: what the farmer saw was external and in the things themselves 
142 
what the poet saw was the growth and painting of his own mind” (85).  Rather than 
allowing him to integrate into the social world, Fleetwood’s powers of the imagination 
cause him to disdain it.  Indeed, it is precisely this blindness that prevents Fleetwood 
from discovering that his Parisian mistress, who is seen in retrospect as a terrifying exotic 
figure, “rather an Asiatic sultana, in her turn of mind, than a native of our western world” 
(107), has been deceiving him.25  Ironically, it is Sir Charles who reveals these 
infidelities to Fleetwood, who responds, “it is impossible to express how sudden and 
terrible a revolution this discovery produced in me!”(109).  Although it would appear that 
this moment of disillusionment would cause Fleetwood to begin to accept the social 
world, he recounts, in an image that would not be out of place in Wollstonecraft’s fiction, 
that he had felt like a victim in a Gothic narrative: 
I felt like the personage of a fairy tale I have somewhere read, who, after being 
delighted with the magnificence of a seeming palace, and the beauty of its fair 
inhabitants, suddenly sees the delusion vanish, the palace is converted to a 
charnel-house, and what he thought its beautiful tenants, are seen to be the most 
withered and loathsome hags that ever shocked the eyes of a mortal. (114-5) 
Nevertheless, in spite of this revelation through the loss of the bewitching figure of the 
eastern “Asiatic” temptress, Fleetwood maintains, “my sensibility was not one atom 
diminished by my perpetual disappointments” (116).  Indeed, Fleetwood’s ability at 
                                                 
25 In his imaginative recollections, Fleetwood constantly ships his perceived enemies and rivals off to the 
corners of the British Empire, whether it is to Asia or the West Indian colonies.  It goes without saying that 
Fleetwood provides an implicit critique of British nationalism in favor of a more cosmopolitan and 
Enlightenment perspective.  As we shall see, Godwin couches Fleetwood’s attempt to defend his paternal 
estate from imagined rivals and false plots within the language of Burkean sentiment, which locates the 
foreign, savage Other within the nation.  Through Fleetwood, Godwin places this imaginary sense of being 
under siege within a misanthropic, mad figure who sees the world itself as allied against him.     
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imagining Gothic visions of reality behind the picture of the world as Sir Charles sees it 
augur the problems that his overactive imagination will both produce and excuse.   
Fleetwood retreats from Paris to Switzerland for consolation: “I hastened … from  
Paris … and plunged amidst the wild and desolate scenery of Mount Jura” (116).  Yet the 
natural world has been forever tainted by his experiences of la monde in Paris: “the 
instant I plunged into solitude and the retreats of uncultivated nature, my reveries became 
endless and inexhaustible” (117).  His imagination haunts him with images of his 
faithless mistress: “where no human form was to be discerned, there the figure of the 
Countess de B- flitted before me” (118).  Wandering in the Romantic scenery of the Alps, 
Fleetwood reflects on how difficult it has been for him to write the narrative of his life 
and explains why he has felt compelled to include “a tale of debaucheries” that he 
experienced in Paris within his narrative confession: 
Most earnestly do I entreat the reader to pardon me, for having thus much 
interspersed these pages with a tale of debaucheries.  It is not, I solemnly assure 
him, that I have any pleasure in the recollection, or that I glory in my shame. … I 
do not look back on (this incidents) without aversion … Why have I introduced it 
then?  Because it was necessary to make my subsequent history understood.  I 
have a train of follies, less loathsome, but more tragic, to unfold; which could not 
have been accounted for, unless it had been previously shown by what causes I, 
the author, and in some respects the principle sufferer, was rendered what I was.  I 
was a misanthrope.  My misanthropy was a conclusion, however erroneous, that I 
unwillingly entertained.  I felt what I was, and I pined for the society of my like.  
It was with inexpressible sorrow that I believed I was alone in the world.  My 
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sensibility was not one atom diminished by my perpetual disappointments.  I felt 
what man ought to be, and I could not prevent the model of what he ought to be 
from being for ever present to my mind. (115) 
For Fleetwood, the “new” man of feeling, what man “ought to be” becomes the 
foundation for his transformation of the world around him through the imagination rather 
than through concrete acts of charity.  Fleetwood’s passion for reason and analysis 
overwhelm his own conscious recollection of events, and turn the experiences of self-
forgetting in his past into elaborately staged exercises to excuse whatever rage or 
violence he feels as an outcast from the very society he despises.   
 Fleetwood begins the final incidents of his novel, a tale about the Othellian 
jealousy he felt for his wife, by describing the low state in which he had arrived after 
becoming disillusioned with a foray in politics as a successful member of Parliament.  In 
a moment of Burkean nostalgia over the past, Fleetwood laments, “I saw that the public 
character of England, as it exists in the best pages of our history, was gone.  I perceived 
that we were grown a commercial and arithmetical nation; and that as we extended the 
superficies of our empire, we lost its moral sinews and strengths” (226).   Indeed, the 
“wealth of either India has been poured upon us, to smother that free spirit which can 
never be preserved but in a moderate fortune” (226).  Ironically, as we have seen, 
Fleetwood tends to feel a strange attraction to the colonial, Gothic Others of his tale, such 
as Fleetwood’s first mistress, the “Asiatic” Parisian countess.  Indeed, while the imperial 
imaginary in Fleetwood’s estimation is reduced to finding new ways to exploit 
commercial interests, Fleetwood’s own imagination is able to maintain its distance from 
grosser world of economic desires for wealth by embracing “novelty and change,” which 
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also have a “sovereign power over the human mind” (228, my emphasis).  Indeed, in this 
final retreat from the public world, Fleetwood decides to recapture a sense of this lost 
England through the extermination of the bewitching, revolutionary colonial Other from 
his own paternal estate.   
Setting up this final section of the novel, Fleetwood relates to us his encounter 
with Macneil, “who was supposed to have possessed the confidence of the celebrated 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau,” and his family.  Mary Macneil is one of Macneil’s daughters, 
and Fleetwood begins to feel an attraction towards her.  His initial description of Mary 
emphasizes her literal transparency, as against the artificiality of Parisian women: 
Mary had a complexion which, in point of fairness and transparency, could not be 
excelled: her blood absolutely spoke in her cheeks; the soft white of her hands and 
neck looked as if they would have melted away beneath your touch; her eyes were 
so animated, and her whole physiognomy so sensitive, that is was scarcely 
possible to believe that a thought could pass in her heart, which might not be read 
in her face. (246) 
Indeed, Mary does not appear human as much as an immaterial, imaginary being whose 
transparency and bookish readability seem perfectly suitable as the mirror for 
Fleetwood’s own imaginary constructions of her.  
While Mary and Fleetwood eventually become husband and wife, Mary does not 
seem absolutely perfectly suited to be Fleetwood’s ideal friend.  For Fleetwood, the ideal 
friend is a male friend, a “brother of the heart” (230), as he is “impressed with no 
favorable prepossessions toward the female sex” (252).  Before his death, Mary’s father 
predicts Fleetwood’s future plight by comparing him to Robinson Crusoe (the only novel 
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that Rousseau’s mentor allows his pupil to read in Emile) and Prospero from The 
Tempest.  Macneil is a radical believer in the innate moral goodness of mankind, and 
proposes the following prediction of Fleetwood’s future: 
“I have sometimes had the thought,” continued Mr. Macneil, “of composing a 
little novel or tale in illustration of my position.  I would take a man, as my friend 
Fleetwood, for example, who looks with a disdainful eye upon his species, and 
has scarcely the patience to enter into discourse and intercourse with any one he 
meets.  I would put him on board a ship; he will, of course, be sufficiently 
disgusted with every one of his companions; all of a sudden I would raise a most 
furious tempest: I would cause him to be shipwrecked on a desert island, with no 
companion but one man, the most gross, perverse, and stupid of the crew … My 
fastidious misanthrope would no longer have a world or a nation, from which to 
choose his companion … By degrees he would find a thousand resources n this 
despised sailor … How these two companions would love one another!” (249-50). 
Indeed, the jealousy he feels for Mary will be seen less as a belief in her infidelity as a 
need to have a male friend who understands his mind.   
In his retreat back to Merionethshire with his young wife, Fleetwood discusses the 
events leading up to his jealousy and madness.  In one of many ironic evocations of 
Paradise Lost that begin to appear more frequently in the latter half of the text, 
Fleetwood expostulates on the “pure now purer air” (IV, ln. 153) that Milton’s Satan 
senses as he approaches Eden in book four of Paradise Lost; as Fleetwood and Mary 
embark on their journey back to Fleetwood’s estate in Wales, he states “it seemed that the 
spirit of kindness still gained new strength, as the scene was perpetually shifted before 
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our eyes, and as we breathed an atmosphere for ever new” (287).  When Mary begins to 
express her own feelings at Merionethshire, however, Fleetwood’s dream of a perfectly 
transparent companion begins to darken; unlike the silent natural world, through which 
and against which Fleetwood is able to project himself, Mary’s own speech, originating 
from her own experience with Fleetwood, interrupts Fleetwood’s dream of domestic 
bliss.   
Given the older Fleetwood’s bizarre eccentricities and love for solitude, young 
Mary begins to lose her feelings for Fleetwood and starts to resemble a character from 
Wollstonecraft’s fiction.  She quickly becomes “disturbed” and suffers from “distemper” 
(321).  Fleetwood, anxious to return her to health, takes her to Bath, and she quickly 
recovers.  Yet for Fleetwood, “Bath, of all places on earth, I detested” (325).  He 
devolves into ceaseless speculation on his condition of being enslaved to Mary as a 
lackey.  Again mimicking Milton’s Satan, Fleetwood begins to plot a revolt in his 
feelings: “Certainly man, particularly the man whom Heaven has endowed with inventive 
faculties and a comprehensive intellect, was made for something better than this.  I was 
now engrossed by a single individual; I was playing a subservient and humble part in her 
train” (327).   
At this point, Fleetwood seeks out his “distant relations,” his young cousins, who 
will play an important role in the political unconscious, at it were, of this final act of his 
confessions, containing “the events which have pressed with so terrible a weight on my 
heart, and have formed my principle motive to become my own historian” (234).  In yet 
another instance of foreshadowing, Fleetwood very carefully introduces us to his last, 
and, as we shall see, perhaps most important mentor, his “nephew,” Gifford.  Gifford is 
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described in vaguely feminine terms as “a youth of dark complexion, and elegant figure, 
sagacious, shrewd, supple, and insinuating” (332); his darkness is symbolic and also 
racial, because, as we have learned earlier, he is the illegitimate child of his cousin and a 
“young officer, a West Indian of color” (328).  As with his discussion of the 
“bewitching” Orient through his experiences with his mistress in Paris, the discourse of 
slavery in Fleetwood is an interesting one, given Fleetwood’s frequent references to his 
psychological slavery to his passions and to Godwin’s own discussion of Rousseuavian 
education as a kind of enslavement in the Enquirer.  At the same time, this discussion of 
slavery and the West Indies furthers identifies Fleetwood with Burke, who, in his Letters 
on a Regicide Peace (1796), set up a series of comparisons between developments in 
France and revolutionary San Domingo.  Ensnaring him in a false plot that accuses Mary 
of infidelity with Kendrick, Fleetwood’s other nephew, an unspotted and “beautiful” 
(336) youth, Gifford takes Fleetwood to the “Continent” on a gross parody of the Grand 
Tour during his bouts of madness and jealous rage, deepening the connection between the 
revolution in the West Indies and revolutionary France that Burke is attempting to make 
in his Letters.  Finally, as Fleetwood himself admits, he has always been “the spoiled 
child of the great parent, Nature” and attracted to “a bewitching vibration of sound” that 
is “unexpected” and promises “so pure a delight” (223).  Unlike the sympathetic 
comparisons that arise between women and slaves in Wollstonecraft and other early 
nineteenth-century women writers, the comparison between men and slaves is productive 
of a sense of mutual hatred towards the world that paradoxically draws them together. 
The relationship between Gifford’s Iago and Fleetwood’s Othello, then, is a parody of the 
sentimental relationship itself as an impossible relation between modern masculine 
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savages, one that is not based on any institutional relationship, such as marriage, but on 
shared ressentiments between men; in this case, it is the fact that Gifford is Fleetwood’s 
illegitimate nephew, and that Fleetwood feels that he himself is unworthy of his father’s 
estate.  Further, his relation with his other nephew, Kendrick, provides him the 
opportunity to reunite with an idealized image of his own childhood, for whom Gifford 
acts a kind of doppelganger.  In his initial description of Kendrick, Fleetwood even 
characterizes Kendrick as a young “soldier” (336), who would defend Fleetwood’s estate 
in the future; yet, at the same time, Kendrick is an appropriate vessel to be filled with 
Fleetwood’s own imaginary ideals, or, at this point, ideology: “there was a brilliancy in 
his eye, a modest blush in his cheek, and a sensibility in his accent, that, all together, 
constituted one of the most interesting objects that can be imagined” (336, my emphasis).   
The reader is left with the grim prospect, at the end of the novel and in spite of 
Fleetwood’s obvious madness, that Fleetwood will become the first Rousseauvian mentor 
to Kendrick, given that Fleetwood writes him into his will and provides him with a 
substantial sum; it is “a testimony that, of all the men living on the face of the earth, he 
was the one that most deserved my love” (421).  Reconciling himself with his dead 
father, for whom he accosted himself for leaving to die, and his abandoned wife, with 
whom he has an overwrought reconciliation at the end of the final book, returns the 
narrative to its beginning and its restored natural paradise, with Gifford put to death by 
“the hands of the public executioner” (423).  Fleetwood successfully, if only 
imaginatively, purges from his own small estate in Wales, the province of his father, this 
illegitimate “foreign influence” and reclaims his heritage.  Gifford represents, within the 
logic of the novel as a whole, the embodiment of everything that Fleetwood has been 
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attempting to forget about his own past.  Gifford is clearly representative of Iago in 
Fleetwood’s mind, and this provides Fleetwood the opportunity to deal rather harshly 
with Gifford in the end.26   
If, as Coleridge has noted, Iago’s primary motive is “motiveless malignance,” or, 
that he wreaks havoc on the other characters' lives for his sadistic enjoyment from the 
suffering of others, then it would appear that Gifford and Fleetwood share certain 
characteristics that are all too clear to Fleetwood himself.  Indeed, within the logic of the 
narrative, which, as we must always recall, is a logic that is Fleetwood’s own, Gifford 
symbolizes Fleetwood’s dark side, and his death, at the end of the novel, symbolically 
purges Fleetwood of his own errors.  At the same time, Gifford also presents himself as 
Fleetwood’s last and perhaps most effective, mentor, and the representation of Gifford 
that Fleetwood presents is a perfect representation of the novel’s narrator himself.  
Consigned to execution on the scaffold for his trickery, Gifford closes the novel with a 
scene of death with which Fleetwood refuses to sympathize and which perfectly mirrors 
the guilty birth that Fleetwood experience in its opening paragraph.  Gifford must suffer 
death as a projected embodiment of Fleetwood’s sin as a Satan in his own Welsh garden: 
after consigning his memory to oblivion, Fleetwood states that he, the master of 
sympathy, “will shed no tear upon the bier of Gifford,” because, he asks, “for what 
society, or plantation of men, in the remotest corner of the globe, was he fitted?” (423). 
Fleetwood’s final resolution of his Othellian jealousy towards his wife promotes a  
                                                 
26 In one of his many alterations to Othello, Godwin makes Fleetwood’s antagonist Gifford a dark figure.  
Transferring his own “blots” or instances of moral error to Gifford allows Fleetwood to regain a lost sense 
of purity or innocence as associated with his other nephew, Kendrick, who is “a florid and beautiful boy, 
alert and nimble in his motions, and singularly open and ingenuous in his demeanor” (336).   
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regained Edenic estate as substitute for and retreat from the crass commercialism of 
empire that Fleetwood discovered had corrupted his idea of Parliament.  Forgotten behind 
the boundaries of the paternal estate in Merionethshire are the ills of the world, both in 
terms of “things as they are” and the empire.  
In the end, the difficulty in seeing Godwin’s criticism of the appropriation of 
sympathy can be found in the fact that it is a criticism of the appropriation of 
sentimentality from within the very genre itself.  Compounding this difficulty is that 
Godwin still feels a residual kind of allegiance to the ideals of sympathy.  In Fleetwood, 
Godwin argues against Rousseauvian reverie and Wordsworthian lyricism, demonstrating 
that the recollected scenes and landscapes of memory become the sites upon which the 
impossibility and impotence of the masculine subject to coincide with itself is urgently 
and aggressively mapped out.  
 What can we draw from Fleetwood’s practice of being his own historian?  The 
multifaceted personality that Fleetwood presents to us is infinitely more complex than the 
character of Caleb Williams because Fleetwood’s narrative voice writes the individual 
episodes of his life into a totalizing narrative structure that is based solely on his attempt 
to forget or disguise his own errors within overly imaginative bouts of what we might call 
irrational analysis.  Fleetwood’s imaginative powers enable him to color his actions with 
a potentially limitless self-analysis that wears away and displaces any feeling for or solid 
representation of the events he has experienced in his life.  In other words, Fleetwood’s 
attempt to analyze his past as his own truthful “historian” alienates him from himself and 
his past.  Fleetwood sums up his own dilemma in the following manner:  
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There are but two principle sources of happiness to the man who lives in solitude: 
memory, and imagination.  The recollections which offered themselves to my 
memory gave me no pleasure.  That period of my life which was most fraught 
with impressions, and which, therefore, made the principle stock of my memory, 
was hateful to me. … The actual affairs into which the passions of man have 
obtruded themselves, ambition, and vanity, and shame, and love, and jealousy, 
and despair, take so much faster hold of the mind, than even when we would 
expatiate in worlds of fancy, these affairs will push forward, and is spite of us 
make a part of the landscape we delineate. (217-8) 
As it is with Charlotte Smith’s poetic personae, Godwin’s Fleetwood discovers that the 
past and its “sorrows that sense refuses to forget” are ineradicable ingrained into memory.  
At the end of his tale, Fleetwood is left to write his confessions and disclose the painful 
memories that haunt him.  Quite naturally, Fleetwood, the self-analyst par excellence, 
provides us with the moral of his own tale: “When I came to myself, the spots I observed 
upon the vesture of my innocence, made me feel a still deeper loathing for the foul and 
miry roads through which I had journeyed. … My entire future life was devoted to the 
expiation of five years of youthful folly and forgetfulness … (yet) I had contracted a 
contamination, which could never be extirpated” (216, my emphases).  Even as these 
“spots” that Fleetwood has contracted from his experience of the world are considered 
permanent, Fleetwood nevertheless continues to attempt to regain the “unspotted mind” 
of childhood innocence (217).  These attempts only add to the spots that sully his mind 
and obscure his figure. As in Fleetwood’s projected identification with Gifford, we might 
say that Fleetwood ironically “talks like an oracle” (337) who predicts his own future 
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from within his narrative self-fashioning, and that Fleetwood’s fascinated self-analysis 
conveys the impression of “a general physiognomy (which) conveyed the idea of 
something obscure and problematical,” of which I was at a loss to expound” (337).     
 
Romantic Survival, Fragments of Memory: Godwin’s “Essay Upon Sepulchers”  
If we were to read Fleetwood from a more generous moral perspective, we might 
state that one of Fleetwood’s most intractable problems is his inability to properly 
understand himself and his own emotions, and that he consequently causes others to feel 
the frustrations that he cannot excise from his own mind.  In The Enquirer, in an essay 
entitled, “Of Choice of Reading,” Godwin intimates the difficulty entailed in the act of 
reading or comprehending a text derives precisely from a freedom of discovering 
meaning that may not exist in the intention of the author: “authors themselves are no 
more infallible in this respect, than the men who read them.  If the moral be invented 
first, the author did not then know where the brilliant lights of his story would fall, nor of 
consequence where its principle power of attraction would be found.  If it be extracted 
afterwards, he is often taken at a disadvantage, and must extricate himself as he can. … 
But one of the most remarkable remarks that suggest themselves under this branch of the 
subject is, that the true moral and fair inference from a composition has often laid 
concealed for ages from its most diligent readers. … It seems that the impression we 
derive from a book, depends much less upon its real contents, than upon the temper of 
mind and the preparation with which we read it” (119-21).  Through Fleetwood’s 
narrative deceptions, Godwin demonstrates an interconnection between hypocritical self-
deception and the most sincere act of reading. 
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To this degree, what could possibly linger on or remain within texts if their 
intentional meaning or authorial voice is set adrift?  For the texts by Godwin that I have 
analyzed up to this point, the deeply intertwined relationship between feeling and 
forgetting or is established in order to posit the destructive desires that lurk below the 
surface of an imaginary retreat into self-forgetfulness or the assumption of other 
identities.  In spite of this danger, Godwin explores how the repression of the individual 
by history can only be overcome by an imaginative leap backwards into the past on the 
part of the reader, whether that reader is analyzing his own past or the texts of others.  
Balancing these concerns of readerly freedom and the ideas or texts of history, Godwin 
promotes a complex notion of survival in the publication that follows Fleetwood, the 
1809 essay, “Essay Upon Sepulchers:” for Godwin, survival is not indicative of an 
overcoming of loss in a triumphalist, delusive sense, but rather the continued existence of 
a person or idea beyond their historical moment or epoch, and indeed beyond their own 
imaginative projection into a future without them, in a way that refuses to constrain that 
existence to a repeated iteration of a coherent, unchanging identity.  Survival demands a 
profound isolation and solitude that is neither heroic nor revolutionary, but rather one that 
is driven by dispossession, alienation, and fragmentation.  As with Smith’s survival of her 
own attempts at fashioning a version of Romantic memory through aesthetic forms, 
Godwinian selfhood is derived from absent or disfigured totalities that, in the future, will 
have had no meaningful or epistemological relevance.  In other words, as a human 
fragment of a (revolutionary) past that no longer exists outside of a memorial culture that 
seeks to erase it, Godwin’s survivor must give his identity to a future that may or may not 
comprehend it.   
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In the “Essay,” Godwin confronts the idea of personal dissolution, but also the 
possible evanescence of his own utopian rationalism through a meditation on the ruins of 
the graves and reputations of forgotten authors. Rather than craft an embrace or a 
hysterical rejection of a Romantic poetics of the sublime, Godwin points towards a 
soberer, more restrained sublime that allies itself with the social world and the world of 
the human, worlds that are evoked as constantly passing. In this essay, existence is 
defined as a state fraught with uncertainty, as if present experience were always colored 
with the feeling of ultimately being written out of the historical register. Godwin’s essay 
is not a tract on the need to recollect the past, nor a heroic cry from a survivor of 
catastrophe, but appears as a collection of future-directed fragments, a concatenation of 
individual encounters with the dead that give to the dead a kind of haunting life and voice 
through the life of those whose existence is constrained by the knowledge of their own 
immanent demise. Godwin does not rely on the imagination to bring the dead back as 
figures to be represented, but as disembodied voices that literally speak to us.  Like the 
frail individual experience that it investigates, the essay attempts to define an encounter 
with the past that is telegraphically transmitted and amplified through the imagination.  
These dead voices are not only those of famous authors from the past, but also the voice 
of the essayist himself mingling with them. For Godwin, the past, lodged already in the 
present, disfigures noiselessly yet speaks silently through the passing present to an 
unknown future.  
Elements of the preface to the essay summarize a great deal of the themes and 
concepts contained within, and provide a warning of sorts to its readers. Although the 
essay is to be about sepulchers, Godwin emphatically denounces an idolatry of the name 
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of the dead or absent other. In the preface to the “Essay,” Godwin discounts the idols or 
ideology of representation through allusions: “I trust that none of my readers will be 
erroneous enough to consider the vivid recollection of things past, as hostile to that tone 
of spirit which should aspire to the boldest improvements in future. The genuine heroes 
of the times that have been, were the reformers, the instructors, and improvers of their 
contemporaries; and he is the sincerest admirer of these men, who most earnestly aspires 
to become ‘like unto them’.”27 Godwin collapses a number of references in this passage. 
Echoing a problematic engagement of teaching and tyranny as found in his collection of 
essays on education, The Enquirer, as well as prefiguring Shelley’s “A Defense of 
Poetry,” Godwin maintains that the “heroes of the times that have been” are best suited to 
be the “instructors of their contemporaries” (7).  The undocumented Biblical quotation 
that ends the preface to the essay, however, directs us to the Psalms and a warning against 
the heathens and idol-worship. The past ought to be important to us, Godwin states, but 
not as something to be blindly followed or into which we project our own habitual 
impressions. As we shall see later, while a factual account of history is to be avoided, a 
sympathetic reading of history must be set aside as well.  
Godwin begins his essay by recounting his feelings of loss and mourning in the 
wake of a friend’s death. For Godwin, death is a “calamity” because it “keeps the world 
in infancy” (9) following the path set out by eighteenth century empiricists, Godwin 
states that when someone dies, all of his or her sensory impressions, his or her 
“experiences,” are lost forever. And so any knowledge that the dead may have gained is 
                                                 
27 Godwin, “Essay Upon Sepulchers,” in The Political and Philosophical Writings of William Godwin, vol, 
6, ed. Mark Philp (London: Pickering and Chatto, 1993), 6. 
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also lost, and the world must begin again to accumulate this knowledge: speaking of his 
friend, Godwin states that in spite of his greatness and importance to him, there is “very 
little of him that survives, in his memory, and his works” (10).  Death is also a calamity 
because unlike “health, fortune or character,” which we lose by degrees, death arrives 
unexpected and all at once: “in a moment, to me … he is nothing” (11).  The brief 
amount of time, between death as an ontological event and oblivion as a threat to 
memory, will be used by Godwin to highlight a criticism that he wishes to make of his 
own time, and one which carries over into Wordsworth’s contemporaneous essay on a 
very similar topic: a general resistance to any form of memory that exists outside of 
habit.  
In the wake of his grief, Godwin begins searching for the means to preserve some 
vestige of his friend and finds it in the others who outlive him as a monument to the dead 
man’s life. Here, then, the question of the sepulcher is less a matter of the dead body: “let 
us put out of the question for the present the dead man himself, and think only of 
survivors.” For Godwin, the past becomes a fragment or ruin that is founded upon the 
discarded dead body, which, as we recall from the preface, we ought not to consider as an 
idol to be venerated as if it were the representation of a real person. The dead body is not 
a figure to be idolized, nor is it an avenue towards “abstraction and mathematical or 
syllogistic deductions” (11) that would found our understanding of the dead body. In 
what sense, then, is human imagination and human feelings to be considered as lasting if 
not from sensory perception or from theoretical abstraction of general or objective 
theorems?  Anticipating Paul de Man’s reading of Wordsworth’s “Essay Upon Epitaphs,” 
we might suggest that Godwin’s “Essay on Sepulchers” is a species of autobiography-as-
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survival.  What is one to do when one lives beyond one’s own relevance, or, more 
plainly, what is a revolutionary to do when the revolution is over? The fickle nature of 
fame as it has treated him is certainly on Godwin’s mind when he states the following, an 
understated criticism of Thomas Gray’s famous elegy:  
Go into any country church-yard. Three-forths of the tombstones, you will find 
dated within the last twenty or thirty years. Yet as many persons died in the years 
that preceded, and the passion for tombstones is probably now not greater than it 
was formerly. The best chance that a monument can have, is to be enclosed within 
a church, or to be fixed against its wall: it may then last three or four centuries. 
(15)  
Unlike Gray, who mourns the “mute, inglorious Miltons” of a country church-yard, 
Godwin avers that there will be no monuments to mourn. Like Shelley’s later 
“Ozymandias” (1817) and “Triumph of Life” (1822), Godwin’s essay notes that 
everything, including the very idea of history itself, is subject to the passage of time and 
its ruinous oblivion. Tacitly acknowledging his views against institutional religion, 
Godwin ironically notes the survival of monuments “within a church” as three or four 
hundred years: in the scope of time, there is no difference between twenty years and three 
hundred years, as all is subject to ruin.  
At the same time, Godwin is unwilling to dismiss the need for a powerful force 
that binds together disparate people across time and distance. Opposed to the seductive 
force of the narrative of history as romance, which demands a kind of passivity and 
employment of the imagination to project oneself into history, Godwin advocates for an 
employment of the fragments and ruins of history, the funeral monuments and sepulchers, 
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one that acts as a conduit to the past through which the past quite literally speaks to and 
through us. There should be no confusion on this point: for Godwin, it is not our 
imagination working to create the voice of Shakespeare or Milton in our own minds, but 
the actual voice of Shakespeare and Milton speak to us. Godwin makes this clear 
throughout the essay: 
Portraits may be imaginary … but the dust that is covered by his tomb, is simply 
and literally the great man himself. … The aspiring and lofty minded men of 
former times were seen by me as I passed along, and stood in review before me. 
… They are not dead. They are still with us in their stories, in their words, in their 
writings, in the consequences that do not cease to flow fresh from what they did: 
they still have their place, where we may visit them, and where, if we dwell in a 
composed and quiet spirit, we shall not fail to be conscious of their presence. (20) 
Considering these quotations, we may ask how the conduit, between the present and the 
past and, implicitly, between individuals, operate if it is not an imaginative projection. 
The remainder of Godwin’s essay is full of images of essays, such as wandering 
and traveling as if by accident, and it is this element of chance or contingency that 
somehow undergirds and undermines the operation of the imagination as a power that is 
itself always open to interruption and change.  As with an essay by Montaigne or Bacon, 
“accidents” and breaks into the passage of the essay occur with great frequency. As a 
characteristic example, and to prove a point, Godwin will state, “in the autumn of the 
same year accident led me to Reading in Berkshire,” or, “I never understood the annals of 
chivalry so well, as when I walked among the ruins of Kenilworth Castle.” Godwin’s 
final gesture towards overcoming or “paralyzing the hand of oblivion” is to be found in 
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his suggestion for the publication of a “Sepulchral Atlas,” a book that marks the location 
of the blank, wooden monuments throughout the countryside that Godwin is ostensibly 
recommending as a solution the preservation of the memories of the dead . Is this a book 
that could even be made available, or published? In what sense does it address the 
problem of idolatry in the Biblical allusions from the preface?  
The catalogue of these locations, acting as a “precious relic to the man of 
sentiment … and a traveler’s guide,” will allow a reader to visit these monuments to the 
dead in the imagination. The most important element of the “Sepulchral Atlas” for 
Godwin, then, is that it would be a book without mediator, or, a book with an impersonal 
author. As Godwin acknowledges, there would only be references to the location of the 
tombs or monuments which the reader would encounter in his or her place in the 
telegraphic traveling or essaying of individuals across time and space. The reader of this 
“Sepulchral Atlas,” however, would not be an anonymous reader of texts; rather, in the 
language of Godwin, the reader would be a survivor who “reads” books by impersonal 
authors, or, in other words, who experiences books at a level removed from conscious 
engagement and that is disengaged from consciously acquired unconscious activity, or 
habit.  
The traveler, then, or author as essayist, does not know in advance where he is 
going or what he or she is writing. Rather, the essayist silently tracks a movement that is 
both predictable in theory (if we recall the abstract nature of physical de-composition that 
Godwin dis-cards earlier) and unknown in practice. The image that Godwin chooses to 
discuss the “influence” of the dead and their works is a pebble falling in a pond. The 
concentric circles that spread from the pebble, a fragment of their possible impression, 
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touch the farthest corner of a pond or, in Godwin’s example, an ocean. In similar fashion, 
the survivor of an encounter with the dead or with death itself perpetuates the fragments 
of past existences within the unconscious, telegraphic network of humanity that stretches 
from Britain to China.  According to Godwin, the reach of the great authors of the past 
cannot be measured:  
The poorest peasant in the remotest corner of England, is probably a different 
man, from what he would have been but for the writings of Shakespeare and 
Milton. Every man who is powerfully and deeply impressed by the perusal of 
their works, communicates a portion of the inspiration all around him. It passes 
from man to man, till it influences the whole mass. I cannot tell that the wisest 
mandarin now living in China, is not indebted for part of his energy and sagacity 
to Shakespeare and Milton, even though it should happen that he never heard their 
names. (25) 
This remarkable passage condenses, as it were, a number of possible readings.  The 
encounter with the dead author through texts functions like a pebble and transmits the 
“inspiration,” the divine breath that is transformed into a human voice, “from man to 
man” in a relay that does not depend on conscious engagement or habitual practices. 
Rather, it depends on a kind of passive sacrifice of the self, such that living beings, who 
are now survivors of their own imaginative foreboding of death, may have a minimal 
grasp upon the value of knowledge as it exists in the world of abstract laws and reasons. 
In other words, if the body is doomed to the dust, and we ought not to concern ourselves 
with it in death because it is fated to oblivion, then the body may still be valued as an 
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unconscious relay for culture, even if there no guarantees for an absolute future that 
redeems the past.  
In “Logos and Techne, or Telegraphy,” Jean-Francois Lyotard also confronts the 
figuring/disfiguring question of the telegraphic; he wonders, in a more contemporary 
sense, about the survival of memory in an information age in ways that appear to channel 
Godwin:  
Current technology, that specific mode of tele-graphy, writing at a distance, 
removes the close contexts of which rooted cultures are woven.  It is thus, through 
its specific manner of inscription, indeed productive of a sort of memorization 
freed from the supposedly immediate conditions of time and space.  The question 
to follow here would be as follows: what is a body (body proper, social body) in 
tele-graphic culture?  It calls up a spontaneous production of the past in habit, a 
tradition or transmission of ways of thinking, willing, and feeling, a sort of 
breaching, then, which complicates, counters, neutralizes, and extenuates earlier 
community breachings, and in any case translates them so as to move them on 
too, make them transmissible.28 
For Lyotard, the body is a site of resistance in a “hegemonic teleculture on a world scale 
(that is) already posed” (50).  Yet for Godwin, the empirical tradition of experience as 
housed in the body makes this problem seem irrelevant. Human memory, figured as a 
“Sepulchral Atlas,” a world-map of monuments for the dead, is tied to the merest 
semblance of the dignity of a natural forgetting (or death), such that forgetting becomes 
                                                 
28 Jean-Francois Lyotard, “Logos and Techne, or Telegraphy,” in The Inhuman: Reflections on Time trans. 
Geoffrey Bennington (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), 50. 
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that which human memory must imperfectly strive to overcome and enshrine, and with 
which one silently communes in the movement towards creating a social or cultural body 
that is influenced by voices that are heard and shared with each other, such that 
telegraphic transmission is not from a single source, but multiple points projecting to 
each other.  Individual feeling is transmitted and shared within this expanding circle of 
influence even as the body that felt and experienced that feeling is forgotten and left to 
oblivion.  
While Smith’s poetics of oblivion initially posits a desire to retreat into a timeless, 
imaginary space, her Petrarchan-inspired poetic personae discover that the illusory 
consolations of poetry cannot assuage the sorrows they are designed to contain.  For 
Godwin, a survivor is someone who has considered his or her own mortality through the 
deaths of close friends, and struggles, in a language that exhibits both reason and feeling, 
and memory and forgetting, to overcome the paralyzing fears that this imaginary 
encounter with oblivion produces within the self.  This desire to overcome the fears of 
death and consequent, inevitable forgetting beneath a tombstone that does not fully mark 
out or contain individual existence is similar to the paradoxical desire for a vestige of 
future life that Smith had located in the “bosoms” of her readers in The Emigrants.  Smith 
does not think that she will achieve lasting fame through her works, but, rather, would 
survive her own demise in the responses of readers of feeling.29   
                                                 
29 For Smith, survival in the form of a post-memorial reinscription in the hearts of her readers is built on 
the unstable foundations of the Petrarchan notion of fama (fame).  For Petrarch, the eternal nature of fame 
is bounded by the temporal duration of a dream of eternity and subject to loss and ruination.  As explained 
by Guiseppe Mazzotta in a discussion of Petrarch’s Trionfi, a poem that portrays Petrarch’s dream-like and 
“imaginative journey of self-discovery” through encounters with various allegorical personages,  “Petrarch 
is the poet of the mind’s spirals and of its dialectical growth until it plunges in the abyss where the ruins of 
time, love, death, and fame vanish.  From his shifty and purified standpoint, the spectacle of the world is 
164 
The tragic irony of Godwin’s Fleetwood is that it mocks Fleetwood’s moral 
development at the very moment that he accepts responsibility for his unmotivated 
“errors.”  The comforting notion of an autobiography as the progressive coming to 
consciousness of an autonomous self, one which evolves through the forgetting of past 
within a genre designed to forgive transgressions, is radically undermined by Fleetwood’s 
attempt to give narrative sequence to the events of his life.  In the end, the narrative of 
Fleetwood appears as a vicious circle along which the obsessive repetition of the same 
dilemma, the unconsciously self-inflicted loss of his paternal estate and inheritance, is 
replayed over and over again throughout the course of his life.  As such, Fleetwood 
reenacts an identical pattern of events that moves closer to an inheritance of those 
memories at the cost of the world around him.  Unable to give coherent shape to his past, 
Fleetwood’s tale becomes a network of echoes, allegorical and inverted repetitions, and 
mirroring events that gives shape to a complex system of internal reference, depriving 
each individual memory of any moral value as each operate in reference to others.  
Fleetwood’s attempt at self-forgetting results in a severing of the relationship between 
                                                                                                                                                 
consistently reduced to a mere catalogue of events and objects for the self. … Totality is available as a 
dream, just as is a dream the view of the self as a subject whose gaze attains a global understanding of the 
world and its values. … Petrarch’s ethics is the dream of an absolute viewpoint wherein the self appears as 
a fragment of a larger world, and the world itself comes into being through the poet’s dream” (101).  If for 
Petrarch fame is only possible in the dream of the poet who only imagines portraying the totality of the 
world and must awaken to its continuing fragmentation, then we might consider fame as residing in the 
strange way that Smith imagines her readers to hear, or learn and so remember, her poems.  Derrida 
discusses apprendre par coeur (to learn by heart): “the memory of the ‘by heart’ is confided like a prayer 
… to a certain exteriority of the automaton, to the laws of mnemotechnics, to that liturgy that mimes 
mechanics on the surface” (“Che cos’è la poesia?,” 231).  The tension inherent in learning Smith’s poems 
by heart, the vehicle of her form of Petrarchan fame, involves a form of mechanical forgetting which 
repeats without understanding the meaning of the words repeated.  In other words, Smith thinks that her 
readers will perhaps feel a form of sympathy for “her,” her poetic voice, that is radically different from the 
experiences that are the basis for her poetic evocations of melancholy.  Unlike the typical evocations of a 
Romantic conception of an infinite or totalizing poiesis that transcends time, Smith’s Romantic poetic is 
based in the communication of a radical finitude, or self-sacrifice, which entails the forgetting of self.       
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one’s own putative story and its moral significance.  Each scene gestures towards or 
recalls not only other passages, but more trenchantly, the obsessive need to recall or 
rewrite other scenes in the book as well as the utility of the book itself.  This network 
appears to tarry with the negative of the past, as found here in isolated, lived experience 
that is cut off from a disinterested perspective on the progressive flow of time, bringing to 
the fore the ineradicable emotional presence of guilt and culpability that is buried within 
transcendent Wordsworthian memory and highlighting the unreliability of fixed 
interpretations of individual passages, individuals or even words themselves.   
166 
Chapter Four 
"I say the tale as ‘twas told to me:" 
Walter Scott's Forgetful Memories and Romantic Nostalgia 
 
How poetic the simple incident seemed, told just thus! Homer was always telling things after this manner. 
And one might think there had been no effort in it: that here was but the almost mechanical transcript of a 
time, naturally, intrinsically, poetic, a time in which one could hardly have spoken at all without ideal 
effect, or, the sailors pulled down their boat without making a picture in "the great style," against a sky 
charged with marvels. Must not the mere prose of an age, itself thus ideal, have counted for more than half 
of Homer's poetry? Or might the closer student discover even here, even in Homer, the really mediatorial 
function of the poet, as between the reader and the actual matter of his experience; the poet waiting, so to 
speak, in an age which had felt itself trite and commonplace enough, on his opportunity for the touch of 
"golden alchemy," or at least for the pleasantly lighted side of things themselves? Might not another, in 
one's own prosaic and used-up time, so uneventful as it had been through the long reign of these quiet 
Antonines, in like manner, discover his ideal, by a due waiting upon it? Would not a future generation, 
looking back upon this, under the power of the enchanted-distance fallacy, find it ideal to view, in contrast 
with its own languor--the languor that for some reason … seemed to haunt men always? 
-Walter Pater, Marius the Epicurean (1885) 
 
Stay yet, illusion, stay a while, / My wildered fancy still beguile! / From this high theme how can I part, / 
Ere half unloaded is my heart! 
-Walter Scott, “Marmion: A Tale of Flodden Field” 
 
From the principle of contingency in history and historiography, as found in his 
Life of Chaucer, to the destructive possession of the present by the past in Antonio, and 
the telegraphic projection of the past into the bodies of the present in the “Essay On 
Epitaphs,” Godwin attempted to discover the means of preserving the past without 
allowing it to dominate the present.  The complex notion of the past as living (on) 
through survival, as elucidated in the “Essay,” provides the most adequate articulation of 
Godwin’s attempt to keep the feelings of the past from being forgotten within the 
ideological and institutional regimes that ostensibly seek to preserve them.  In this 
chapter, I will argue that the suppression of memory plays an essential role in Walter 
Scott’s Lay of the Last Minstrel, and, consequently, sets the stage for the ways in which 
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nostalgia becomes the foundation for a new kind of narrative principle of sympathetic 
recollection.  Nostalgia, in this sense, invokes a feeling of imaginary community with a 
past that is thought of as separated from the present.  I will contend that Scott records the 
voice of the bard as an exiled lyric poet who is available to recount and lament a lost, 
more authentic time without a properly lyric “I,” a figure who must be in the end 
transferred to the margins of society in favor of the work that he recounts.  Moving away 
from the overtly political problems associated with feeling and forgetting in Godwin, 
Scott gives the bard, the book, and the heroic characters within a nostalgic value that is 
transmitted into the present without melancholic feelings of loss and historical oblivion. 
Traditionally, the work of Walter Scott has been discussed in relation to the 
origins of the nation and national identity in the Romantic period, and in the ways that the 
various concepts of the nation are rooted in the establishment of a collective, cultural 
memory that predates the civic and social structures of the Enlightenment.  Noting that he 
gave shape to these concepts through poetry and fiction, however, recent critics have 
accused Scott of sidestepping the complexities of national, cultural existence and 
historical difference both in Scotland and elsewhere by fomenting delusive images of an 
idealized chivalric past or nostalgia for a bygone era.  Indeed, even as many of Scott’s 
narratives seem no more than glossy reminiscences of a feudal past, Scott is further 
accused of appropriating these narratives and their characters from female novelists; 
unlike Godwin, whose novels demonstrate how masculinity is unavoidably and 
permanently disfigured by the use of the discourses of sympathy and sentiment that it 
cannot fully cast off, Scott accounts for feminine sentiment and sympathy as either the 
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dominant markers of an ideal, unrealistic domestic space or as signs of youthful passions 
that must be exorcised in the social, political, and cultural education of male characters.     
Many of these accusations have used as the basis of their critique Benedict 
Anderson’s construction of the ideal imagined community of the nation in Imagined 
Communities.  According to Anderson, the nation is not defined by physical space or 
geographic borders but exists through a print culture that disseminates images of the 
nation to its readers.  In locating the nostalgia for the nation in tales from the past and 
shared memories that seem to resemble a form of historical amnesia, Scott turns the 
possibility of the “real” existence of the nation into a fictitious ideal that can only exist 
within a past that has already passed.  Recent critics have argued, however, that there is 
significant difference between the work of memory in Scott’s novels and Anderson’s 
theoretical models.  Cairns Craig, in “Scott’s Staging of the Nation,” rebukes Scott’s 
attackers by arguing that these critiques say more about the limitations of Anderson’s 
model of the nation than about Scott’s use of the imagination in constructing an image of 
the past.1  By allowing “the malign specter of the nation as communal hallucination” to 
enter into his argument, Anderson registers his disenchantment with the continued 
existence of the modern nation as an anonymous sphere of “empty, homologous time” 
that allows for no cultural differences.  Craig feels that there is a conflict at the heart of 
Scott’s use of the imaginary and is representative of the struggle between national 
identities within a vision of English history.  In spite of these struggles, according to 
                                                 
1 Cairns Craig, “Scott’s Staging of the Nation,” Studies in Romanticism (Spring 2001: 40 (1)). 
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Craig, the imagination provided for the means to freely define the future of the nation 
beyond these conflicts: 
Scott understood that the dramatization of the nation was not about its fictionality 
or its truth, but about the values which its imaginings tested and which they 
projected as the path of action for the future. … The real and ironic success of the 
notion of “imagined communities” lies in the fact that it makes the nation an 
aesthetic construction.  “Imagined communities” may be a term of despair about 
rational politics or history, but it is a term which puts artists back in the position 
of being the “unacknowledged legislators” of the world, makes arts again central 
to all those processes of politics to which, in other views, it has seemed so 
marginal. (27-8) 
While Craig argues that Scott participated in a deeply Romantic belief in the power of 
works of art to construct possible future images of the nation based on shared pasts, Scott 
felt deeply skeptical about the construction of the modern nation based on idealized 
images of a lost or forgotten past.  Although Scott appeared to praise the traditional 
aristocracies and feudal landowners of the past, I contend that he is also deeply 
suspicious of how this past is employed in or transmitted to the present.  In his first verse 
romance, The Lay of the Last Minstrel (1805), the heroic past is deliberately set against 
the sentimentalized present, in which allegiances to traditional figures, patriotism and 
ideals of chivalry are misplaced or forgotten in favor of the revolutionary economic and 
political forces of change that Edmund Burke attributed to the threats to national 
institutions as posed by the French Revolution.  
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As I will hope to make clear, several constitutive elements of Scott’s fears about 
revolutionary change were indeed shared by Smith and Godwin.  However, the 
construction of their identities as French sympathizers, by both their critics in the Anti-
Jacobin Review and elsewhere, purposefully occluded any recognition of their eventual 
dissatisfaction with the revolution.  The connection between them all hinges on the way 
that “fear” is defined; following Rousseau, “fear” both creates and is produced by the 
debilitating anticipation of death, which in turn becomes the basis for a mode of writing 
about the impossibility of community and communication.  For Smith, the extensive 
popularity of her poems served as the basis for an identity that was permanently alienated 
from authentic interaction with others; if she was able to exploit the sympathies of 
sentimental or melancholic readers by appearing self-forgetful in a performance of 
profound sadness, as many critics argue, then it was at the cost of allowing history to 
understand her poems and construction of emotion in a more complex way.  Both human 
bodies and natural objects carried with them the material markers of experience through 
the passage of time, yet it was precisely this experience that could not be completely 
recollected.  Godwin’s masculine denunciation of sentimental literature, and the 
confusion between literature and life that it produced in both authors and readers, may 
have opened up a future in which the feelings of sympathy could be used as a basis for a 
new aesthetic community through imaginative projections into the minds of others.  At 
the same time, Godwin could only sense this renewal of emotion in a negative sense, as 
emotion without feeling; paradoxically, then, only the absence of genuine emotions could 
gesture towards a possibly redeemed future that Godwin could nevertheless not imagine 
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without feelings.  The nation, according to Godwin, must remain unrealized and 
fragmentary because its imaginary value, given full shape in both Fleetwood’s fulfillment 
of his inheritance and paradise regained at Merionethshire as well as in Antonio’s 
deluded and destructive reenactment of an idealized moral order, is categorically open to 
abuse through the seductive ideology of power.  For these reasons, the value of 
imaginative literature resides in its deeply critical stance against the appropriation of the 
imagination and sympathy by institutions.  Encounters with the great figures of the past 
must be purely individual. 
Even though Scott aligned his conservative sensibility against the revolutionary 
politics of Smith and Godwin, the difficult distance that both Smith and Godwin 
attempted to maintain from the structures of imaginary experience within literary texts 
can also be seen in Scott’s works.  Although Craig, for example, alleges that Scott’s texts 
advanced the case of the aesthetic as a basis for national identity, one might also argue 
that the material conditions of the present against which Scott seemed to react were also 
those that allowed him to become a very successful writer, publisher and reviewer.  In 
“Walter Scott and the Birth of a Nation,” Andrew Lincoln observes that Scott’s 
perspective on the task of poetry in his verse romances was tempered by an ironic 
distance that disturbed Scott’s wholehearted embrace of the works of art that he produced 
to praise the very past he admired.2  Discussing the frame narratives that contain many of 
the tales within Scott’s poems, Lincoln argues that “the poet is self-consciously belated in 
relation to the themes of his poetry.  Paradoxically, the minstrel’s alienation suggests the 
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temporary recovery of a lost purity which the adult must see ultimately as fantasy.  A 
sophisticated self-awareness, then, licenses the apparent naiveté of the minstrel persona 
and the anachronistic romance forms associated with it.  The pose distinguishes Scott 
from the visionary romanticism of Wordsworth, which asserts an heroic triumph over its 
own doubts, and relates him to the more skeptical and ironical romanticism of Byron and 
Keats, for whom the poet’s imaginings may always be unmasked as deceiving fantasies” 
(5-6, my emphasis).  Once again, as with Smith, Godwin and Wordsworth, we find here 
the value of recollection based in its evanescence and, consequently, in maintaining a 
permanent moral and epistemological separation between the past and present. 3   
For Smith and Godwin, however, evanescence does not allow for a transcendent return to 
the present; rather, evanescence becomes the distinguished characteristic of an identity 
rooted in the fear of loss and absence.  Even as Godwin’s narrator in Fleetwood and 
Smith’s various poetic personae cannot leave evanescence behind even as they try to 
establish it, Scott’s minstrels attempt to disavow the temporality of the past through its 
momentariness or childishness.  Yet unlike Smith and Godwin, Scott was consider by his 
own contemporaries as an author who was cleansing the Augean stables of sentimental 
fiction, in which revolutionary ideology and sympathy were bound together in a 
universalizing political aesthetic designed to trump national allegiances, and renewing a 
sense of masculinist health to poetry and novels.4   
                                                                                                                                                 
2 Andrew Lincoln, “Walter Scott and the Birth of the Nation,” Romanticism: The Journal of Romantic 
Culture and Criticism (2002; 8 (1)). 
3 Scott’s staging of the complexities of the imagination is strikingly similar to Smith, and this parallel can 
also be found in a great deal of critical literature.  Nostalgia for a lost past in Smith is the both the 
inspiration and didactic lesson of both Smith and Scott. 
4 In the chapter on Scott in The Perversity of Poetry, Dino Franco Felluga’s chapter on Scott’s role as a 
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Indeed, Scott’s appeal as a poet who unmasked the deceptions of poetry, or a 
novelist who exposed and domesticated the disillusionment fostered by a belief in fiction, 
can be found in some of his earliest readers.  In an 1828 essay entitled “History,” Thomas 
Macaulay discusses the value of “imaginary history” that seems, in many regards, to posit 
a solid, figurative body (i.e., history) that Godwin’s various accounts of the imaginary 
and history complicate or dismiss.5  Macaulay’s account of an imaginative history as 
counterpoint to historical novels fed into the posthumous evaluations of Scott’s poetic or 
fictional work as explicitly historical.  In an enthusiastic survey of the Magnum Opus 
edition of the Waverley novels published in the Edinburgh Review in 1832, Thomas 
Lister praised Scott and his contributions, but went on to sum up the novelist’s 
importance in the fact that he had given shape to the historiographical models for the next 
generation: 
Combining materials drawn from scattered sources, Scott’s novels have given us 
pictures of past days, which what is commonly called History had neglected to  
afford.  We now feel more fully that dates and names, -nay, even the articles of a  
treaty, or the issue of a battle, although desirable pieces of knowledge, are yet  
trivial, compared with the importance and utility of being able to penetrate below 
that surface on which float the great events and stately pageants of the time. … 
                                                                                                                                                 
healthy alternative to the tropological and discursive illnesses of the English nation in the post-
Revolutionary period. 
5 Thomas Macauley, “History,” in Essays, Historical and Literary (London: Ward, Lock, and Co., 1972), 
71-91.  Godwin’s essay, “Of History and Romance,” has been widely read and analyzed by contemporary 
Romantic critics as indicative of Godwin’s embrace of a principle of contingency and the plurality of 
interpretations open to historical events.  In this essay, Godwin states that the discourses of history and 
romance do not supplement each other, but compete against each other in seeking to define the past.  See 
Jon Klancher, “Godwin and the Republican Romance: Genre, Politics, and Contingency in Cultural 
History.” 
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Great changes in the conditions and opinions of a people will silently and 
gradually take place, unmarked by any signal event; whilst events the most 
striking, and apparently important, will glitter and vanish like bubbles in the sun, 
and leave no visible trace of their effect. … At present we have only extremes.  
We have the stately political history and the gossiping memoir. … The public 
now desire to see these requisites well blended; and to this growing desire we 
conceive no slight impulse has been given by the works of the author of 
Waverley. 6 
In Lister’s reading, Scott is able to “penetrate below that surface” of historical events to 
discover the feelings of those who participated in them, and then allow the reader to 
participate in or experience history through an immediate identification with its 
characters.  Godwin’s new (diseased, political) man of unfeeling feeling becomes, in this 
transaction, Scott’s solid man of history, a redeemed Burkean figure who feels, rather 
than knows, the veracity of his own and his nation’s past.     
It is only at the end of the boom of interest in historical fiction that we find a 
denunciation of this method.  Alessandro Manzoni, in his essay “On Historical Fiction,” 
deems it to be a dead genre.7  According to Manzoni, it is all too easy to spin imaginative 
reconstructions of the past; indeed, Manzoni’s evaluation of the historical novel paves the 
way for history’s own gesture towards factual objectivity at the expense of imaginative 
fiction.  For Manzoni, history takes from the poetic and historical fiction the power of the 
imagination and accords it to version of events that always displaces the imaginative.  In 
                                                 
6Thomas Lister, "The Waverley Novels,” Edinburgh Review 55 (April 1832), 77-8. 
175 
a sense, it is a return to Humean indifference, but as a form of indifference that is situated 
upon the exclusion of that which would threaten its objectivity.  It is this form of history, 
as a record of the past that gains power from its own representations, which has become 
the dominant form of history and the devaluation of historical fiction after Manzoni.  As 
Manzoni saw it, and in a way that remarkably resembles the limitations of Godwin’s 
approaches to writing history, the historical novel was chronically problematic because 
readers do not know in the end what attitude is required of them and are left vacillating 
between the two poles, with only disquieting doubts about the boundaries of the real and 
the invented left as remainders of the experience.  Manzoni could see no solution to the 
problem: if writers were somehow to distinguish those statements which are claimed as 
true from those which are invented, the readers’ uncertainty as to when they should adopt 
what sort of belief would be resolved, but only at the unacceptable cost of destroying the 
unity of the work as a whole.  Thus, as in Godwin’s separation of history from fiction, the 
two genres can accommodate each other, but only at the cost of their viability as narrative 
forms.   
 Manzoni’s attack against historical fiction stood until another post-revolutionary 
author, Georg Lukács wrote his study of the genre, The Historical Novel, in 1937.8 The 
first chapter of the book argues strongly for Scott’s innovation, locating it in the era 
around the French Revolution.  According to Lukács, the path to the French Revolution 
was paved by the study of history during the eighteenth-century: “the often superb 
                                                                                                                                                 
7 Alessandro Manzoni, On the Historical Novel (1850), trans. Sandra Bermann (Lincoln: University of 
Nebraska Press, 1983).  
8 Georg Lukács, The Historical Novel, trans. Hannah and Stanley Mitchell (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 
1981).  
176 
historical construction, with its discovery of numerous new facts and connections, serves 
to demonstrate the necessity for transforming the ‘unreasonable’ society of feudal 
absolutism; and the lessons of history provide the principles with those help a 
‘reasonable’ society, a ‘reasonable state may be created” (17).  For the ideological 
defenders of progress, such as the Godwin of the 1790s, the revolution of 1688 presented 
itself as the ideal of perfectibility: “the fact that England had fought out its bourgeois 
revolution in the seventeenth century and had from then on experienced a peaceful, 
upward development, lasting over centuries, on the basis of the Revolution’s 
achievements, showed England to be the practical, model example for the new style of 
historical interpretation” (31).  Lukács considers Scott as a writer who stands against this 
version of historical development.  Instead, Lukács suggests that Scott perceives the 
nature of English development as consisting of a continuous series of class struggles and 
revolutions.  For Scott, history is an endless “chain” of individual and social crises of the 
deepest kind.  It should come as no surprise that Lukács evokes the concept of the “chain 
of … crises” (57) as this version of post-Enlightenment history draws on the Lockean 
notion of a “chain of associations” that we already encountered in Godwin’s Fleetwood 
as the problematic process by which identity is established.  Moving from an individual 
history that must piece together the story of development or regression to the progress of 
history, Lukács argues that the immanent demise of one group, such as the Scottish clan, 
results from and contributes to this endless cycle of revolutions: “the inability of the clans 
to defend their common interests is … an inevitable result of the basis of clan life” (57).  
According to Lukács, then, this chain of crises cannot be broken, as Scott’s “historical 
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necessity … is of the most severe, implacable kind” (58, my emphasis).  Tapping again 
into the language of Godwin’s critical, philosophical language which rebukes the concept 
of ideological necessity as developed in the Enquiry, Lukács gives to Scott the character 
of a modern revolutionary. 
 In considering Scott’s Marxist revolutionary credentials, however, we ought to 
pay strict attention to the way that Godwin constructs his own materialist vision of 
history writing in “Of History and Romance:” 
Laying aside the generalities of historical abstraction, we must mark the operation 
of human passions; must observe the empire of motives whether groveling or 
elevated; and must note the influence that one human being exercises over 
another, and the ascendancy of the daring and wise over the vulgar multitude.  It 
is thus, and thus only, that we shall be enabled to add, to the knowledge of the 
past, a sagacity that can penetrate into the depths of futurity. We shall not only 
understand those events as they arise which are no better than old incidents under 
new names, but shall judge truly of such conjectures and combinations, their 
sources and effects, as, though they have never yet occurred, are within the 
capacities of our nature. (363) 
For Godwin, history ought to be seen as the fragmented, isolated experiences 
concentrated in “human passion” as well as their hold over individuals in the “empire of 
motives.”  Recalling Lister’s reading of Scott in which history is a surface that must be 
penetrated in order to discover the feelings of individual actors and Godwin’s dismissal 
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of an Enlightenment, Humean vision of history as “abstraction” brings us closer to an 
estimation of the value of passion and feeling to the discourse of history.       
We can see, in retrospect, the overarching path of Scott’s fortunes as a writer 
worthy of serious academic study.  From Macaulay’s embrace of Scott’s “imaginative 
history,” to Manzoni’s dialectical opposition of history and fiction and rejection of 
historical fiction, Lukács’ embrace of Scott’s Marxist populism in representing the 
totality of history in a post-revolutionary vein, and to Anderson’s view of postcolonial 
literature as imagining a community that has no history of its own outside the narratives it 
circulates, Scott’s “anti-Romanticism” is drawn increasingly closer to the theories of 
some notion of gradual reform and the importance of individual experience and feeling as 
found in both Smith and Godwin.  To consider a more skeptical Scott requires addressing 
Godwin and his construction of a (post-)revolutionary or “new” man of feeling as 
someone pathologically obsessed with events from past.  A common literary touchstone 
for both is Mackenzie’s popular novel, The Man of Feeling (1771), and its ambiguous 
portrait of a sentimental man who does not fit within an emerging capitalistic world.  
While the final volume of Fleetwood is a clear re-writing of Othello, Godwin’s narrator 
also interweaves whole passages from Mackenzie and transposes them, with important 
and ironic alterations, into his own life story.  Godwin here aligns the idea of the 
decomposed manuscript with age and moral decrepitude, turning the past into a series of 
errors that cannot be overcome or even read, much like a ruined text that is full of 
unbridgeable gaps and blanks; his fascination with the text and with Harley in the Man of 
Feeling as an exemplar of moral goodness and feeling is translated into the finitude of 
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human life as a text that is always decomposing and recomposing, and as such 
perpetually open to (re)interpretation and re-writing.9  The epistemological and moral 
complexities of Godwin’s fiction were precisely the kinds of texts that Scott wished to 
rebuke through his use of a young, proto-Bildungsroman hero in Waverley, who seems to 
be moved by historical forces into, rather than out of, the domestic and social worlds.  
Scott thus seems to stand in dialectic opposition to Godwin by containing the 
epistemological and moral crises that destroy the psychic fabric of Fleetwood’s self-
determined identity within the safety of a past that only has symbolic value for the 
present.10  While Godwin crafts texts that maintain an interpretive and critical force only 
by failing to establish a coherent alternative to institutional force, Scott turns his texts 
                                                 
9 Two of the major influences for Godwin and Scott in this regard are Mackenzie and Edmund Burke.  
Reading Mackenzie through Godwin and Scott produces fascinating insights into the way that authors from 
the eighteenth-century sentimental tradition were taken up for very different political purposes.  In an 
excellent essay on The Man of Feeling, Maureen Harkin produces a portrait of Mackenzie that strikingly 
resembles Godwin.  According to Harkin, Mackenzie found sentimental novels to be inadequate forms of 
social critique because they were also productive of a certain kind of pleasurable feeling of remorse that 
would be familiar to both Adam Smith and Diderot: “The Man of Feeling does not resolve simply into a 
failed strategy for constructing appropriate social models; its representations of distress produce an evident 
pleasure as well as an impulse to social critique. The novel's tendency to indulge at length in what it 
acknowledges is futile opposition, tears and complaints, indicates that these sympathetic tableaux are a 
source of aesthetic pleasure rather than of ethical practice, an association central in Smith's reservations 
about the social usefulness of sympathy” (336).  From this perspective, Godwin’s Fleetwood is very much 
in the spirit of Mackenzie’s novel in that both are concerned with representing the limits of feeling from 
both the subjective and objective perspective: one must feel the inadequacy of feeling in a sympathetic 
mode.  It is a critical commonplace that Scott shunned the complex, inner psychological portraits that 
Godwin built into his fiction; yet, as I shall argue, Scott’s turn to the transmission of history as that which 
determines identity rather than the paradoxical coils of a passionate Godwinian rationalism merely provides 
the illusion of shifting the burden of feeling’s hold over individuals.  Burke, another ambiguous figure who 
was alternately revered and dismissed by the Romantics and their contemporaries, provided a schema for 
wedding feeling to history.  Mike Goode, in “The Man of Feeling History: The Erotics of Historicism in 
Reflections on the Revolution in France,” argues that Burke, “by remaking the well known late-eighteenth-
century figure of the Man of Feeling—a sentimental and sexual type—as a civic-minded Man of History, 
… set the central terms in which a subsequent generation of British thinkers would debate the legitimacy of 
different kinds of historical writing and the nature of historical competence” (851).  It would not be beyond 
the realm of possibility to consider that both Godwin and Scott rejected this remaking of the man of feeling 
as an historical agent and social representative of progressive change.   
10 Ian Duncan argues persuasively that Waverley constructs and legitimates a retreat from an active role in 
history to its passive, commercial consumption by the bourgeois reader.  See Duncan, Modern Romance 
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into alternately objective and passionate transmitters of the past through narratives that 
idealize the repeatable nature of the past and that are able to historicize the pathological 
destabilization of fact by romance evidenced in Godwinian history and romance.  Unlike 
the powerful cultural institutions that speak as a ventriloquist through individuals and 
leave hidden, undetectable scars in Godwin’s texts,  history is allowed to speak 
triumphantly through its agents in Scott.    
If there is a more fundamental struggle between Godwin and Scott regarding the 
nature of narrative, then, it takes place over the definition of the space outside the 
narrative and its potential disengagement or disinterest in the tale, whether historical, 
fictional or a hybrid of the two, being told.  In many ways, both Godwin and Scott 
operate within an elegiac mode regarding the possibly idyllic nature of the past, and this 
distinction regarding the space outside of narrative determines the makeup of a great deal 
of nineteenth century literature, between literary realism, things as they are, and the 
popular literature of Scott’s historical fiction as an escape from the present, or things as 
they used to be.  In Lukács’ rejection of the “bourgeois realism” of Balzac and Flaubert 
in both The Historical Novel and Theory of the Novel appears an endorsement of Scott’s 
brand of progressive historicism, an embrace of the health and “bitters” of a Marxist 
populism founded in an apologia for Scott as the Shakespeare or Swift for the proletariat, 
that nevertheless indirectly acknowledges the presence of Godwin’s revolutionary 
idealism as a danger that must always be sympathetically addressed and rejected.  
                                                                                                                                                 
and Transformations of the Novel: The Gothic, Scott, Dickens.   
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While it may be abundantly clear that Scott, the noted antiquarian, was concerned 
with the fate of literary genres from the past and their ability to communicate the 
sentiments of the present, Scott has not generally been considered as being within the 
same aesthetic horizons as Smith and Godwin.  I would like to suggest that Smith, 
Godwin and Scott are all reacting to a similar problem regarding the past and its affective 
presence in ways that are distinctly different than the transcendental forms of 
recollection, whether individual or collective, as are found in Wordsworth’s more 
“Romantic” conception of memory.  For Smith and Godwin, the question may be 
formulated as the following: how do we know that our feelings are truly our own?  
Smith’s poetic personae know their feelings through memorial traces that cannot be 
eradicated but only transmitted to others through sympathetic channels.  Wedding her 
personal biography to this poetic project, Smith demonstrates the emotional involvement 
of the real with the fictional in a way that radically destabilizes the boundary between the 
two.  This question leads, in Godwin’s moral philosophy, to deeper ethical problems: 
how ought we to mediate a retrieval of the haunting, living presence of the past in all its 
recollected immediacy?  I have already suggested that the “new” man of feeling was not, 
for Godwin, a renewed or morally upright vision of the sentimental hero, but a mocking, 
ironic vision of the man of feeling as a political enabler and a ventriloquist of sympathy 
who would give rise to the disillusioned anti-heroes of the French mal de siècle.  Yet for 
Smith and Godwin, the traditional consolations or self-forgetful distraction that literature 
seems to promise to its readers in identifying with authors, whether in elegiac poetry or 
sentimental fiction, were displaced or interrupted by history.  Fictional Gothic fears and 
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terrors, in other words, had become real  The invocation of the “new” in Smith and 
Godwin, illustrative of a kind of Gothic haunting of the present and transmission of 
fictional fear to real emotions, is very much a concern in Romantic literature of the time.  
Forgetting in Romanticism can be defined, in this sense, as a kind of alternative form of 
memory that ceaselessly attempts to record the passage of that which eludes 
consciousness, a trace of what will later be defined as evidence of trauma or shock, and a 
crisis to which recollection constantly responds.11  Predating Freud and Walter Benjamin, 
Smith and Godwin consider forgetting as a form of inscription that is fraught with 
authorial insecurity about the interpretive value of texts and that is consumed with fears 
about the dispersal of identity through the distribution of texts among an anonymous 
readership.12  Read through Hume’s consideration of the limits of human knowledge, 
Smith and Godwin turn texts into the containers of memories that cannot be opened quite 
the same way again, and that consequently that the subject inside out, exposing it to its 
own death and memorial limitations within the atemporal, eternal time of the recollected  
                                                 
11 Jon Klancher also suggests as much in his reading of Godwin’s revolutionary romances: “Godwin’s 
reflex was a moment of writing that undid the earlier moments of a reflexive argument by responding to the 
kind of contingency that is always material, unimaginable, unheard-of – that is, one’s own place and act in 
the moment of comprehending history” (165). 
12 As I have already indicated in the introduction, many attempts have been made to link together the 
psychological portraits or ‘cases’ found in Godwin’s fiction with Freud’s later work.  See Joel Falflak, 
“Speaking of Godwin's Caleb Williams: The Talking Cure and the Psychopathology of Enlightenment.” 
For Falflak, the Enlightenment produces as a side-effect of its progressive search for knowledge a 
dangerous “passion to know” that devolves into psychological sites of unconscious resistance: “Sustaining 
this state’s economy of knowledge in the (Caleb Williams), however, is a primal scene of psychoanalysis, 
governed by an ungovernable passion to know and thus to possess the other that leaves subjects perpetually 
unsatisfied. In the end, Godwin’s novel ends up reading political injustice not as the antithesis of political 
justice but as its unconscious resistance to psychoanalysis” (114, my emphasis).  It is possible to resist 
analyzing a subject who offers a discourse whose sole basis for existence is confession?  As I attempted to 
argue in my own “analysis,” Godwin’s Fleetwood gives shape to this question rather than its answer.   
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memory.13  Scott rejects this special kind of poetically or fictionally conceived container 
of traumatic memories that is not opened by the subject, allowing him or her to 
dispassionately examine its contents of past events, but that opens the subject to its own 
fragile existence.14   
Rather than giving credence to the ways in which the past can confront and 
become the obsessive focus of the present, Scott’s works provide access to a more 
                                                 
13 Both Smith and Godwin seem to augur Baudelaire’s use of memory containers in his poetry as sites of 
resistance against a radically changing world.  See Elissa Marder’s chapter on Baudelaire and Walter 
Benjamin, “Women Tell Time: Traumatic and Addictive Temporality in Les Fleurs du mal,” in Dead Time: 
Temporal Disorders in the Wake of Modernity. 
14 As Felluga has noted, Scott embraced a rhetoric of health in his texts: “Scott managed to turn the rhetoric 
nervous sensibility and disease completely around, claiming for himself and for his metrical romances a 
rhetoric of manly and invigorating health” (33).  This healthfulness is built upon a rejection of traumatic 
events, such as the French Revolution and an emerging industrial world, that Scott and his reviewers felt 
had driven readers to ennui, exasperation, “idleness and effeminacy” (33).  Referencing Coleridge’s 
formulation of a “suspension of disbelief” as a necessary precursor for engaging in the illusory works of 
fiction and poetry, Felluga considers Scott’s texts and the readers of his texts to employ a fetish-logic 
regarding the epistemological status of fiction; Felluga states that these readers would say to themselves, “I 
know very well that what I am reading is not true in stricto sensu but, nonetheless, I believe it to be ‘true’” 
(45).  The rhetoric of health emerges also in the historicizing hermeneutics of Hans-Georg Gadamer and his 
attempts, against poststructuralist and deconstructionist critics who are seen to strip texts of any access to 
meaning, to maintain a form of truth within aesthetic experience or consciousness that accrues or even 
changes over time.  In particular, Gadamer’s discussion of the “memento” in Truth and Method (1960) is 
emblematic of this healthful response to “theory:” “A memento has value as a memento only for someone 
who already – i.e., still – recalls the past.  Mementos lose their value when the past of which they remind 
one no longer has any meaning.  Furthermore, someone who not only uses mementos to remind him but 
makes a cult of them and lives in the past as if it were the present has a disturbed relation to reality” (146).  
Gadamer’s rejection of the memento is based on his perception of it as a purely signifying structure: like a 
cheap souvenir from a trip that one gradually forgets, a memento has no intrinsic value and only has 
meaning in referring to a past; in a delusive sense, it “keeps the past present for us” (146).  Against the 
memento stands the Coleridgean symbol, which is more picture than sign: “a symbol manifests the presence 
of something that really is present.”  In healthfully rejecting the memento, Gadamer rejects de Manian or 
Derridean écriture and the logic of the fetish as absent from truth and “disturbed.”  In keeping with Scott’s 
notorious ambiguity, one might say that objects may be both mementos and symbols in Scott’s historical 
fiction and verse romances; indeed, Scott’s narratives work to create symbols of the past from dangerous 
mementos by stripping from them their intrinsic violence and delusiveness.  For Scott, the way in which 
mementos are stripped of their delusive violence is through a very distinct form of reading.  Gadamer and 
Scott may agree on the fundamental and healthy necessity of this kind of work: for Gadamer, “written texts 
present the real hermeneutic task.  Writing is self-alienation.  Overcoming it, reading the text, is thus the 
highest task of understanding” (392, my emphasis).  While it would take too long to address it here, it is 
clear that de Man’s effort to expose the very concept of time itself as a memento (or, as a purely signifying 
structure without synthesis that repeats a “past” without meaningful relation to a present) in “The Rhetoric 
of Temporality” stands against Gadamer.  Yet both gesture towards the difficulty and consequent necessity 
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pleasing past that remains past through the reaffirming experience of nostalgia.  While 
Cairns and Lincoln build their cases for Scott’s imagined nations through and against 
Anderson’s imagined communities, most recent criticism regarding Scott’s poetry has to 
do with the way in which Scott constructs his books and poems as forms of media that 
give the past a more problematic life in the present.  I will argue here that Scott had a 
similar skepticism regarding the technological medium of the book and its ability to 
reproduce national or cultural memories.  The importance of the concept of media for this 
work can be discovered in the value associated with forms of technology as forms of 
mediation that have come to dominate modern aesthetic experience.  In contemporary 
Scott criticism, we might adduce a difference between two different kinds of media: 
forms of media are either technologies that store the raw data of memories in vast 
impersonal archives that threaten the very possibility of mediation itself or they provide 
glimpses into a past through amplified memories that no longer can be felt.   
While critics have discussed Scott’s concept of the book, recent work has 
attempted to understand Scott’s employment of the book as a nascent form of media.  In 
“Understanding Media in 1805: Audiovisual Hallucination in The Lay of the Last 
Minstrel,” Celeste Langan argues that Scott produces the origin of blank verse as a 
“blank and silent screen” upon which different poetic genres produce sound effects and 
almost hallucinatory visions that are difficult to retrospectively understand in our own 
more highly integrated audiovisual world.15  For Langan, “the fully residual status of 
sound,” or the silent reading of poetry in 1805, “is constitutive of the poetry of print 
                                                                                                                                                 
of “reading.”               
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culture” (62).  Scott’s Lay “suggests how blank verse--invented to translate the "dead 
letters" of Latin poetry into vernacular language--comes to define a literary vernacular 
that signals, evokes, or mediates, rather than records, the aural component of poetry. We 
fully understand the point of Scott's nostalgic evocation of an oral poetic tradition, in 
other words, only in recognizing how the print medium turns all verse into a blank and 
silent screen” (63).  Langan invokes Samuel Weber’s notion of the mediauratic, 
indicative of Scott’s poetic technique of putting past forms of poetry to use in a poem that 
is merely their silent vehicle.16  According to Weber, the mediauratic is constituted by 
“auratic flashes and shadows that are not just produced and reproduced by the media but 
which are themselves the media, since they come to pass in places that are literally inter-
mediary, in the interstices of a process of reproduction and of recording … that is above 
all a mass movement of collection and dispersion” (106).  In other words, the minstrel of 
Scott’s Lay is a kind of mechanistic poetic recorder (“I say the tale as 'twas said to me”) 
who plays back the poem that he has heard before with a passion that is neither fully his 
own nor those represented within the poem.   
Pushed to a limit, Scott’s last minstrel no longer represents a human individual 
with an actual voice recalling his own history, but a kind of transcription machine that 
repeats what it has never really “heard.”  Installed within the overarching frame narrative, 
is this the model of the author that Scott wishes to construct, a ventriloquized amplifier of 
the tale that was told to him or her, someone who passively participates in the 
continuation of a past that has no (or no longer has) real meaning for him or her outside 
                                                                                                                                                 
15 Celeste Langan, “Understanding Media in 1805: Audiovisual Hallucination in The Lay of the Last 
Minstrel,” Studies in Romanticism (Spring 2001; 40 (1)). 
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of its passionate re-telling?  Or, is the author as “last” minstrel as he no longer has a fit 
audience for his work and merely (re)performs for an audience in search of the aura of 
nostalgic remembrance?  For Scott, the author performs both functions.   
While Scott’s minstrel is the repository of feudal tales that are in the process of 
being forgotten, then, from a more skeptical perspective, the minstrel is a model of 
authorship that takes up and stores tales whose nostalgic aura is diminishing.  Felluga 
discusses the notion of the Benjaminian aura in relation to Scott, but the notion that the 
aura is fundamentally reductive to a form of nostalgia should be viewed with skepticism.  
Weber states, in discussing Benjamin’s conception of the film camera, “the recording 
apparatus, whether visual or auditory, ‘takes up’ everything but never looks back, never 
returns the glance.  Instead, what it does is to arrest and separate and reproduce the ‘here-
and-now’ again and again in a proliferating series of images which go here and there.  
The ‘time’ of reproducibility is that of this ‘posthumously shocked,’ immobilized, 
dispersed, recollected and finally forgotten moment” (100).  Promising to grant 
sympathetic access to a past through his voice, a perfect recording that mimics the 
iterability of the book, the minstrel of the Lay augurs a Heideggerian technology that 
makes of everything raw material for its processes.  In Benjaminian terms, as elucidated 
by Weber, the minstrel who perfectly recounts the past for any audience, an audience 
fundamentally anonymous, is already representative of the sense that “aura thrives in its 
decline.”  In other words, forms of human communication, found in “authentic,” face-to-
face meaningful dialogue, are valued most highly in a society in which these forms of 
                                                                                                                                                 
16 Samuel Weber, Mass mediauras: Form, Technics, Media (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996).  
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communication are vanishing, even as the technological reproducibility of 
communication contributes to and indeed sustains this vanishing that never quite fades 
away.  For Langan, the illusion of intimate communication is found in the homogenous 
world of print culture. 
As the title of Langan’s article suggest, her vision of silent reading and the “fully 
residual status of sound” in Scott’s poetry owes a great deal to Frederic Kittler’s 
deconstruction of modern forms of technology.17  For Langan and Kittler, the past and its 
aesthetic categories are transformed through “discourse networks.” Modern media are 
recording and “storage mechanisms” that place the past into an undifferentiated archive.  
Kittler suggests that the digitization of data “will erase the very concept of medium” and 
reduce “sound and image … to surface effects, known to consumers as interface.  Sense 
and the senses turn into eyewash” (1-2).  To cite examples: we have already seen how 
Charlotte Smith’s melancholic verse has become a kind of “eyewash” for many critics, 
and who find that the relentless melancholy of her poetry generates an illegibility, or, a 
feeling of readerly anesthesia: according to Jerome McGann, we have simply forgotten 
how to read these poems.  We have also seen, in Fleetwood, the play between different 
tropes and narrative elements of sentimental novels, reinforcing a perception that the 
narrative “voice” of Fleetwood works to turn these archived gestures to well-known 
sentimental passages into figures into which Fleetwood may endlessly reconstruct 
authentic feelings through a Nietzschean “active forgetting.”  Fleetwood no longer uses 
the discourse of sentiment to express his sympathetic feelings for mankind, but, in an 
                                                 
17 See Frederic Kittler, Discourse Networks, 1800/1900 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992). 
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inversion, uses his misanthropic failure to feel the suffering of others into a permanent 
locus of self-analysis that substitutes for the absence of feeling.   
While Langan privileges the archival nature of Scott’s poems, the work of Peter 
Manning, Jonathan Crary, Jay Clayton, and Margaret Russett suggest that the 
technological media analyzed by Kittler are limited to the visual field.18  Responding to 
Langan, Peter Manning argues that, in Scott’s day, “the aural component of poetry, 
whatever the genre or verse form, remained significant.”   He continues, saying that the 
innovation of silently reading allowed poetry to be “freed to develop the sound quality of 
the verse itself. It is not that the readers gain access to the mediated, narratively evoked 
scene of the poem so much as they gain access to the immediate music of the text itself. 
Freed from the exigency of communication, sound patterns become ever more intricate 
and various. The medium does not become invisible, but ever more prominent, a 
Jakobsonian intensification that proceeds from the chants of Wordsworth or Coleridge 
toward the virtuoso effects of Tennyson and Swinburne, Browning and Hopkins.”  
Margaret Russett argues that Coleridge’s attempt to find a legal basis for original, poetic 
“voice” is counterbalanced by his debt to Scott, who retroactively gives a sense of 
authority to Christabel in the Lay: “Coleridge's debt to Scott consists in the deferred 
action that locates voice in transmission rather than expressive origin.”  More than a loss 
of Coleridge’s authentic voice in repetition, Scott confers authority on what came before 
                                                 
18 Peter Manning, "The birthday of typography": A Response to Celeste Langan', Studies in Romanticism, 
40 (2001), 71-83; Jonathan Crary, Techniques of the Observer: On Vision and Modernity in the Nineteenth 
Century (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998); Jay Clayton, Dickens in Cyberspace: The Afterlife of the 
Nineteenth Century in Postmodern Culture (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003;  Margaret Russett, 
“Meter, Identity, Voice: Untranslating Christabel,” SEL:Studies in English Literature 1500-1900, 43.4, 
(2003) 773-797. 
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by displacing and repeating it.  The very act of reading, then, confers authority on the text 
that one is in the process of reading because the reader is in thrall to the text’s 
“glamourous” power.  Jay Clayton, discussing the “voice in the machine” of audio 
technology, argues “the history of telegraph confounds (Kittler’s) assumptions by 
showing that information, which even in the nineteenth-century could be decoded 
optically or acoustically, had profoundly different impacts, depending on how it was 
apprehended.  The choice of interface for the telegraph had effects on the body, which 
influenced both the meaning of the message.  If visual data processing seemed to 
reinforce the growing abstraction of modern life, acoustic processing produced odd 
sensations that ran counter to normative trends” (39).  In sum, Clayton agrees with Crary, 
stating that a “failure to consider the difference between acoustics and optics in 
communication networks as distorted much contemporary thinking about media” (40).    
 
The Lay of the Last Minstrel and the Book of Memory 
The “lay” of the Lay of the Last Minstrel creates a distinction between the past 
and the present on the level of nationalism through an evocation of a border world, a 
feudal time in which allegiances are formed according to clan and loyalty, rather than any 
general interests in an imaginary community.  According to Andrew Lincoln, in Scott’s 
description of William Deloraine, the knight who will fetch the magic book for the Lady 
of Branksome to avenge her husband’s death, the characteristic that is most valued in him 
is his local knowledge of the countryside:  
A stark moss-trooping Scott was he,  
As e'er couch'd Border lance by knee;  
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Through Solway sands, through Tarras moss,  
Blindfold, he knew the paths to cross;  
By wily turns, by desperate bounds,  
Had baffled Percy's best blood-hounds; 
In Eske or Liddell, fords were none,  
But he would ride them, one by one;  
Alike to him was time or tide,  
December's snow, or July's pride;  
Alike to him was tide or time,  
Moonless midnight, or matin prime;  
Steady of heart, and stout of hand,  
As ever drove prey from Cumberland;  
Five times outlawed had be been,  
By England's King, and Scotland's Queen19  (I, ii, 215-30) 
 
For the Lady, Deloraine is valuable because he understands the physical geography of the 
country.  The Minstrel describes him as “steady” as well in that the passage of time is all 
“alike” to him, privileging the fact that he inhabits the world around him through a dense 
network of intimate knowledge of the land and local allegiances.  Like the other knights 
in the poem, there isn’t really an ideal of the Scottish nation even when the English begin 
arriving at the border, as they come together through their accustomed manner that 
reflects Deloraine’s own structures of loyalty and friendship: “Young Gilbert, let our 
beacon blaze, / Our kin, and clan, and friends to raise.  (III, xxvii,17-8).”  Like the first 
authorial footnote to the poem, which evokes a complicated genealogy from the present 
back to the past through kings, noted at a point in which we are told of the death of a 
king, interestingly enough, the poem connects the nobility and heroism of the feudal past 
with the modern present of the book and the naturalized position of the Minstrel’s songs 
                                                 
19 Walter Scott, “The Lay of the Last Minstrel,” in The Poetical Works of Sir Walter Scott (Ware, 
Hertfordshire: Wordsworth Editions, 1995). 
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through a local understanding of the nation as a community of individual relationships 
that transcends general interests of a civic nature. 
This timeless character of Deloraine and the interlaced loyalties of his feudal 
world, seen here in counterdistinction to the two nations of England and Scotland, are 
transported forward, through the poem, to the Minstrel who, in the modern world, 
inhabits and defines the safe distance between the present and the past.  The presence of 
the Minstrel, according to Scott, is necessary because he acts as a intermediary in a 
literary sense: “the Poem was put into the mouth of an ancient Minstrel, the last of the 
race, who, as he is supposed to have survived the Revolution, might have caught 
somewhat of the refinement of modern poetry, without losing the simplicity of his 
original model.”  He is a literary border character, which befits his ultimate residence at 
the wall of Newark tower, where, like a book, in fact, he endlessly repeats his tale: 
“shelter’d wanderers, by the blaze, / Oft heard the tale of other days; / For much he loved 
to ope his door, / And give the aid he begg’d before.  So pass’d the winter’s day;” (VI, 
xxxii).  Initially, then, the Minstrel will give “the aide he begg’d before” to other 
wanderers; this act of charity can also be seen as a metaphor of the local loyalties that the 
Minstrel has for others like him, who, for whatever reason, do not fit into the world they 
inhabit and reenacting in summary fashion the world of the poem.  Yet later in this 
description, the Minstrel is seen to sing his song to “the rapt traveler (who) would stay, / 
forgetful of the closing day” (VI, xxxii), moving towards the end of he poem itself, in 
which the older Minstrels sing: “So sweet was Harold’s piteous lay, / Scarce mark’d the 
guests the darken’d hall” (VI, xxiv, 1-2).  Here, the “rapt traveler” is distinct from the 
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wanderer, in that the traveler is going somewhere and is delayed, literally caught in 
rapture, by the tale.  Finally, the Minstrel sings to “noble youths, (who for) the strain to 
hear, / Forsook the hunting of the deer” (VI, xxxii).  Here, the poem has come full circle, 
in that these noble youths imagine themselves as Deloraine, not hunting deer in a park, 
but out on the border, driving “prey from Cumberland.”  The imagined communion with 
the past through the projection of the listener into a timeless character in the poem is no 
longer seen as a part of a necessary charity, as with the wanderers, nor as a pleasant 
delay, as with the travelers, but as a substitution of luxury goods, hunting in a park or 
listening to a tale, conferring on the latest listener a sense of imagined loyalty with the 
characters of the past.   
Before proceeding along this line, we ought also to recall that the Minstrel is also 
the first listener in the poem: in an important aside during the description of Melrose 
Abbey, where Deloraine has been sent to retrieve the sorcerer Michael Scott’s magic 
book, the Minstrel states, “I cannot tell how the truth may be; / I say the tale as 'twas said 
to me.”  Scott marks the Minstrel, here and elsewhere, as a border figure, one who 
inhabits both worlds; even though Scott locates the tale “in the mouth” of the Minstrel, 
with Scott acting as ventriloquist, the description of the Minstrel’s necessity is hedged 
with uncertainty in order to shelter an unambiguous transfer from Scott to the Minstrel.  
The Minstrel is a singer of songs to a specific, historical audience, and Scott is a writer 
who creates both textual and goblin pages.  We will return to the reason as to why Scott 
may have distanced himself slightly from the Minstrel, but it is important to note here 
that the Minstrel is already encoded as a border character himself, one who is caught 
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between the past and the present, and, as we shall see, is precisely like a reader who has a 
hard time seeing both together. 
Who is this Minstrel?  According to Jane Millgate, Scott had very particular ideas 
as to how the Minstrel should appear, as the original book was to contain illustrations of 
him: in a letter, Scott states, “the Minstrel should wear over his dress what we call a 
Maud or Low Country plaid.  It is a long piece of cloth about a yard wide wrapd loosely 
round the waist like a scarf and from thence brought across the breast and thrown over 
the left shoulder where it hangs loose something like a Spanish Cloak.  It is not of Tartan 
but of the natural color of the wool with a very small black check which gives it a grayish 
look.”20  In this picture, one can imagine the Minstrel as something of a Gothic figure, 
wearing “something like a Spanish Cloak” with “a grayish look,” yet locating this 
character as a Low Country Scot.    
Why would Scott give the Minstrel this Gothic attire?  Perhaps it was meant to 
demonstrate how the Minstrel is an almost supernatural figure, who grows young in the 
telling of the tale that possesses him and begins to appear different to his female listeners; 
it may also mark him as a transmitter of the past that cannot be wholly trusted.  In the 
famous beginning to the sixth canto, we can see that the idea of loyalty and feudal 
allegiance is transferred from people to a more ambiguous notion of “the land,” one that 
is made of “Land of brown heath and shaggy wood, /Land of the mountain and the flood, 
/Land of my sires!”  
Breathes there the man, with soul so dead, 
                                                 
20 Jane Millgate, “Scott’s Lay of the Last Minstrel: The History of a Book,” European Romantic Review 13 
(2002),  227. 
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Who never to himself hath said,  
This is my own, my native land!  
Whose heart hath ne'er within him burn'd,  
As home his footsteps he hath turn'd,  
From wandering on a foreign strand!  
If such there breathe, go, mark him well;  
For him no Minstrel raptures swell;  
High though his titles, proud his name,  
Boundless his wealth as wish can claim;  
Despite those titles, power, and pelf,  
The wretch, concentred all in self,  
Living, shall forfeit fair renown,  
And, doubly dying, shall go down  
To the vile dust, from whence he sprung,  
Unwept, unhonor'd, and unsung.  
 
O Caledonia! stern and wild,  
Meet nurse for a poetic child!  
Land of brown heath and shaggy wood,  
Land of the mountain and the flood,  
Land of my sires! what mortal hand  
Can e'er untie the filial band,  
That knits me to thy rugged strand!  
Still as I view each well-known scene,  
Think what is now, and what hath been,  
Seems as, to me, of all bereft,  
Sole friends thy woods and streams were left;  
And thus I love them better still,  
Even in extremity of ill.  
By Yarrow's stream still let me stray,  
Though none should guide my feeble way;  
Still feel the breeze down Ettrick break,  
Although it chill my wither'd cheek:  
Still lay my head by Teviot Stone,  
Though there, forgotten and alone,  
The Bard may draw his parting groan. (VI, i, 1-35) 
 
The neutral, descriptive location of the Minstrel’s home is quite different than the land of 
Deloraine, which is explicitly tied to specific locations.  The kinds of boundaries erected 
within Deloraine’s world, which cross given borders in order to establish local limits of 
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knowledge, is lost to the Minstrel, who gives signs and indications of not being of 
Deloraine’s world, but of the more modern world.   The place-name of “Caledonia” does 
not act to center the world of the Minstrel in any real, present-day location, but it does 
exhibit the Minstrel’s difficulty in imagining a home, a “land of my sires,” in the past.  
While it is linked symbolically with the attempt to shift the poem away from a Celtic, 
British past, it is also linked with the Roman origin of the word, which names the land 
through reference to a single tribe rather than groups of tribes, as well as subjection to an 
imperial rule.  The double-vision of the “well-known scene,” viewed in the past and the 
present and to see things that aren’t there, gives a visionary quality to the Minstrel, yet 
the imaginary location of the scene is stressed through the uneasy rhyme of the scene 
with “what hath been.”   
If, as Langan has argued, the medium of the poem, the page, acts more in Scott’s 
hands as a telegraphic carrier of information when the poem becomes the book,  then the 
poem itself cannot advocate this change as anything less than a catastrophic fall and a 
loss of bearings for those caught in the change.  Discussing Benedict Anderson’s 
Imagined Communities, Marc Redfield makes the following commentary on Hegel’s 
notion of the arbitrariness of the sign and the “radical anonymity” of the subject of the 
nation founded on the enforced recognition of an arbitrary sign as the site of excessively 
symbolic national origins: 
The signs of nationhood – the flags and emblems that, according to Hegel, in their 
sheer arbitrariness demonstrate the mind’s creative power – serve the cause of 
misrecognition insofar as they transform a semiotic function (linguistic 
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arbitrariness) into an image – an image of the nation as will, or better, of the 
nation as imagi-nation.  The arbitrariness of the sign and the radical anonymity 
that marks the possibility of the sign’s apprehension are thus figured as a 
sensuous experience and becomes sublime intuition of the nation as this flag, 
anthem, building, cultural monument.  Sensuous tokens of lack, … these signs are 
in a quite precise sense the fetishes of an imagined nation.21   
Overarching the entire poem’s appeal, and underwriting Scott’s risk in creating the book, 
then, depends upon Scott’s ability to conjure up a decisive break from a feudal past 
while, at the same time, making it appear aesthetically desirable as a vague point of 
origin from which the present might come together as a nation in its wake.  It is a risky 
slight of hand that places the present in line with the past, and the past into a printed page 
to be circulated, yet perhaps not in the same sense as the beacons of war blaze in the 
poem itself, where we “let our beacon blaze, / Our kin, and clan, and friends to raise;” 
rather, it offers nostalgic site of national consciousness to be read by others outside of 
particular borders, or who have different interests in reading.  Margaret, one of the lovers 
of the marriage plot of the poem, who is dreaming on the western star and playing her 
lute, for “lovers love the western star,” seemingly and harmlessly misreads one of the 
beacon fires.  Yet, she looks again, and asks, “Is yon red glare the western star? / O, 'tis 
the beacon-blaze of war!”  What is it that allows Margaret to very fortunately recognize 
her misrecognition?   The deceptiveness of the lute and its music makes Margaret see 
differently, initially; it makes her experience a signal to rouse the nation as a reflection of 
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her own forbidden love, one that is as arbitrarily willed (“lovers love the western star”) as 
the beacon fires themselves, which have no other origin save in unremembered tradition 
and mechanical repetition.  Individual concern, here, and personal interest, much like the 
individual loyalties of the clan, must be placed beneath the threat of national war, but 
there is no real basis for that recognition except Margaret’s strange and willed re-reading.  
Or is it the Minstrel?  Again, we are unsure, as the Minstrel distances himself from 
authorship as much as Scott distances himself from the Minstrel. 
As a highly controlled and marketed synesthesia, the Lay of the Last Minstrel is 
essential to an understanding of Keats’ poetic technique, the ‘negative capability’ of his 
art and, as such, a more healthy “vulgarity” than that which was attributed to Keats by his 
contemporary reviewers; in this sense, Scott could be a part of a historical moment in 
which antiquarianism, as a kind of personal taste for antiquities, is merely willed into 
what Adorno has called “museum culture” as a complex site of national memory and the 
mourning of our past.  Certainly, Keats’ poems are more richly invested with objects that 
have a profoundly dispossessive effect on subjectivity, yet Scott anticipates this 
problematic through an imagined reading of the past of the nation and its (strangely) 
more concrete, more present, and therefore threatening, status than our present.   
In the end, the Lay performs a complex interplay between the various texts within 
the book.  Langan’s insightful reading into Scott’s poem resists these possibilities, and 
deconstructs her own argument, by stating that the book within the text is the key to a 
reading of the Lay: “though the nested narrative structure of the poem might seem to lead 
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us ever inward, the blank at the poem’s center turns the inside out, so to speak, and 
suggests the relevance of another medium – the telegraph, not the book – as a possible 
structural paradigm” (66).  Langan fails to realize that using the telegraph as a structural 
image, or, for that matter, the sublime and monumentally “nested narrative structure,” are 
already idealized images of the book as the site of a historical change from the oral to the 
written, from the spoken to the printed, or, in other words, as a problematic, telegraphic 
model of human consciousness.  Troubling figures of that transfer are found throughout 
the poem, and, indeed, struggle against each other: from the goblin page who has no 
loyalties except to his own desire to “(omit) still / no opportunity of ill,” to the daughter 
who refuses to follow her mother’s wishes, to the Minstrel himself, characters see what 
they wish to see.  If the telegraph is working in this poem, then it acts as a transfer both 
into and out of the poem; the book moves the reader into the two worlds of the past 
through idealization and imagination while, at the same time, drawing into doubt how 
that synthetic ideal is effected through the material presentation of historical information, 
planned images, etc., in the book itself.  The past of the Lay is already burdened with the 
misrecognition that subtends aesthetic self-forgetfulness through the project of desire.   
In this sense, Scott’s expensive, tightly controlled productions are tied up with the 
economic possibility of feeling a deep connection with an imaginary, invisible nation.     
Here, we may come full circle towards the ways that the material presentation of 
the text returns to a particular origin: the local knowledge and structure of loyalties that 
work in opposition to, yet are shown as leading towards, a more general sense of 
nostalgia for the nation and that mark the feudal consciousness in the poem are translated 
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into the book.  The past becomes interiorized as our past because we recognize it in the 
present, or because we value the pleasant, imaginary dissolution it offers our gaze, and 
this marks a particular, if hallucinogenic, limit to the object status of the past.  While the 
subject can still be loyal to general interests of the nation in times of strife, as the 
Napoleonic Wars and potential invasion provided for Scott’s Scotland, the personal past 
is cordoned off and contained by the book, not as a space that is acknowledged as set 
apart from the general interests of the nation, but as an aesthetic substitution of that 
space.  In this sense, Scott, Scotland and the book itself, straddle an imagined line 
between the past and the present, between England and France, between the old loyalties 
and the historically contingent need to be organized as a nation.  Lukács’s historical 
necessity, written into the traumatic experience of its subjects, emerges as an idea 
contained by history.  If it is a telegraphic carrier of information from the past, the book 
also acts as a kind of relay system within which the imagination is free to work in the 
past.   
So, what we might be able to say with more certainty is that these modes of 
reading the book always seems to come after the book itself; the telegraph, the relays, the 
imaginary, symbolic, figural, and so forth, must posit the book as a site of transcendental 
consciousness, and not mere mechanical transcribing and endless iteration.  Like many of 
Scott’s books, the Lay is itself already an anthology acting as a knowledgeable collection 
that ironically distances itself from itself, a recollection of different modes and genres, 
and of “descriptions of manners” from the past.  The passionate, ideological attachment 
to the nation as a mode of mystical or magical possession by the past, as evidence of an 
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unbroken Burkean inheritance that speaks through and embodies the present, is 
transformed into a possession of the past.  The text of the Lay becomes a site of 
seemingly benign amnesia that requires a kind of proper tuning into the past as it is 
broadcast.    
 In this chapter, I have contended that Scott’s employs partial amnesia and the 
selective forgetting of the physical or material past in the Lay of the Last Minstrel 
beneath the restoration of a “healthy” recording of history as nostalgia in order to “cure” 
the revolutionary melancholy of the late eighteenth-century, understood by Scott to have 
developed from a use of reason that had been tainted by a diseased imagination and the 
loss of historical perspective.  Whether or not one agrees with the exigency of Scott’s 
displacement of the recent, revolutionary past outside the boundaries of the nation and 
well-defined domestic spaces, it seems clear that Scott was himself aware of the effects 
of his narrative’s tendencies to remove both the perceived threats of revolution or 
invasion and those elements of the past that he seems to value.  The value of the quasi-
bourgeois world that Waverley enters at the conclusion to their Bildungsroman-like 
narratives can be discovered in the losses that accrue between the intimate acquaintance 
that the Lay’s Deloraine has with a physically known space at the Anglo-Scottish border 
and the vaguely defined sense of allegiance to a “Caledonia” that the Minstrel feels for 
his “native land;”  in other words, written into the modern world as Scott perceives it is 
both a memory of the principles that it has retained from the past, both loyalty and 
violence, and its necessary forgetting.  Ian Duncan and Marilyn Orr have developed 
insightful arguments that the ideological trajectory of the Waverley novels leads towards 
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the legitimation of the reading practices that seek to define the novels themselves.22  If 
these novels are, in the words of Ian Duncan, “consumed” (15), then Scott also seems to 
understand that the consumption of historical fiction is, like the disease, also a signal of 
historical decay, wasting away and waste.   
Is this dual consumption of the romance both within and of Scott’s texts a 
consumption, or wasting away, of their aura of authenticity as well?  Or, as Weber has 
suggested regarding the aura, does authenticity thrive in its decline, and is this decline 
productive of nostalgia?  As Langan seems to suggest, the hallucinatory play of an in-
between time, the time of tuning into the past from the present within the present, takes 
place on a blank screen of partial amnesia in which reading is a touring and turning of the 
past into the present.  Scott represents within his poems appeals to both an aristocratic 
group of readers, as in the group of listeners in the Lay, and to popular crowds, as in 
representation of the pageantry and entertainment in the feudal games in The Lady of the 
Lake.  As Andrew Lincoln has suggested, Scott seems to hedge his recasting of history 
with an acknowledgment that his own texts may themselves become the stuff of mere 
entertainment and fantasy: “Scott … insists on the deceptive nature of romance 
imaginings, and emphasizes their distance from the contemporary world even as he 
suggests their relevance to that world” (6, my emphasis).  If we keep in mind the 
arguments of Langan and Felluga, who both employ Benjamin’s notion of the aura in a 
discussion of Scott’s development of a poetic technology that illusively mediates an 
immediate apperception of sensory experience, the question of distance that Lincoln uses 
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in a discussion of Scott’s poems becomes crucial.  Indeed, Benjamin states that the aura 
of a work of art is that which absorbs attention and, consequently, develops the notion of 
the individual reader or spectator: “a man who concentrates before a work of art is 
absorbed by it.  He enters into this work of art the way legend tells of the Chinese painter 
when he viewed his finished painting” (239). 23 As Rodolphe Gasché has noted, 
“concentration, contemplation, absorption presuppose a single spectator, or very few, 
who in front of the authentic, authoritative artwork lack the power to control themselves 
or each other.”24  
This depiction of the individual who has fallen into the artwork that he has created 
calls to mind Godwin’s Fleetwood, in fact, who finds it hard to discover the difference 
between the representations he has crafted and the reality to which they fail to fully refer.  
Mesmerized by the working of his imagination, Fleetwood is alternately fascinated by 
and repelled from the fictions he creates about his past.  His use of memory to recall 
moments of self-forgetfulness, or moments from the past to which he must lay claim even 
as he tries to alienate himself from the feeling he associates with these events, establishes 
a distance between himself and his memories.  Indeed, Fleetwood’s projects his 
memories upon an alluring, powerful blank screen that transforms feelings of guilt into a 
kind of guilt-less consumption of his own past.  This literal absorption of the powers of 
temporal distance as the powers of the imagination leaves its traces in Fleetwood’s text, 
marked out on its surface in moments of self-forgetful usage of other texts and other 
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voices, beneath which Fleetwood absconds his past.  Recollecting the frequent allusions 
to Milton, Fleetwood’s hopes to find an appropriate audience ironically, given that the 
possibility of finding a sympathetic audience from among an anonymous reading public 
that he would in all likelihood hold in the greatest contempt, Fleetwood is perhaps 
doomed to be the only sympathetic reader of his confessions.  Indeed, we might suppose 
this perspective is a sublimated version of Godwin’s own feelings of betrayal and 
bitterness; thought of as a fall from political prominence to being a marketer of children’s 
fiction, Godwin may also have felt more than a slight contempt for the readers of his day.   
Scott’s use of the aura, on the other hand, dresses this absorptive sense of 
individual experience with the character of heroes of the past who become unconscious 
victims to a society that is unaware that their consumption of entertaining fictions 
ultimately dooms their real presence.  In other words, it is because we recollect forgotten 
pasts that they cannot return or exist as such in the present.  In a passage from The Lady 
of the Lake, Roderick Dhu, the sympathetic anti-hero of Scottish nationalism and a 
Highland chieftain, is mortally wounded and captured by the disguised British king.  In 
his prison cell, he asks the minstrel of his enemy to sing songs of ancient battles.  The 
minstrel looks towards Roderick as he is playing and discovers that he has died during 
the singing: 
Oft had he stolen a glance, to spy 
How Roderick brooked his minstrelsy: 
At first, the Chieftain, to the chime, 
With lifted hand kept feeble time; 
That motion ceased,--yet feeling strong 
Varied his look as changed the song; 
At length, no more his deafened ear 
The minstrel melody can hear; 
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His face grows sharp,--his hands are clenched' 
As if some pang his heart-strings wrenched; 
Set are his teeth, his fading eye 
Is sternly fixed on vacancy; 
Thus, motionless and moanless, drew 
His parting breath stout Roderick Dhu!-- 
Old Allan-bane looked on aghast, 
While grim and still his spirit passed; 
But when he saw that life was fled, 
He poured his wailing o'er the dead. (VI, xxi, 590-607) 
 
This remarkable passage describing the death of Roderick as the death of a hero, in many 
respects, describes the gradual decay of his senses and fading out of his figure for both 
the reader and the minstrel, Allan-bane: he loses an ability to keep time with the song, 
which prefaces his loss of hearing and loss of vision, to his loss of motion and speech, 
and, finally, to Allan-bane’s Gothic witnessing the “still” passage of his spirit.  While 
Roderick may see himself as a hero of old, he is absorbed by the poetic meter: in a 
moment of self-conscious reflection, Scott calls attention to his own work as a poet, 
overlapping Allan-bane’s song with his own, such that “to the chime, / With lifted hand 
kept feeble time.”  Russett has noted in her reading of Scott’s seeming indebtedness to 
Coleridge’s Christabel that it is Coleridge, in fact, who owes a debt to Scott: “Coleridge's 
debt to Scott consists in the deferred action that locates voice in transmission rather than 
expressive origin. Understood in this way, the concept points as much to the empirical 
author's absence as to any assumption of presence—and to the reconstitution of 
subjectivity as a formalism that is nothing but this history of transmission” (791-2).  The 
transmission of the minstrel’s lay in the scene involving Roderick Dhu signals Roderick’s 
allegiance to the songs of old and to the minstrel.  How does this take place?  Listening to 
205 
Allan-bane is represented in this sense through Roderick’s ability, even on the verge of 
losing his life, to keeping time.  Almost unconsciously, Scott’s representation of 
Roderick’s death-scene writes him into the noble history that absorbs his (temporal) 
attention.  Roderick keeps time as much as time will keep him by writing him into Scott’s 
own verse. 
While the great emotional poignancy of the scene is found in the death of the hero 
and Allan-bane’s lament, it is also found in the “feeble time” that Roderick manages to 
keep.  Mortally wounded, of course, one would imagine Roderick waving his hand lightly 
in the air.  Yet Scott also signals that Roderick is already and sadly a part of the historical 
time that finds it difficult to keep time with the past; Scott indicates this in the passages 
that describe the crowd’s absent-minded enjoyment of the pageantry of the fair and the 
story of Robin Hood and Friar Tuck: “Now, in the Castle-park, drew out / Their 
checkered bands the joyous rout. / There morricers, with bell at heel / And blade in hand, 
their mazes wheel; / But chief, beside the butts, there stand / Bold Robin Hood and all his 
band,-- / Friar Tuck with quarterstaff and cowl” (5:22, 1-7).  In the scene of Roderick’s 
death, Scott demonstrates how a heroic figure is carried away by the song he hears and 
responds to its meter in a moment that confirms his heroic stature through his response to 
the song; in the pageant scene, Scott provides readerly self-confirmation by including a 
textual footnote that explains the origins of the festival and contest involving Robin 
Hood.   
Scott’s representation of heroic verse as employing meter as a way to confirm its 
continuation through self-forgetful, unconscious identification through repetition is offset 
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by the gesture towards an explanatory footnote for a form of popular entertainment.  
Scott seems to mournfully acknowledge an oscillatory, readerly rhythm, into and out of 
the body of the poem, that keeps time with the limits of his own strangely bifurcated 
textual apparatus: historical knowledge that responds to its own absence in the 
representation of popular entertainment in the wake of the hero’s real, physical and 
irrecoverable demise in Scott’s own “feeble time.”  In many respects, Godwin would 
agree with Scott’s assessment of the “feeble time” of their era, yet they express this 
disaffection differently.  Although Godwin confronts the political and moral apathy of his 
audience head-on from a dispassionate position that hides a bitter, self-accusatory 
misanthropy, Scott seems to disguise his own skepticism towards his audience, one that 
enjoys his work as popular entertainment as if it were a form of knowing the past, though 
his use the different frames and paratexts that accompany his tales.  Scott’s ambiguous 
disparagement of written history, in favor of the oral transmission of texts in the scene of 
Roderick’s death, can be found in his early efforts as a translator.   
In 1799, Scott translated Goethe’s Sturm und Drang drama, Götz von 
Berlichingen, and clearly meant to indicate the Fleetwood-like sentimental value of the 
narrative by designating Goethe as “Author of ‘The Sorrows of Werter’” on the title page 
of the first pressing.  According to Kenneth Weisinger, Götz is about the demise of a 
more robust feudal era during the ascendancy of an aristocratic, courtly culture that 
enforces abstract, written laws.25  The hero, Götz, decides to write his own 
autobiographical history in order to leave a trace of his life for a future that will be 
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different from his own.  Weisinger states that the scene in which Götz writes own his 
history shows how “Götz becomes fully aware of his own historical dimension and this 
awareness is as debilitating as it is illuminating. … It is a supreme act of self-
interpretation that Götz has begun to write his autobiography and the task is clearly 
uncongenial to him.  The final act of the play is a long exemplification of the fact 
presented in the last scene of Act IV (in which he writes his history): Götz is no longer 
the simply, unreflecting tool of his own will.  Götz tries to fit himself into a role of action 
in the world once again, but now victory eludes him as mysteriously as it once crowned 
his simple unreflective spontaneity” (227-8).  Unlike Götz, Roderick is spared the 
debilitation of having to write his own history.  Allan-bane surrounds Roderick with oral 
tales and songs that confirm his place in the past he wishes to inhabit.  In Scott’s Lay of 
the Last Minstrel, nostalgia and allegiance to the past are based, in this sense, on the 
fading from presence of the past as a historically known time and into the book as the 
generator and object of forgetfulness.  
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While writing his own history when imprisoned in his castle, the eponymous hero 
of Goethe’s 1773 Sturm und Drang drama, Götz von Berlichingen, expresses a sentiment 
that seems to haunt the three writers that I have discussed in this dissertation:  
This idleness is distasteful to me, and the limits imposed on me get narrower from 
day to day; I wish I could sleep, or at least deceive myself into thinking that peace 
and quiet were something pleasant. … Alas! Writing is a busy form of idleness; it 
does not bring pleasure.  When I write about what I have done, I get angry about 
the loss of time when I could still do something.”1 
For Smith, Godwin, and Scott, the connection between writing as a way to record the 
desire to forget about the present or reconfigure its meaning, and the ability to 
meaningfully and ethically act in a world that is overwhelmingly haunted by the past has 
been radically broken.  Driven by a sense of “the loss of time” or times that are, in 
Hamlet’s phrase, “out of joint,” Smith, Godwin, and Scott attempt to find distinct ways of 
preserving the feeling of being forgotten through the passage of time, as well as the 
feelings that must be forgotten in the act of recording what we may term the “loss of 
time.”  
For Charlotte Smith, pleasing oblivion and self-forgetful poetic consolation no 
longer operate in a world that seems to have passed beyond the time in which such 
consolation would be possible.  Invoking a Petrarchan spirit of paradoxical and shifting 
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positions between poetic subjectivity and objectivity that is replayed without conclusion 
and repeated over and over again in her own poems, Smith gives voice to a more radical 
forgetting that can only be heard in negating the very self-forgetful consolation that she 
seems to seek.  Her turn from the deceptive, deconstructing “long mirrors” of the Mother 
in The Emigrants to the “long murmurs” that are heard in the hearts of her future readers 
signals both an acceptance of the death of empirical memory and experience in human 
mortality as the price that must be paid for a future that would escape the self-centered 
melancholy of the Elegiac Sonnets.  In Beachy Head, the historical past becomes open to 
interpretations that must proceed without a sense of certainty or viable context.  
Considered as a reflection on the present, Smith seems to suggest that her own poems 
will have lost the feeling with which she has invested them; like the strange bivalves and 
volutes the poet discovers on the cliffs of Dover, Smith’s poems will become mysterious 
or illegible because they are merely the fragments that have survived the loss of a past, 
historical “context” which no longer exists.   
In his diatribe against Parliament, Godwin’s Fleetwood lashes out at the spirit of 
conquest, irrational violence and coldly calculating commercial interests than defines his 
time; however, in demonstrating that Fleetwood is doomed to embody these spirits in his 
own domestic space and paternal estate, Godwin gestures towards a fatal sense of 
hopelessness for the present and provides a hope for the future that can only be glimpsed 
through its negation.  The possibility of a progressive future for Godwin could not be 
clearly embraced; it was shapeless, formless, posited in an unknowable elsewhere or 
other time that could only be referenced negatively in the forgetting of the present.  
Feeling like a revolutionary who had outlived the Revolution with which he will be 
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forever associated, Godwin invested his later novels and works with a sense of ending 
that can never end enough, invoking a revolutionary consciousness that no longer had a 
revolution to fight.   
The persistence of reason in the post-Enlightenment era delivers to feeling its fate 
of being subjected to close analysis.  It is always within Fleetwood’s discretion as a judge 
to adjudicate his feelings.  Numerous studies have attempted to read Godwin’s texts 
through the lens of Freud, and there is good reason to do so.  To open up distance 
between the two, however, we might suggest that Godwin, in preceding Freud, did not 
carve out a space within which feelings or experiences from the past would be 
permanently housed; rather, to exist at all, feelings, Godwin would say, must have a 
reason because only those feelings that have been corrupted by reason can be recognized 
or made legible in their absence.  Through an imaginary relationship with Chaucer and 
the experimental “Sepulchral Atlas” as a book of impersonal memory, Godwin models a 
future reading for his own works that is based on sympathetic connection and revivified 
feelings that are not subjected to a rational forgetfulness of feeling found in the excesses 
of self-analytical inquiry that define the individual.  Feeling exceeds the control of the 
individual because feeling must always reflect on an individual who suffers torments that 
exceed understanding.  
 In the end, I hope that the authors I have studied here can be understood, as 
Godwin might have it, as giving shape to our own world and reminding us that our own 
experiences are not always our own.  Sylviane Agacinski’s Time Passing: Modernity and 
Nostalgia is a book that has inspired this study, and seems to provide a fitting final note 
to the analyses contained herein regarding the relationship of the present to the past in our 
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own time.2  For Agacinski, “each generation is called on a new to experience the test of 
time.  But what does to pass mean for us if neither eternity nor history any longer gives 
meaning to that passage?  The vertiginous effect of the worlds’ irreversibility is mitigated 
only by the possibility of enduring, which is the fruit of repetition and reproduction” 
(10).  It is technology, for Agacinski, that provides for the passage from the past to the 
present, even if it means that “our world, overpopulated by images, makes us live among 
crowds of phantoms and doubt the homogeneity of our times” (10).  For Smith, Godwin, 
and Scott, the world was indeed “overpopulated by images” and made them “live among 
crowds of phantoms.”  Yet, as Agacinski remarks, in concert with Godwin, reason alone 
cannot distinguish the real from its hallucinated images and phantoms: “as a calculating 
power, reason can serve the most sinister ambitions and is no guarantee – we know only 
too well – against any sort of madness” (163).  Given the limits of reason, Agacinski asks 
the following questions: “to be moved to reason, to feel and to judge, are these 
necessarily contradictory?  Should we reason without emotion and without any passion?” 
(163).  Rather than providing answers to these questions, I would argue that Smith, 
Godwin, and Scott all seem to pose these questions to us as urgent questions, and that 
they, like us, struggle to find the ability to keep feeling from being forgotten within the 
very forms that seem designed to preserve it.   
                                                 
2 Sylviane Agacinski, Time Passing: Modernity and Nostalgia, trans. Jody Gladding (New York: Columbia 
UP, 2003). 
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